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Abstract

AN EXPLORATION IN ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE,
CONTINGENCY AND PERFORMANCE, 2015-2017
By Siriporn Patricia Satjapot, Ph.D., MS
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in Health Related Sciences at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2020
Major Director: Laura McClelland, Associate Professor, Department of Health Administration

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 enacted one of the most
significant reforms seen in the United States healthcare landscape. The Center for Medicare
and Medicaid (CMS) led transformation efforts in regulatory reform and coverage expansion
across the U.S. population. Since 2010, care delivery systems have been shifting from episodic,
decentralized and fee-for-service models to value-based population health models, like
accountable care organizations (ACO). ACOs have been specifically primed for local response
to improve the health of their communities. ACO research has traditionally focused on
performance measures like mortality, readmissions, quality outcomes and savings. ACO
organizational characteristics analyzed in the literature have focused on provider composition,
health information technology, leadership structures and provider access. According to CMS,
readmissions account for one of the greatest contributors in healthcare spend, and studies by
The Commonwealth Fund detail the top percentile of the population as high need, high cost
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(HNHC) patients who further contribute to the majority of healthcare spend. Opportunity exists
to explore the diversity among ACO structures, their relationship to local environments and
influence on top contributors to healthcare spend, like readmissions and high need , high cost
populations.
The objectives of this study are to better understand existing ACO structures, explore
relationships among ACO organizational structures, their local environment in which they
operate and directional impact on performance, with emphasis on at risk patients like high need,
high cost populations. Theoretically, this study applies Structural Contingency Theory (SCT) for
its empirical analyses, specifically a multiple contingency approach. In the extant literature, SCT
has not been commonly applied due to its longitudinal nature and limited public access to ACO
organizational data.
The study sample consists of 45 ACOs that entered into the Medicare Shared Savings
Program under Track 1 for the entire term from 2015 to 2017. ACO performance is represented
by total shared savings, change in rate of readmissions and change in rate of inpatient
psychiatric admissions. Four contingency-structure relationships are analyzed from the National
Survey of Accountable Care Organizations and CMS Public Use Files, 1) ACO governance
structure and strategy alignment, 2) Interdependency from complex coordination and formalized
provider agreement types, 3) interdependency from complex coordination and formalized
relationships with mental and behavioral health specialists, and 4) complex coordination and
health IT integration and interoperability. Regression analyses were used to analyzed potential
misfit and directional impact on performance and the contingency-structure pairs. Results
indicate that wide variety exists among ACO structures, that conventional investments in
provider agreements and fully integrated health IT do not clearly present positive performance
effect. Future research opportunities exist to further examine the impact ACO programs have on
meeting community needs and populations.
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This study offers the theoretical application of a multiple contingency approach from
Structural Contingency Theory and a practical exploration of ACO structure, its con textual
operations and performance on high need, high cost populations.
Keywords: Accountable care organizations, structural contingency theory, organizational
design, organizational structure, high need high cost, readmissions, earned shared savings,
NSACO, value based care

Chapter 1: Introduction

In the wake of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, many healthcare
organizations and payers in the United States moved towards a value-based model for health
services delivery and reimbursement (Kaufman et al., 2017). Historically, United States care
delivery has been volume-driven and based on fee-for-service payment schemes according to
episodes of care delivered in fragmented pieces with disparate provider incentives (Martin et al.,
2016). In comparison, value-based structures, such as the Accountable Care Organization
(ACO), operate under an integrated population health delivery model that considers the total
cost of services across the care continuum (Berenson et al., 2016).
Organizations under a value-based model are incentivized to reduce unnecessary
services and focus on preventable care (Cox et al., 2016). Furthermore, studies have shown
that the greatest improvement opportunity to reduce healthcare expenditure is among the top
10% of the patient population that consumes the largest quantity of services – identified as high
need, high cost patients (HNHC) (McCarthy, Ryan, & Klein, 2015). These patients are usually
indicated by Medicare and Medicaid dual eligible status, existing chronic conditions, behavioral
issues, functional limitations and socioeconomic challenges (Dean & Grabowski, 2014; Guerard
et al., 2019). Healthcare literature cites readmissions as being the greatest performance
indicator for unnecessary spend due to breakdowns in care coordination, discharge planning,
post-acute care transitions and timely access to ambulatory care services (Chukmaitov et al.,
2018; Hines et al., 2014; Mask & Adepoju, 2018). Therefore, significant reduction in
1

unnecessary health spend may be achieved by concentrating efforts on preventing unplanned
hospital readmissions for HNHC patients.
Existing research has yet to validate that ACOs have produced sustainable
improvements and what ACO structures are optimal to reduce readmissions (Albright et al.,
2016; Comfort et al., 2018; Fisher et al., 2012). There is exploratory research being conducted
to determine if a value-based population management approach can effectively reduce national
healthcare expenditure and improve quality outcomes (Albright et al., 2016; Duggal et al., 2018).
This research will study the structural characteristics of value-based programs, specifically
Accountable Care Organizations, and their performance in preventable readmissions and total
savings earned in relation to HNHC patient populations.
Background
The US has operated mostly under a fee-for-service model of healthcare delivery; thus,
health services consumption and utilization remains high as the United States population ages,
catalyzing the need for regulatory and healthcare delivery reform. Currently, 17.9% of the US
GDP is attributed to national health expenditures, with projections by the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid (CMS) to reach 19.4% by 2027, if spending continues at its current rate (CMS,
2018). On a global scale, US health spending is highest among Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, 2019). According to the Commonwealth Fund (Squires, 2015), consumption of
health services in the United States is 50% greater than in other high-income nations, while
producing less than comparable health benefits in relation to their cohort. Efforts to implement
delivery reform are being addressed in both public and private sectors, with CMS being one of
the largest public players to affect such reform efforts (Kaufman et al., 2017).
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Population Health Key Indicators and Outcomes
CMS has implemented critical changes to regulatory, quality and financial policies to
align with population health care delivery. One major metric CMS has identified as part of
healthcare reform is the rate in which patients are re-hospitalized or readmitted within 30 days
of their hospital discharge (Kroch et al., 2015; Mask & Adepoju, 2018; Ryan et al., 2017) .
According to the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), $41.3 billion in hospital
costs were associated with 30 day all-cause readmissions, pointing to major potential for
savings (Hines et al., 2014). Patients who were re-hospitalized within 30 days of their inpatient
discharge were potentially admitted with “ambulatory care sensitive conditions [that suggested
they] could have been avoided through high-quality outpatient care or that reflect conditions that
could be less severe, if treated early and appropriately” (AHRQ, 2001). Readmissions serve as
indicators for healthcare gaps and magnitude of waste in the delivery model.
Causes for Readmissions
Extant readmissions literature consists of diverse approaches and tools focused on
readmissions reduction or prevention. For example, the Society of Hospital Medicine published
a risk assessment tool with categories identifying high risk factors that attribute to patients who
are more susceptible to being readmitted within 30 days of discharge if not addressed
appropriately or in a timely manner. This tool, called BOOST 8Ps, uses a methodology that
addresses social and clinical determinants of health, such as problematic medications,
polypharmacy needs, psychological care, primary diagnoses for chronic care management,
patient support needs, prior hospitalizations, poor health literacy and palliative care needs
(Hansen et al., 2013).
Several studies have analyzed readmission root causes and effects on patient
outcomes, such as provider coordination during transitions of care (Mileski et al., 2017;
3

Takahashi et al., 2016; Winblad et al., 2017). Winblad and colleagues identify one cause being
communication breakdowns from inpatient discharge to post-acute settings, like a skilled
nursing facility (SNF), that result in readmissions. The authors compared hospitals affiliated or
not-affiliated with ACOs on targeting at-risk patients and communication platforms between
facilities. The research showed that hospitals affiliated with ACOs had significantly better
processes in identifying patients at-risk for readmissions, enhanced information sharing and
greater communication between hospitals and SNFs. Such enhanced processes are dependent
on the technological capabilities of health service providers and organizations to promote care
continuity. This is especially important for patients with higher needs and complexity requiring
intensive care coordination. Traditionally, models of care and cost evaluations have been
focused at the inpatient setting, but with the move towards value-based care, the scope of
managing patients with high risks for readmissions expands to the ambulatory and post -acute
setting (Berry et al., 2013)
Populations at Greatest Risk for Readmissions. A large concentration of
readmissions is centered on a small population (top 10% of Medicare patients) with few chronic
diagnoses, heart failure, septicemia and pneumonia, representing $4.3 billion in hospital costs
(Hines et al., 2014; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2019). Often
referenced as an inverse pyramid, 5% of the adult populations accessing health car e in the
United States are identified as patients with the highest need and producing the highest costs
(Bélanger et al., 2019; Blumenthal, 2017). Opportunities, therefore, exist in developing a
healthcare delivery model that bridges care gaps and focuses on chronic disease populations at
highest risk for readmissions.
Public Health Program Efforts that Address High Risk for Readmission Patients.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act implemented several federal programs to begin
4

structural alignment with changes to healthcare regulatory reform. One such program that has
gained significant momentum and attention is the accountable care organization (ACO) model.
ACOs were established in 2010 in order to build a patient-centered community among providers
across all settings of care through population health management (Fisher & Shortell, 2010; Sen
et al., 2018). Essentially, ACOs are groups of providers collectively held responsible for a
defined population, (described as ACO beneficiaries) to control spending and improve quality of
care, measured or benchmarked according to national healthcare outcomes metrics (Barnes et
al., 2014; Berenson et al., 2016). In correlation with the high potential cost savings of
readmissions, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act included a section in the new
legislature called the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) and implemented a
new incentive for readmissions reductions for participating Medicare organizations (McIlvennan
et al., 2015). Healthcare organizations or physician groups that elected to become an ACO have
grown exponentially from its inception in 2010 to current times, showing a dramatic shift in care
delivery from fee-for-service to value-based care (Winblad et al., 2017). But due to the
fragmented and convoluted system of healthcare delivery in the US, heterogeneous structures
have developed across the ACO markets and performance has been variable (Kaufman et al.,
2017). Variability of ACO structures exist, differing by size, governance, span of control, risk
sharing, networking and information systems maturity (Cryts, 2015).
Accountable Care Organizations: What Structures Exist Today
Initially, CMS established two main ACO financial models: the pioneer model and the
Medicare Shared Savings Program model (MSSP). The pioneer model served as the ACO’s
first generation model for 2-sided risk sharing, including upside rewards for shared savings and
downside penalties for overspending or missed targets. Slight deviations to the 2-sided risk
sharing model include advanced payment bundling or capitated payments for bundled care
5

programs (A. J. Barnes et al., 2014; Zhu et al., 2018). MSSP models came online in subsequent
generations, building an incremental bonus structure for upside rewards sharing and advancing
to multiple options for 2-sided risk in later models.
These financial models serve as incentives and change drivers to healthcare delivery. In
risk sharing models, healthcare organizations are incentivized to improve car e coordination,
place greater emphasis on preventative care and reduce medically unnecessary services.
Operational and environmental challenges exist along the care continuum, representing multiple
issues individual organizations must address. Additionally, current ACO models may operate
under different forms of governance, such as a hospital-led versus physician group-led ACO.
The difference in governance informs where risk will be taken. For example, hospital-led ACOs
would have greater capability for risk management and be inclined to integrate services along
the care continuum in the effort to have greater control of services to ease transition from
inpatient discharge to the ambulatory setting. On the contrary, physician group -led ACOs would
be more focused on controlling referral and admission patterns to manage their risk as patients
navigate the system in the outpatient setting (Comfort et al., 2018; D’Aunno et al., 2018; Wu et
al., 2016). For those with higher risks and higher potential for rewards, organizations are thus
motivated to decrease risk where they are weakest in operations. This may translate to
organizational integration in the effort to improve service coordination or new partnerships to
expand coverage and services (Fisher et al., 2012; McHugh et al., 2018; Winblad et al., 2017) .
Research Opportunities
CMS outlined preliminary structures for ACO management but allowed individual ACOs
flexibility to customize their programs to their local environments. Therefore, many structural
forms have been trialed, and healthcare organizations continue to seek the best form to deliver
care and optimize patient outcomes. Shortell and colleagues (2014) proposed a taxonomy for
6

ACOs, classified into three groups: 1) large integrated health systems with broad services, 2)
physician group practices focused largely on primary care, and 3) joint physician -hospital
initiatives with moderate service levels. The study precipitated further taxonomic ACO research
by Bazzoli and colleagues (2017), who analyzed commonalities across ACO structures using
the American Hospital Association’s ACO competencies, utilizing key data to categorize ACOs
along a spectrum of ambulatory services, provider network access and health information
technology (IT) capabilities. The study categorizes organizational structures as having either: 1)
highly functioning IT capabilities and expansive access to ambulatory services; 2) highly
functioning IT capabilities but low levels of access to ambulatory services; 3) low functioning IT
capabilities; 4) highly functioning IT capabilities, expansive access to ambulatory services, and
tight alignment between hospitals and providers regarding value-based care incentives; or, 5)
some IT capabilities and a loose alignment among providers with hospitals on the value -based
model. Bazzoli and colleagues expanded their taxonomy from Shortell and colleagues’ seminal
work by including ACO technology capabilities for evaluation. At the time of Shortell and
colleagues’ research, ACO development was at its nascent form, including any national-level
and standardized data consortium available for ACO research. As ACOs grew in volume and
sophistication, data capture and management also improved for research and study , which
helped Bazzoli and colleagues’ updated ACO taxonomy analysis. This research will utilize
Bazzoli and colleagues’ taxonomic groups and adapt according to data available by the National
Survey of Accountable Care Organizations (NSACO) related to in-depth organizational
categories relevant to current environmental trends in health services research .
Existing literature has focused on the impact that MSSP and Pioneer ACOs have had on
health services consumption and clinical outcomes, such as mortality and re -hospitalizations
from a SNF (Colla, Lewis, Tierney, et al., 2016; Conway et al., 2018; Pham et al., 2014) . Further
7

opportunities for more in-depth analyses of populations with the greatest impact to readmissions
exist. Studies involving ACOs have not drilled down on specific populations that contribute to
high service consumption, such as patients with multiple chronic conditions and socioeconomic
needs. Comparatively, there is a plethora of literature on the topic of readmissions and high -risk
populations with chronic conditions and complex needs (Bergethon et al., 2016; Bisiani &
Jurgens, 2015; Chukmaitov et al., 2018; Hayes et al., 2016; McCarthy et al., 2015; Ryan et al.,
2017; Shah et al., 2016). Opportunity exists to bridge the two areas of study and further explore
population health models that address readmissions for high risk patient populations.
Structural Contingency Theory and ACO Model Research
On a national scale, CMS has implemented regulatory and reimbursement policy
changes that effected constant disruption across the healthcare industry. On an organizational
level, diverse ACO models exist in the healthcare market, producing varied results. One of the
top contributors to healthcare spending has been identified as readmissions by at-risk
populations. Conceptually, opportunity exists to explore ACO organizational structures, their
associated environmental contingencies and the effect on performance, such as readmissions
and total shared savings related to high risk populations. Bazzoli and colleagues (2017)
described five categories of structures among hospital-affiliated ACOs, highlighting variation in
their range of IT capabilities, ambulatory services, and provider alignment. Among the
readmissions literature, studies have identified significant factors in addressing high risk
populations that may prevent readmissions, such as communications among providers,
coordination of services, transitions management during changes in levels of care and care
continuity as the patient navigates the system.
This research will bridge the gap in ACO and readmissions literature by analyzing which
ACO structures have the greatest impact on readmission rates and total earned shared savings
8

for high risk populations through the lens of Structural Contingency Theory (SCT). SCT is most
apt as a theoretical framework for this study because SCT focuses on how performance is
impacted by fit between organizational structure and the contingencies in which organizations
operate. Contingencies, like environmental uncertainty and task interdependence, are identified
in the literature as moderating variables that influence changes to structure and impact on
performance. In SCT literature, Donaldson (2001) highlights the core concepts of the theoretical
framework that this study will apply: 1) there is an association between structure and
contingency, 2) when contingencies change, fit can be disrupted and structural adaptation
occurs to regain fit, and 3) fit between structure and contingencies affects performance. A
foundational concept in SCT is that there is no one best fit; instead, fit is tailored to that specific
organization’s structure and its contingencies. Performance is thus determined by the most
optimal fit between an organization’s structure and contingencies. Applying Bazzoli and
colleagues’ (2017) taxonomic categories, this study will analyze the relationship that exists
between hospital structures among ACOs, the level of differentiation and integration among its
services and the impact on performance for high need, high cost populations.
Upcoming Chapters
In chapter two, this paper will present extant literature on ACOs, specifically what
research exists comparing various ACO program structures, qualitative and quantitative models
of research conducted on ACOs and the different applications such research have had on
operationalizing ACOs. Also, this literature review chapter will include the theoretical models
applied in analyzing ACOs in the past and what statistical models have been utilized.
Chapter three will describe the theoretical framework of Structural Contingency Theory
and the working hypotheses this study will attempt to analyze. Specifically, this study will
analyze the following relationships to determine their probable impact on readmission rates for
9

high risk populations: 1) the association between ACO size and formalization of partnerships
within the ACO, 2) the moderating effect of ACO size on fit between formalized structure and
performance, 3) the association between task uncertainty and organizational integration, and
lastly, 4) the moderating effect of uncertainty on fit between integration and performance.
Chapter four will describe the methodological approach to be used to analyze the
relationships between the ACO models, their contingencies and performance. This study will
derive its contingency variables from reported data and defined based on SCT literature. For
example, ACO size will be defined by hospital bed size and number of physicians employed;
task uncertainty will be defined by level of IT functionality of an ACO, such as the presence of a
system ACO-wide EMR. This study will use Bazzoli and colleagues’ taxonomy to identify
formalized structures and ACO program integration. Formalization is interpreted under an SCT
lens as formal hospital/health system and physician alignment. ACO program integration may
be interpreted as contracted access among health services in the ACO network. To analyze the
relationships between contingency variables and organizational structure, this study will use a
correlation to determine the strength of association and direction between the variables. A
regression will be used to analyze moderating effect of contingency variables on the relationship
between ACO structural variables and their performance.
Chapter five will present the results of the statistical analyses, in reference to
hypotheses discussed. Lastly, chapter six will highlight discussion points, practical implications
to the results from the study’s analyses, the study’s limitations and future opportunities for
continued research in this topic.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review

This study focuses its research on Accountable Care Organization structures and
contingencies that effect their organizational performance. Emphasis is on savings and
readmission rates for high need, high cost patient populations because of their scope of impact
on overall healthcare spend. Thus, this chapter will synthesize extant literature on accountable
care organizations, existing structures, their effectiveness on improving outcomes and reducing
costs, related literature on readmissions and any linkages to high need, high cost populations.
US healthcare spending has been on an upward trajectory with little improvement in
care. As the baby boomer generation ages and enters retirement, the US anticipates increased
utilization of health services and corresponding exponential growth in healthcare expenses.
CMS projected growth in national health expenditure from 17.9% in 2017 to 19.7% in 2026,
which prompted serious discussions around health delivery reform (CMS, 2018). Reform came
in the execution of the Affordable Care Act, which incorporated multiple financial reform
programs to assist in shifting the US’ historical fee-for-service reimbursement model towards a
pay-for-performance value-based model (Gaynor et al., 2015; Walker et al., 2017). The Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act emphasized a triple aim: improving the care of individuals,
improving the health of populations and reducing healthcare spending by reducing unnecessary
utilization of health services (Loeher et al., 2016).
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Under the auspices of The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, accountable care
organizations are a means for healthcare organizations to voluntarily participate in reform. ACO
performance is categorized into four domains: Patient/Caregiver experience, care
coordination/patient safety, clinical care for at-risk populations, and preventive health. Under
each domain, CMS has identified quality metrics for ACO performance that are used to
calculate savings and penalties (Peck et al., 2018). Key metrics that have been popular topics of
discussion include risk-standardized, all condition readmissions under care coordination/patient
safety and populations “at-risk” for preventable disease management or inappropriate health
services utilization (O’Malley et al., 2019; Sen et al., 2018). Readmissions account for $41.3
billion in hospital costs, making it one of the highest expenditures among healthcare costs
(Hines et al., 2014). Among the highest spenders, 5% of patients account for 50% of annual
healthcare spending. High need, high cost patients are often categorized in that top tier of
population and are identified by characteristics that make them “at-risk”, such as, elderly
patients with multiple chronic conditions, persistent behavioral health challenges and distinct
lack of social support. This research will target the highest contributors to the nation’s
healthcare spending and how such topics are associated together with the development of the
ACO.
ACO Models
The ACO model drives alignment between payment incentives and provider practice to
improve care in both public and private health services sectors (Fisher et al., 2009). Varied ACO
models exist in the US, primarily ranging across government-sponsored ACOs versus managed
care ACOs (Shortell et al., 2015). However, managed care ACOs do not have the necessary
market share that a national payer, such as CMS, has on membership and performance for true
impact on population health (A. J. Barnes et al., 2014; Shortell et al., 2015). Limited data
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capture and comparative capabilities existed prior to the inception of the Medicare ACO. Thus,
most studies have focused on analyzing Medicare-sponsored ACOs due to its large
membership, potential policy impact and high variability (Bazzoli et al., 2019; Fisher et al., 2012;
Fisher & Shortell, 2010).
Amongst the literature, accountable care organizations are described as a network of
healthcare providers that have entered into an agreement to take joint accountability for
coordinating high quality, efficient and medically appropriate care for populations ( Barnes et al.,
2014; CMS, 2018). Care under the ACO spans across the continuum for outpatient, inpatient
and post-acute settings; provider networks under the ACO agree to take financial responsibility
of a population’s health through an incentive payment system to keep costs down and improve
care. Like a health maintenance organization (HMO), ACOs assign a primary care provider
(PCP) to beneficiaries to coordinate care and manage costs through proactive case
management. However, HMO beneficiaries are restricted to accessing care to in-network
services. ACO beneficiaries are not restricted to the ACO’s network, but the ACO is still
financially responsible for the healthcare outcomes of their beneficiaries regardless of where
services are accessed (Berenson et al., 2016; Martin et al., 2016). This reimbursement model
broadens ACO incentives to address community healthcare access and coordination,
regardless of payer network (Rittenhouse et al., 2010).
Medicare Shared Savings Program
Accountable care organization models consist of several programs. The largest program
is the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP). In the MSSP, ACOs have the option of
entering into different tracks for risk sharing, with the opportunity to earn bonuses when the
ACOs surpass quality and outcome benchmarks. MSSPs consist of progressive tracks in which
ACOs can mature and increase financial risks for the potential to earn greater bonuses. ACO
13

eligibility requirements include: 1) clearly defined ACO structures and operations capabilities for
provider incentive payment, 2) sufficient access to providers relative to number of beneficiaries
to be serviced, 3) application of patient-centered primary care practice, 4) robust care
management to identify beneficiaries, Track and monitor key performance metrics, report out
quality data and support beneficiaries in their care, 5) timely exchange of information among
providers for care transition management, 6) transparent communication of clinical performance
and quality to patients, 7) measures and publicly reports performance and quality key ACO
metrics, such as quality, patient experience and cost. Among the eligibility requirements,
organizations are allowed limited autonomy to construct their governance and service delivery
based on local resources (CMS, 2018; Barnes et al., 2014). Therefore, ACO variability is
derived from the unique combination of local environmental conditions and basic CMS program
requirements.
Essentially, ACOs are financially reimbursed through a pay-for-performance basis,
where financial penalties and rewards are determined by how ACOs perform on healthcare
outcomes compared to national benchmarks (CMS, 2017). The MSSP is organized by different
tracks for ACO participation and allows for a 6-year participation period. Key elements, such as
financial structure, population management, and permitted waivers to CMS rules, differentiate
the tracks. Financial incentives progress as tracks advance; ACOs are benchmarked at rates
corresponding to the amount of risk the ACO takes. For example, MSSP Track 1 is an entry
level track that includes one-sided risk for participating ACOs. ACOs under MSSP Track 1
receive revenues from shared savings if they perform better than comparable organizations in
quality, patient experience and cost. There are no penalties or downside risk for Track 1 ACOs.
Revenue can be up to 50% of savings, once the ACO meets a minimum savings rate (2.0 –
3.9%) better than benchmark (Pyenson et al., 2011). As ACOs progress in the MSSP to
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advanced tracks (such as, Tracks 1+, 2, 3 and next generation model), ACOs shift from onesided risk to a two-sided risk arrangement, including ACO downside risk. In advanced tracks,
ACOs are not to exceed a minimum loss rate (0.5 – 2.0%) worse than benchmark and are liable
to pay back an “x”% of every dollar beyond that rate. ACOs in advanced tracks have the option
to choose symmetrical savings and loss rates, so that the minimum percentage would be the
same for savings above and losses below the benchmark. There is a corresponding increase for
potential revenue as advanced track ACOs take on greater downside risk. As mentioned earlier,
advanced tracks permit ACOs to waive certain CMS rules to enhance operational flexibility for
care coordination. For example, in Track 1, ACOs are required to still apply the 3-day skilled
nursing facility (SNF) rule or 2-midnight rule, where hospitals will not be reimbursed for patients
transferred from an emergency room visit to a SNF until that patient has been admitted as an
inpatient for 2 midnights. In advanced tracks, such as 1+ and 3, ACOs are permitted to waive
the 3-day SNF rule. Another example is allowing an ACO to bill an after -discharge home care
visit to improve care coordination and preventative measures for readmissions. This waiver is
permitted only for next generation models. Table 1 presents a simplified comparison of the
different MSSP Tracks.
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Table 1
Medicare Shared Savings Program Track Comparisons
MSSP Elements

Minimum Savings
Rate (MSR) /
Minimum Loss Rate
(MLR)

Track 1

2.0 – 3.9%

Track 1+
Options:
• 0.0 – 0.0%
• 0.5 – 2.0%
• Varies based
on number of
beneficiaries

Track 2

0.5 – 2.0%

Track 3

Next Gen

0.5 – 2.0%

None; dollar
savings/losses when
spending below/above
benchmark

Shared Savings

Up to 50%

Up to 50%

Up to 60%

Up to 75%

Options:
• Incremental increase
up to 85% w/in 5 years
• Up to 100%

Shared Losses

N/A

30%

40 – 60%

40 – 75%

First dollar losses for
spending above
benchmark

Not
Permitted

Permitted

Permitted

Permitted

Permitted

Prospective
Beneficiary
Assignment

MACRA Waivers

Not
Permitted

Skilled nursing
facility (SNF) 3day

Not
Permitted

•
•
• SNF 3-day •
• Telehealth •

SNF 3-day
Telehealth
Claims for home visits
Primary care co-pay
waiver

Alternative ACO Programs
In parallel to the MSSP, CMS launched a secondary ACO program intended for more
developed and mature health systems already actively engaged in population health
management, called the Pioneer Program. In this experimental version of the ACO, mature
organizations have the option to enter a track with greater financial risk for the opportunity of
greater rewards. Most organizations that started with the Pioneer Program had either dropped
out or shifted to a 2-sided risk sharing MSSP model. Fewer than 20 ACOs participated in the
Pioneer Program at its inception year (2012) and less than a tenth of Pioneer Program ACOs
had opted to stay in the program due to the heavy financial penalties. The central concept of
greater risk and reward was later incorporated into newer MSSP Tracks, after ACOs have had
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the chance to build up their programs (McWilliams, 2016; Pham et al., 2014). As a result, the
Pioneer Program was discontinued in 2015.
In 2013, CMS established an advanced payment model to assist rural health systems
and small provider practices develop health information technology (HIT) capabilities for data
tracking, information sharing and reporting (Wu et al., 2017). The advanced payment model
evolved into the ACO Investment Model (AIM) in 2015, acting as a capital development
assistance program that provided ACOs access to funds based off of anticipated shared
savings. In addition to AIM, MSSP Track 1+ was established in 2018 to offer a moderate option
for savings and minimal downside risk, with some waivers to CMS rules. Both AIM and Track 1+
target and encourage rural areas to participate in the ACO program. These models highlight
regional consideration to ACO structure and reiterates the inherent variability among ACOs
(Chen et al., 2016). Figure 1 presents a timeline of the formation and discontinuation of different
Medicare ACO programs. The Henry J. Kaiser Foundation published a map of United States
ACO programs and locations. The map shows that 82% of ACOs are under Track 1, as of 2018,
and there is a dense concentration of ACOs in the Midwest and East Coast regions.
Figure 1
Medicare ACO Program / Track Activation Timeline

2012

2013

2015

•Medicare
•Advanced
•Discontinue
Shared Savings Payment ACO Pioneer
Program (MSSP) Model (for rural Program and
Track 1 & 2
systems)
Advanced
Payment ACO
•Pioneer
model
Program

2016

2018

2019

•Next Generation •MSSP Track 1+ •Discontinue
ACO Model
(aimed at small MSSPs
•ACO Investment practices and •Pathways to
rural health
Model (AIM)
Success ACO
(complementary to systems)
Model begins
Advanced
Payment)
•MSSP Track 3
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ACO Structures
CMS’ ACO models provide high level structures for population health management to
healthcare organizations, while allowing for adaptability to their environment. Structural
variability exists among healthcare organizations, depending on the environment in which they
operate, such as existing physician groups, accessibility of health services, geographical region,
socioeconomic conditions and populations served (Comfort et al., 2018). Due to the high
variability, research and analysis of inter- and intra-organizational relationships have been
difficult; thus, researchers have sought to classify structures by their derivative forms and in
discrete categories (Rich, 1992).
Systematic approaches to organizational classification include: Common sense, a priori
and a posteriori. Common sense is defined as a conceptualization of organizational structure
that has been intuitively determined without data or theory. A priori is a theoretically driven
heuristic approach where organizational structures are classified and sorted based on a
theoretical framework. A posteriori is an empirically driven approach that classifies
organizational structures by statistically analyzing similarities or variance to then sort into
themes. The a posteriori method is considered by researchers to be a taxonomic approach that
allows for data-driven classification of hierarchies spanning across individual characteristics to
broader categories for populations (Rich, 1992). Therefore, taxonomies provide a robust means
of classification, especially important for such complex multidimensional constructs like
healthcare organizations.
ACO Taxonomy
Bazzoli, and colleagues (1999) analyzed organizational structures and strategies across
hospital-led health networks and systems according to three main structural characteristics:
differentiation, integration and centralization. Using these three main constructs as points of
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classification, the authors developed a widely recognized taxonomy of health networks and
systems, reliably defining organizational trends in health system changes and network
evolution.
Similarly, Shortell, Wu, Lewis, Colla and Fisher (2014) proposed an ACO taxonomy that
was grounded in two different organizational theories: resource dependence and institutional
theory. Shortell and colleagues (2014) posited ACO structures were clustered into three
categories: large integrated health systems with broad services, physician group practices
focused largely on primary care, and joint physician-hospital initiatives with moderate service
levels. The authors were able to conduct an a posteriori approach using ACO entry year (2012)
data from CMS to identify the three clusters.
In a recent publication, Bazzoli, Harless and Chukmaitov (2017) presented an updated
taxonomy of hospitals participating in Medicare ACOs that was based on transaction cost
economics (TCE) theory. They examined how ACOs structured their programs to best interact
with the market and conduct healthcare transactions. The authors conducted a hierarchical
cluster analysis of MSSP and Pioneer ACOs to empirically identify themes and variations across
the two programs for the period of 2012-2013. As part of this study’s taxonomic development,
the authors measured key ACO competencies derived from the American Hospital Association
(AHA) and the Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society (HIMSS) related to 1)
physician association, 2) ambulatory services access and 3) health information technology (HIT)
infrastructure. Like Shortell and colleagues’ 2014 taxonomy, Bazzoli and colleagues included
physician associations and health services in their taxonomy. Physician association was
described as physician (MD) alignment with the ACO organization through formal agreements
and contracts. Ambulatory services demonstrated access to preventive care and timely follow
up care post-hospitalization. In contrast to Shortell and colleagues’ 2014 taxonomy, Bazzoli and
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colleagues included a crucial competency that Shortell and colleagues did not: health
information technology. The importance of an ACO’s HIT infrastructure is outlined by Bazzoli
and colleagues as: a) an ACO’s ability to conduct timely communication among providers, b)
coordinate across beneficiaries’ care continuum through ready access of information across
care settings, and c) capture data for analyzing trends and reporting purposes.
Bazzoli and colleagues’ research showed fundamental structural characteristics
clustered in five groups for each program, summarized in Table 2. Pioneer programs showed
slightly greater scope of ambulatory services than MSSPs in cluster 1 and cluster 4 of the
taxonomy. It is important to note that both Pioneer programs and MSSPs have highly developed
health IT infrastructures, but that competency alone is not an indicator of an ACO’s care
coordination capabilities. Further extrapolating from the data, MSSPs with high health IT but low
numbers of ambulatory services in their network may indicate less robust capabilities to
coordinate across beneficiaries’ care continuum once discharged from the hospital.
Shortell and colleagues identified primary care and joint physician initiatives as critical
factors for physician engagemen. In comparison, Bazzoli and colleagues included access to
ambulatory and specialty services.
Table 2
Summary of Bazzoli, Harless & Chukmaitov’s Five Cluster Taxonomy

Pioneer

Cluster 1

Cluster 2

Ambulatory
services

high

low

Health IT

high

high

Cluster 3

MSSP

Cluster 5

high
low

MD alignment
Ambulatory
services
Health IT
MD alignment

Cluster 4

high

high

tight

loose

high
tight

high
loose

low
high

high
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low

Associations Explored Among ACO Models and Their Performance.
Invariably, researchers question whether ACOs provide true value or significant structure
to current healthcare systems. Key ACO performance metrics were established by CMS to
improve healthcare quality and decrease costs in four major domains of healthcare delivery:
Patient/Caregiver Experience, Care Coordination/Patient Safety, Preventive Health and At-Risk
Populations (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Shared Savings Program,
2017). For 2018-2019 reporting years, thirty-one quality measures were identified for ACO
performance across the four domains. Several research studies have explored how ACO
models impacted performance and identified future research opportunities.
McWilliams and colleagues analyzed ACO performance under the Medicare Shared
Savings Program and focused on measures under the domain of Preventive Health, such as
hospitalizations for patients with ambulatory-care sensitive conditions (e.g., Diabetes,
Congestive Heart Failure and Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease) and all cause 30-day
readmissions (McWilliams et al., 2016). McWilliams and colleagues (2016) applied a common
sense approach to categorizing ACOs by Medicare spending at or above the median pre- and
post-ACO entry, which produced the following categories: ACO structure, baseline spending at
entry, and ACO contracting with commercial insurers. The study differentiated ACOs as
vertically integrating with either hospitals, multispecialty physician groups or independent
primary care practices. McWilliams et al concluded that ACOs integrated with independent
primary care practices saw significantly greater savings than other structures, resulting in
reduced inpatient and outpatient services. Furthermore, savings were greatest among earlier
cohorts where baseline spending was above benchmark. As ACOs matured, savings diminished
and became harder to achieve. The authors identified some key limitations to be considered for
future research: 1) probable self-selection bias and identified savings were due to organizations
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already primed for spending reduction 2) estimated savings excluded costs from improvement
efforts 3) the statistical model utilized did not adjust for ACO subgroups. McWilliams and
colleagues’ study identifies important points for future ACO research, such as incorporating in
the statistical model how best to account performance and appropriately categorize ACO
models for a true comparison of savings.
Recently, Winblad, Mor, Mchugh and Rahman (2017) examined ACO quality data for the
anticipated effect ACOs were intended to have on care coordination, specifically around
rehospitalizations. Rehospitalizations, or readmissions, were identified as one of the highest
contributors to Medicare spend, and 20% of those rehospitalizations were attributed to postacute care transitions to skilled nursing facilities (SNFs). The authors thus concentrated this
study on a subset population most likely to be transferred to a SNF post-discharge and most atrisk for rehospitalization. They identified ACOs with the highest concentration of
rehospitalizations from post-acute care settings. The population with the highest rate of
rehospitalization were elderly patients with multiple comorbidities and were being treated for
multiple chronic illnesses. First, the authors analyzed general rehospitalization performance
across different ACO models. The authors organized the ACOs by 1) physician-led ACOs
(without a hospital formally affiliate to the ACO), 2) hospital-led ACOs, 3) ACOs with joint
ventures between hospital and physician groups and 4) ACOs under standalone limited liability
companies. The study analyzed hospitals participating in an MSSP and non-ACOs. The results
of the study displayed ACOs affiliated with hospitals utilized post-acute care services, like SNFs,
more frequently than ACOs without hospital affiliations. Furthermore, among ACO-affiliated
hospitals, MSSP hospitals showed the greatest reduction in readmissions, followed by Pioneer
hospitals and then non-ACO affiliated hospitals. The authors postulate that ACO-affiliated
hospitals and Pioneer hospitals may be employing concentrated resources to readmission
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efforts due to incentive programs outside of the ACO, such as the Medicare Hospital
Readmissions Reduction Program implemented in 2013. Winblad and colleagues highlight
significant opportunities for future research to examine readmissions performance within the
considerable variations among ACOs and how provider networks are utilized among the
different models.
Chukmaitov and colleagues (2015) analyzed organizational characteristics associated
with ACO competencies and performance, such as improved patient outcomes and cost
reduction. They cited intensive interdependence among services in the ACO and further
described the need for alignment starting with ACO governance. The authors contributed to the
literature by aggregating and systematizing ACO competencies from multiple sources such as
the American Hospital Association’s (AHA) annual survey, Bazzoli and colleagues’ health
system governance study (1999) and Healthcare Information and Management Systems
Society’s (HIMSS) metrics. Chukmaitov and colleagues (2015) laid out the following
competencies for future research frameworks: leadership and management, linkages among
health care providers, health information technology infrastructure, ability to manage financial
risk, and infrastructure for monitoring and reporting quality. The study aimed to demonstrate that
performance improvement would be higher among ACOs with greater centralization, fully
integrated physician groups, highly integrated medical services along the care continuum, and
advanced health information technology (HIT) infrastructure. The dependent variables were 30day all-cause mortality and inpatient hospital costs. The results of the study showed significant
reduction in mortality for hospitals and health systems with centralized structures in comparison
to freestanding hospitals. Key to centralized structures is governance and leadership in the ACO
to help with aligning the inherently fragmented system towards a similar goal (Chumaitov et al,
2015). This may indicate better care coordination and communication for centralized systems
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than hospitals not associated with a health system. Integrated physician groups were defined as
alignment of incentives, reporting, governance and affiliation. Here, the study did not show
improvement in care for highly integrated physician groups. Instead, mortality was slightly higher
than less integrated physician groups, which suggest that formal physician to hospital structures
are not as impactful to patient outcomes and require greater research. Results proved
inconclusive of significant association between advanced HIT infrastructure and cost savings or
improved patient outcomes. Instead, the authors recommended greater time is needed for
ACOs to mature in their HIT infrastructures before true outcomes will be present. Chukamitov
and colleagues’ approach to analyzing ACO competencies, structure and outcomes is a good
example of an analytic approach for future ACO research.
In Albright, Lewis, Ross and Colla’s (2016) study, the authors conducted a crosssectional analysis for associations between ACO performance and organizational
characteristics correlated to preventive measures. This study is significant in that it focuses on
preventive care, such as vaccines and screenings, and how it may impact ACO performance.
Albright and colleagues utilized the National Survey of ACOs (NSACO) to analyze
organizational characteristics across ACOs, analyzed trends among preventive care quality
performance data and identified composite measures among preventive quality metrics . The
characteristics included provider composition, beneficiary composition, governance, health
services access, electronic health record capabilities, quality management capabilities and
finance performance. Among ACO preventive quality metrics, two subgroups had significant
associations with ACO characteristics: disease prevention (vaccines and cancer screening) and
wellness screening (annual checkups). The subgroups correlated with ACO characteristics,
such as provider composition and upfront ACO investment. The study supported the authors’
position that provider composition allows for better care continuum and easier access to
24

specialist visits, while upfront ACO investment indicates better technology, such as being on an
electronic health record, in detection, patient eligibility and administration of more complex
services for ACO beneficiaries. The statistical methodology Albright and colleagues applied to
this study offer a potential approach for future analyses between ACO characteristics and
composite measures.
In Accountable Care Organizations: The National Landscape, Shortell, Colla, Lewis,
Fisher, Kessell and Ramsay (2015) analyzed ACOs to determine organizational characteristics
that showed highest performance. The study’s scope included ACOs in California due to the
high concentration of ACOs within the state in comparison to the rest of the U.S., with a plethora
of different structures to analyze for performance. The authors applied a three -cluster taxonomic
approach to categorize the different ACO structures, specifically researching types of contracts,
governance, scope of services, care management capabilities and patient experience. The
taxonomy Shortell et al utilized was from A Taxonomy of Accountable Care Organizations for
Policy and Practice (2014), which was an empirically-based taxonomy developed to examine
performance and ACO effectiveness. Shortell and colleagues applied resource dependence
theory as a conceptual framework to analyze the resources necessary for implementation of the
ACO care model. The ACOs were split between Medicare or private payer contracts, essentially
similar in risk, performance and quality metrics. The composition of California ACOs included
51% physician-led ACOs and 33% jointly led by physicians and hospitals. Among the California
ACOs, 84% were under a shared savings contract with either downside risks built into the
agreement or a quality-based performance bonus. The taxonomy categorized the following key
program characteristics: number of full time equivalent (FTE) clinicians in the ACO, variety and
number of provider services across the care continuum, level of integrated delivery system
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using HIT, institutional leadership structure and historical experience with payment reform
activities.
California has been a long time innovator in healthcare delivery reform and expenditure
control; therefore, Shortell et al (2015) concentrated their study on the additional value ACO
participation may bring to healthcare providers in the area of patient experience, care
coordination and cost savings. Results showed that ACO participants generally scored higher,
albeit small percentage points, than non-ACO participants in the measures of access to care,
coordination of care, promotional health, doctor-patient interactions, office staff helpfulness and
overall rating of care. In contrast, quality scores related to heart, cancer, diabetes, pediatric,
asthma and chlamydia screenings were comparable among ACO and non-ACO participants.
Statistically significant results were seen when Kaiser Permanente was excluded from results.
Screenings are indicative of preventive care coordination capabilities within the ACO. Such
capabilities are contingent on appropriate identification of patients requiring screening and
preventive care.
In the 2015 study by Shortell and colleagues, results showed that most significant cost
savings and patient experience scores were around ACOs with greatest prior experience in risk based agreements, strong electronic health record infrastructure and functionality, the
establishment of high risk complex care management programs, strong physician leadership
structure and mature quality improvement programs. Shortell and colleagues highlighted the
importance of high risk complex care management and the integration of strong clinical care
teams. In Accountable Care Organization: The National Landscape, the authors effectively
present a practical outlook in the value ACO participation brings to organizations experienced in
risk-bearing contracts, historical experience with cost savings and intensive high r isk patient
population health management. Results show that, overall, certain ACO structural
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characteristics provide statistical impact to performance, primarily in health information
technology and physician-led organizations.
ACO participation has grown exponentially from 220 to 561 organizations entering into
Medicare Shared Savings Program ACO contracts in 2018 and covering 10.5 million
beneficiaries (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2018a). Building upon previous
ACO studies, Bazzoli, Harless and Chukmaitov proposed a new taxonomic approach to the
study of ACO structures in A Taxonomy of Hospitals Participating in Medicare Accountable Care
Organizations (2017). Earlier in this chapter, this research study mentioned Bazzoli et al’s
taxonomy as an updated approach from Shortell and colleagues’ proposal on ACO taxonomy
(2014). Shortell et al’s taxonomy concentrated on integrated systems that included post-acute
care facilities, extensive primary care network and physician performance and joint leadership
structures between hospitals and physicians. In comparison, Bazzoli et al’s taxonomy drills
deeper into ACO capabilities that allow for integration and accountability among physician
practice, such as health information technology capabilities that can link services across the
broad spectrum of healthcare delivery. With the onset of meaningful use and as healthcare
organizations continue to mature, it is important to specify how HIT influences structure , and this
makes Bazzoli’s taxonomy most appropriate for this research study.
ACO and Readmissions Literature
Among extant ACO literature, researchers studied variability among ACO structures and
their impact on performance, such as readmissions (Hayes et al., 2016; Loeher et al., 2016).
Readmissions represent one of the highest costs in healthcare, reported in 2011 by the Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality as approximately $41.3 billion in national healthcare
expenditure. Historically, 20% of Medicare discharges were reported to have a 30-day
readmission (McIlvennan et al., 2015). Medicare and Medicaid patients have been most
27

susceptible to being readmitted for ambulatory sensitive conditions like congestive heart failure,
septicemia and pneumonia. Because of the high costs associated with readmissions and their
prevalence, CMS directed key reform efforts to reduce readmissions through the Affordable
Care Act. The reform established the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) in
2012, which penalized hospitals for 30-day readmission rates higher than benchmark for acute
myocardial infarction, heart failure and pneumonia. The HRRP complemented pay-forperformance programs, like ACOs, and strategically possessed overlapping requirements to
incentivize healthcare organizations and providers to adopt best practices for care coordination
and preventative health management. In McIlvennan et al’s Hospital Readmissions Reduction
Program, the authors describe how the HRRP has seen preliminary reductions in readmissions
but there is still debate in relation to the program’s penalties spanning all cause readmissions
versus disease specific preventions. Additionally, the authors note hospitals invest in transitions
of care by implementing interventional tools or dedicating key clinical resources to oversee high
risk patients.
In extant readmissions literature, Hansen, Young, Hinami, Leung and Williams (2011)
conducted a systematic review of published interventions that aimed to prevent readmissions.
Hansen and colleagues identif ied twelve distinct interventions that appeared to be effective in
reducing readmissions. Those twelve interventions included three domains: Pre-discharge,
post-discharge and transitions of care interventions. Pre-discharge interventions included:
patient education, medication reconciliation, discharge planning, and scheduling of a follow-up
appointment before discharge. Post-discharge interventions included follow-up telephone calls,
patient-activated hotlines, timely communication with ambulatory providers, timely ambulatory
provider follow-up, and post-discharge home visits. Transitions of care interventions included:
transition coaches, physician continuity across the inpatient and outpatient setting, and patient 28

centered discharge instruction. At a high level, such interventions could be categorized as
complex care coordination, post-acute care services, timely access to health services and an
expansive primary care network. The authors highlight transitions in care as requiring significant
intervention for readmissions reduction due to the handoffs that must occur from one care
setting to another. The interventions mentioned in the systematic review are similar to ACO
structural characteristics analyzed in ACO literature and may be key structural characteristics to
analyzing readmissions performance in comparison among ACO models.
Researchers (Ma et al., 2017) published another systematic review of extant
readmissions literature in The Prevalence, Reasons, and Risk Factors for Hospital
Readmissions Among Home Health Care Patients. The article identified gaps in literature
related to readmissions and patients who received home health care services. In their review,
the authors noted that readmission rates were highest among patients with heart failure.
Reasons stated among the literature included patients being admitted due to a worsening
condition of their primary diagnosis of heart failure, cardiac-related diagnoses or respiratory
conditions. Risk factors for readmissions were identified as being 1) patient demographics:
elderly, male and race, 2) high severity of primary medical condition, presence of multiple
comorbidities and lower functional status, 3) lower patient socioeconomic status, 4) lack of
interpersonal support, and 5) low intensity of post-discharge home health services. Key
takeaways from this systematic review for this research is that certain patient populations are
more susceptible to readmissions and key risk factors exist in identifying which types of patients
may be higher risk for readmissions.
In Falling Through the Cracks: Challenges and Opportunities for Improving Transitional
Care for Persons with Continuous Complex Care Needs, Coleman (2003) highlights the
importance of technology for information transfer across care settings. The article summarizes
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key components necessary for effective care transitions: strong communication between
providers, a common care plan for the patient being treated, reconciliation of medications, follow
up plans and explicit summary of plans, symptoms and signs for which the patient should be
cautious. The component with greatest influence to successful transitions is communication and
the flow of information. It can be extrapolated from this study that information technology, such
as an electronic health record, and timely information exchange across care settings would be
highly contingent on technology and integration of health services.
In ACO literature, readmissions has had cursory exploration due to complex data
capture and ACO identification. As data capture and systems Tracking mechanisms advance,
greater opportunities exist to analyze ACO structural characteristics and readmissions
performance. In ACO-Affiliated Hospitals Reduced Rehospitalizations from Skilled Nursing
Facilities Faster than Other Hospitals, Winblad et al (2017) explored ACO impact on
readmissions for an elderly population with complex chronic and multiple comorbidity conditions.
The authors discuss how ACOs are more likely to have more advanced health IT tools to
capture data, identify probable readmissions from patient medical histories and Track patients
with high risk for rehospitalization from skilled nursing facilities. This would imply that ACOs that
have high integrative services and strong IT infrastructures for care continuum would have the
greatest impact on readmissions from post-acute facilities.
In Colla, Lewis, Tierney and Muhlestein’s (2016) article, Hospitals Participating in ACOs
Tend to be Large and Urban, Allowing Access to Capital and Data, the authors analyze the
general structure of ACO participants and performance. General findings included large health
systems with a wide range of health services available for primary care, specialist access and
post-acute care facilities. Originally, the authors hypothesized that outcomes management, such
as readmissions, began at the hospital setting, prior to discharge and heavily managed via care
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coordination. Thus, ACOs associated with hospitals would be expected to have better outcomes
than ACOs not associated with hospitals. But according to their findings, the authors did not find
great variation between quality or readmissions performance for ACO participants associated
with hospitals and those not associated with hospitals. ACO entry requirements for Track 1
include a minimum 50% of providers participating in the ACO to meet Meaningful Use
requirements for certified electronic health record utilization. This is an especially large financial
investment for providers in rural areas with widely dispersed populations. Rural health
organizations were not inclined to join ACOs due to the incredible capital and human resources
necessary to meet requirements. Early results showed that in general, spending in outpatient
settings increased as inpatient spending significantly decreased as ACOs focused on preventive
measures. This study shows that access to capital for HIT infrastructure tends to be available
for hospitals large in structure and residing in urban environments, but that these specific
structural characteristics do not show significant effect on reducing readmissions.
In readmissions literature, physician incentive alignment is critical. Cox, Sadiraj, Schnier
& Sweeney (2016) published Incentivizing Cost-Effective Reductions in Hospital Readmission
Rates. The authors conducted an experiment on physician engagement under fee-for-service
models versus value-based models like bonuses and bundled payments. The results of the
experiment showed that physicians under bundled payment models had the greatest reductions
in hospital lengths of stay and readmission rates. The implications to these findings are that
when physician incentives and hospital goals are aligned through a value-based model, there is
greater potential for performance improvement and better patient outcomes.
In the study, Association Between Hospital Participation in Medicare Shared Savings
Program Accountable Care Organizations and Readmissions Following Major Surgery , (Borza
et al., 2019) the researchers conducted a retrospective cohort study comparing national
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Medicare beneficiaries who completed a common major surgery and analyzed rate of
readmissions for those part of an ACO or not between 2010 to 2014. The authors identified the
following as most common major surgeries: Abdominal aortic aneurism repair, colectomy,
cystectomy, prostatectomy, lung resection, total knee arthroplasty, and total hip arthroplasty.
Results showed that risk-adjusted readmission rates decreased significantly among hospitals
affiliated with MSSP ACOs in comparison to non-ACO hospitals. This study narrowed its
research from general population to a subset population, but the authors did not study in detail
the different ACO structural characteristics that may have contributed to the readmissions
reduction.
In The American Journal of Accountable Care, authors Gross, Eason, Przezdecki,
Menacker, Gold, Chauhan, Hart, Sawczuk, Garrett and Glenning published The Ingredients of
Success in a Medicare Accountable Care Organization (2016). The authors conducted a case
study analyzing the Hackensack Alliance Accountable Care Organization because the ACO
achieved cost savings while maintaining quality for two consecutive years. The result of the
authors’ analysis were that they had enrolled their physician practices were required to be
certified as a patient centered medical home and that they assigned dedicated nursing
coordinators to follow patients high risk for readmissions. Key elements of the patient centered
medical home that are translatable to the ACO are its emphases on primary care, care
coordination and timely communication of information. Another component mentioned was a
dedicated nurse care coordinator. The nurse care coordinator was responsible for identifying
high risk patients and partnering with the PCP to reduce hospitalizations and manage
ambulatory sensitive conditions like heart failure.
In looking at the broader readmissions literature, readmission interventions are targeted
oftentimes at the patient population that contributes to the greatest percentage of readmissions .
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For Medicare patients, congestive heart failure, septicemia and pneumonia accounted for $4.3
billion in readmission costs. The greatest contributors to readmissions among Medicaid patients
were mood disorders, schizophrenia and diabetes, which accounted for $839 million in
readmissions. Similarly, for privately insured patients, mood disorders, chemotherapy
maintenance and complications to surgeries accounted for $785 million in readmissions (Hines
et al., 2014)
Many studies have focused on targeted patient populations, like heart failure or the
elderly, to better scope efforts for greatest impact on readmissions (Coleman, 2003; Donze et
al., 2013; Hansen et al., 2011; Ma et al., 2017). Other studies have focused heavily on care
coordination interventions among health networks (Burke et al., 2013; Feigenbaum et al., 2012;
McIlvennan et al., 2015; Takahashi et al., 2016), post-discharge follow up interventions (Misky
et al., 2010; Tung et al., 2017) and correct predictive modeling algorithms for identifying patients
high risk for readmissions (Kansagara et al., 2011).
In Risk Prediction Models for Hospital Readmissions, Kansagara and colleagues
conducted a systematic review to identify studies that have analyzed and proposed different risk
models for readmission predictions at varying stages of patient care. Essentially, the authors
posit that patient functional status, severity of illness and social determinants of health variables
improved the predictive quality of identifying patients who were high risk for readmission.
Amarasingham, Moore, Tabak, Drazner, Clark, Zhang, Reed, Swanson, Ma & Halm published
results of their predictive model in An Automated Model to Identify Heart Failure Patients at Risk
for 30-Day Readmission or Death Using Electronic Medical Record Data (2010). The authors
highlighted the variables and methodology for identifying and scoring risk values for heart failure
patients likely to be readmitted. They concluded that accuracy of the predictive model depended
heavily on both clinical and social factors. This is a common thread across the different
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predictive models that clinical factors alone are not enough to identify high risk patients .
Furthermore, patients who are most likely to be readmitted have risk factors that indicate an
inability to function or be compliant to treatment, have socioeconomic factors hindering their
ability to access preventive health services or are among vulnerable demographic populations
like the elderly.
ACOs are a value-based pay-for-performance model with readmissions interventions
inherently built into its Medicare program at large. Although implemented close to the same
timeframe as the HRRP, there is scant research that analyzes readmissions and ACO
structures. The research that does exist has concentrated on 1) ACO performance for general
30-day all cause readmissions, 2) ACO performance on patient populations similar to HRRP
requirements, such as myocardial infarction, heart failure and pneumonia, 3) ACO readmission
rates from SNFs and 4) ACO readmission rates after a major common surgery. This highlights
the opportunity for this study to fill in a research gap to analyze ACO structural characteristics
associated with readmissions reduction. Specific ACO structural characteristics that have not
been analyzed in relation to readmissions are IT capabilities and vertical integration of services.
Consistently across readmissions literature, timely communication and information sharing
across transitional care settings have been highlighted as critical to preventing readmissions .
Thus, this research has the opportunity to analyze associations between readmissions and ACO
structures related to transitions of care, like HIT, scope of PCP network and timely access to
post-acute services.
High Need, High Cost Patient Populations
Among readmissions literature, researchers have recommended focusing intervention
efforts on targeted populations with highest risks. In addition, predictive model studies have
stated key differentiating factors that improve accuracy of identifying patients high risk for
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readmissions as being patient functional status and social determinants of health (Blumenthal et
al., 2016). A similarly defined population exists in high need, high cost patients, whom are
identified by the Commonwealth Fund as patients with 3+ chronic conditions, high risk of health
services utilization, high severity of illness, functional limitations, high social needs and are
elderly (Blumenthal, 2017; Blumenthal & Abrams, 2016; Hayes et al., 2016) . The National
Academy of Medicine (NAM) published a patient taxonomy on HNHC (Long et al., 2017) with an
additional layer of behavioral health and social risk factors. The taxonomy demonstrates a team
approach to improving the care for HNHC patient populations. HNHC patients are primarily low
income and are insured through Medicaid. 5% of Medicaid patients are responsible for 57% of
healthcare expenditure, and the top 1% of Medicaid patients account for 25% of spending.
Furthermore, the Commonwealth Fund has posited that behavioral health issues are key
indicators for future high cost among patients with ambulatory sensitive diagnoses, like chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease, congestive heart failure, coronary heart disease, diabetes and
hypertension (Blumenthal, 2017).
HNHC patients have a significant impact on overall national healthcare spending due to
lack of support and proper maintenance of their health needs, which leads to preventable
readmissions, hospitalizations and emergency room visits (Hayes et al., 2016; McCarthy et al.,
2015; Trendwatch Chartbook 2016 Trends Affecting Hospitals and Health Systems, 2016, pgs.
71-79). Interventions to address HNHC patient management are similar to interventions for
readmissions reductions: “[targeted populations for greatest benefit; comprehensive
assessments of patients’ risks and needs; evidence-based care plans] and patient monitoring;
promoting patient and family engagement in self -care; coordinating care and communication
among patients and providers; facilitating transitions from the hospital and referrals to
community resources; and providing appropriate care in accordance with p atients’ preferences”
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(McCarthy et al, 2015). Furthermore, intensive integration of services and access to ambulatory
care is highlighted for the most vulnerable of populations in the US to address inequity within
the healthcare system (Martin et al., 2016).
In a related study to vulnerable or disadvantaged patient populations, Coleman (2003)
describes the challenges and opportunities for managing patients with complex care needs. In
his article, he focuses on transitions between care settings for patients with chronic conditions
who need intensive management and care coordination. Coleman highlights the difficulties in
coordinating and navigating the US’ inherently fragmented system. It is important to note that
this article was published before the advent of The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
but that the key issues regarding care coordination for complex patient populations have been
an ongoing challenge. The author outlines that system breakdowns exist in medications
management, information transfer between care settings, disparate and disjointed clinical
oversight of patient care and patient advocacy. Coleman posits that healthcare policy reform,
information technology advancement and alignment of healthcare professional accountability
would help address improved management of complex patient population management.
The Commonwealth Fund has been forefront in addressing HNHC patient research and
management. Blumenthal (2017) proposed a patient-centered care model to address HNHC
patients and develop a support structure for such patients that address macro and micro
environmental challenges, such as integration of services, payment reform, correct identification
of high risk patients, strong care coordination services. A key component of HNHC patient care
is to address behavioral health needs. Behavioral health screening was not included in ACO
assessments prior to 2016. The opportunity to integrate behavioral health assessments into
ACOs recently began with the inclusion of a depression screening measure for reporting of
quality performance (Gordon, 2016). At a recent Institute for Healthcare Improvement forum
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(2017), Goldman, Figueroa, Waller & Vogeli presented a “playbook” for identifying high need,
high cost populations. The “playbook” consisted of a five-association sponsorship among The
Commonwealth Fund, The John A. Hartford Foundation, the Peterson Center on Healthcare,
the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and The SCAN Foundation. The vision of the “playbook”
sponsors is to have 30% of ACOs and Medicare Advantage plans adopt proven interventions to
manage HNHC patients by 2020. There is immense interest in integrating and aligning ACO
programs with HNHC patient interventions.
In reviewing HNHC literature, there are diverse perspectives on whether ACOs would be
appropriate for reducing high spend from HNHC patients. Some studies have advocated that
ACOs should target interventions on high risk and high spend patients through dual Medicare
and Medicaid eligibility and disabled beneficiaries (Bynum et al., 2017; Guerard et al., 2019;
Zainulbhai et al., 2014). For example, one study analyzed ACO performance with high dual
eligible and disabled beneficiary populations. Results showed slightly lower quality scores but
with higher earned savings than ACOs with lower dual eligible and disabled populations (Sen et
al., 2018). In contrast, other studies from the New England Journal of Medicine (McWilliams et
al., 2016; McWilliams & Schwartz, 2017) have opined that targeting specific patient populations
is part of a fee-for-service health delivery model and not a value-based model like the
accountable care organization. The authors point out that in order to best manage HNHC
patients, like readmissions, accurate prediction of patients to target are highly susceptible to
error, citing recent statistics from Medicare that patients scored high for risk accounted for only
42% of Medicare spending and may represent lost opportunities for reducing waste in other
areas. Earlier in ACO development, a study was conducted on ACOs and their lack of
innovative models to integrate mental illness and substance abuse into their care programs
(Lewis et al., 2014). In an indirect way, this relates to models for HNHC patient management, as
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mental health and substance abuse are additional factors to be considered in identifying HNHC
patients.
In a recent publication, Performance in the Medicare Shared Saving Program by
accountable care organizations disproportionately serving dual and disabled populations by
Sen, Chen, Samson, Epstein and Maddox (2018), the authors analyze in a retrospective cohort
study if MSSPs serving dually enrolled (aka Medicare and Medicaid populations) and disabled
beneficiaries show improved shared savings from their inception over the time period 20 14
through 2016. Sen and colleagues saw equal or better outcome savings per beneficiaries than
MSSPs that did not serve as many dually enrolled or disabled populations. This study shows the
increasing interest that ACO researchers have on disadvantaged patient populations. Sen et al
were interested on a broader perspective of ACO-level outcomes and did not incorporate
structural characteristics in their study. The authors recognize opportunity for future research to
analyze optimal ACO program design and necessary infrastructure for ongoing monitoring and
Tracking of outcomes for disadvantaged populations.
There continues to be questions related to ACO effectiveness and their ability to improve
quality and financial outcomes. Little research has been published even on ACOs and
specifically readmissions performance, considering interventions necessary for reducing
readmissions. Furthermore, there is an even more distinct gap in substantive, empirical
research on HNHC patient readmissions among ACOs. Regardless, common themes do exist
across ACO, readmissions and HNHC literature (see Table 3 for common themes). This
research study aims to fill this gap and contribute to further knowledge of the impact ACOs have
on healthcare expenditure and future ACO models.
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Table 3
Common Themes Across the Literature
Coordination
across care
continuum

Patients with
multiple
chronic
conditions

Population
management

Ambulatory
care access

Integrated
information
systems

Provider
alignment
across care
system

ACO
Readmissions
HNHC

Literature Review Chapter Summary
In this literature review chapter, extant research on ACOs demonstrates a diverse field
of study that has been a gradual evolution reflective of the ACOs themselves. As the ACO
model matured, researchers have had the chance to better identify, categorize, and analyze
ACO organizational structures, the local context in which they operate, and the domains in
which performance is Tracked and monitored. Most research has been exploratory.
Furthermore, previous studies have not explored a key subset population that has garnered
much attention in recent years: high need, high cost patients. Instead, the literature review
revealed most studies included either a broad scope in general, specific populations with
ambulatory care sensitive conditions, or at-risk populations that utilized skilled nursing facilities.
Performance has primarily focused on mortality and costs. Few studies concerned
readmissions, and the few that had analyzed readmissions provide a strong foundation for
which this study will build its analytical framework.
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

Organizational theory serves as the overarching umbrella for research in the life cycle,
management, structure and performance of organizations — organizations defined as an
organized division of labor where people work together in sub-systems that ultimately transform
services to reach an end goal (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967a; Shafritz et al., 2011). In this study,
Accountable Care Organizations are organizations that span across several divisions of lab or
and sub-systems that transform healthcare services to improve the quality of care in which
health services are delivered, while decreasing costs overall. Several subsets of organizational
theory exist that address how organizations operate, the factors that influence them, and the
impact of such influences. One subset is organizational structure, which is described as a
fundamental characteristic that frames how an organization formalizes its authority and
coordinates work based on its environment and its goals (Jones, 2012).
Structural Contingency Theory
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) focused ACO incentives on value metrics
to drive performance improvement. ACOs were allowed operational flexibility to customize their
structures to local environments for optimal performance. Structural Contingency Theory
provides a theoretical framework that describes how organizations perform best when structural
characteristics align in relation to the situation in which organizations operate. Opportunity exists
to analyze ACOs under the lens of Structural Contingency T heory (SCT) to identify structural
characteristics that have the greatest impact on ACO performance. High need, high cost
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patients are highlighted in the literature as top contributors to healthcare expenditure, and
readmissions are identified as one of the highest costs (Hayes et al., 2016; Hines et al., 2014;
Kroch et al., 2015; Zuckerman et al., 2016). Common themes across ACO, readmissions, and
HNHC literature include complex coordination across the patient care continuum and goal
alignment among providers as key to improving quality and performance.
Structural Contingency Theory (SCT) is a research paradigm composed of three core
elements: 1) there is a relationship between organizational contingency and organizational
structure, 2) a change in the contingency determines a change in structure, and 3) organizations
seek alignment or “fit” between structure and contingency, which results in positive
organizational performance (Donaldson, 2001b). Contingencies are defined as the contextual
variables that influence the environment or work in which organizations operate. SCT focuses
on factors that contribute to performance variability and is based on the premise that
organizations change structure to adapt to environment or contingency. As contingencies
change, the organization shifts from fit to misfit as they adapt and seek new fit. Therefore, there
is no universal fit for organizations due to the specific environment in which they subsist. The
concept of no “one size fits all” is integral in both SCT and ACO design.
The majority of ACO literature has applied transaction cost economics and strategic
management theories to analyze the decision of producing services in-house and organizational
strategies that vertically integrate services (Bazzoli et al., 2017; Diana, Walker, Mora, & Zhang,
2015; Shay & Mick, 2016). transaction cost economics provides a framework for researchers to
examine how ACOs manage and access resources to conduct business (Shortell, 2016), such
as the costs and benefits for ACOs to contract third party vendors versus developing internal
capacity to produce resources themselves. However, neither transaction cost economics or
strategic management theory concentrate on organizational structure and performance
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variability. As seen in the literature review chapter previously, the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act’s goal for executing ACO MSSPs was to establish an overarching
accountability across care settings and improve coordination among fragmented health
services. SCT addresses the structural characteristics that allow for accountability and
coordination.
SCT is particularly apt to identify structural characteristics per individual environments
for organizations to reach optimal performance. An example of SCT in ACO research is
Chukmaitov, Harless, Bazzoli, Caretta & Siangphoe’s (2015) publication, “Delivery system
characteristics and their association with quality and costs of care: Implications for accountable
care organizations.” The authors analyzed ACO competencies, hospital characteristics, and
market characteristics on their impact on 30-day all-cause mortality and hospital inpatient costs.
Specifically, the authors hypothesized that 1) more centralized health systems had greater
improvement in mortality and inpatient costs, 2) hospitals with more physicians in a tightly
integrated physician organization agreement performed better than hospitals without physician
organization agreements, 3) hospitals with greater vertical integration of services along the care
continuum realized better performance, and 4) higher levels of health information technology
competencies were related to improved performance. The authors hypothesized that task
interdependence was a key contingency to study for ACO success based on the US’
fragmented healthcare delivery system. Chukmaitov and colleagues’ research highlights
existing opportunities in ACO literature.
Overall, few studies have leveraged SCT as a theoretical framework because of the
longitudinal nature of SCT research and the limited data available when ACOs were first
implemented. In addition, ACO data collection and ACO identification were intensively manual
at the program’s inception in 2012. As ACOs matured, data collection methodologies and
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research have also matured, allowing researchers to better analyze ACO programs and their
structural characteristics.
Structural Contingencies
Organizations exist to systematically transform services, products, or goods from one
form to another (Andrew H Van de Ven & Drazin, 1985). The actions that exist to transform
services are the activities or tasks that drive the organization's work. SCT is rich with numerous
contingency analyses ranging in level of detail encompassing macro-economic conditions,
organizational-wide factors, and unit level task activities that influence structure and
performance (Pugh et al., 1969). The unique aspect of SCT is the concept of how contingencies
influence structure, and organizational performance will vary depending on the way in which an
organization’s structure fits or fails to fit the contingencies in its environment. Examples of
contingencies are uncertainty (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967b), technology
(Donaldson, 2001b; Thompson, 1967), task interdependence (Aiken & Hage, 1968; Thompson,
1967), environmental change, strategy and diversification (Child, 1972) and size (Blau, 1970).
Among the listed contingencies, this study will f ocus on interdependence and strategy.
Uncertainty as a Contingency
In SCT literature, a variety of contingencies have been proposed throughout research,
such as task interdependence, technology, size and strategy. Researchers have measured
uncertainty by the extent that processes are automated or the frequency that rules and
expectations change (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Child, 1972; Donaldson, 2001b). Donaldson
(2001) postulated that one of the most prolific contingencies examined in SCT literature was
“uncertainty,” derived from Burns and Stalker (Donaldson, 2001, p. 37) as the rate of unknown
in the context of the environment or an organizational task. According to Burns and Stalker
(1961), two types of environments exist: mechanistic and organic. In a mechanistic
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environment, activities in the environment are prescribed, formalized into documentation and
information is quickly available for decision making at the top levels of management. Uncertainty
is low in a mechanistic environment. Contrarily, organic environments subsist in constant
change, where activities are not prescribed, and information is in constant flux. Decision making
requires local knowledge due to the frequency and pace of activities occurring in the specific
environment. Thus, the frequency of change is high, and the amount of uncertainty is high in
organic environments (Donaldson, 2001, p. 38).
Burns and Stalker’s concept of mechanistic and organic environments is applicable to
ACOs because of the fundamental cost saving nature of the program. Drivers to cost savings
are decreasing unnecessary utilization of medical services through heavy emphasis on
preventive care measures, such as cancer screenings, disease prevention and wellness
screenings (Albright et al., 2016). In order to decrease cost and unnecessary utilization of
services, ACOs focus on effectively targeting patients high risk of spending , such as patients
with characteristics like multiple chronic conditions, elderly, disabled and advanced illness (Long
et al., 2017). ACOs have focused efforts on unplanned readmissions and placed greater
emphasis on care coordination across transitions of care. This shift towards preventive care
management and intensive care coordination may be construed as a programmatic approach to
decrease uncertainty of HNHC patients and how they access care.
Interdependence as a Form of Uncertainty. In organizational theory, interdependence
is defined as the “intensity of connections” between tasks and task uncertainty among
organizational departments. This can be described as direction of workflow, information flow,
expected frequency of interaction among organizational departments and integration of work
(Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967a; Thompson, 1967; A.H. Van de Ven, 1976) .
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In the SCT literature, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a, 1967b) examined several
organizations with highly differentiated structures. In their study, they found that the degree of
differentiation and the type of work among the departments influenced performance. If an
organization was composed of highly differentiated departments with individual goals operating
under a very mechanistic environment, such departments would have few tasks interdependent
between each other, and uncertainty between departments would be low since they operate
independently of each other. If an organization was composed of departments that were more
functional in nature and were aligned towards a common overarching organizational goal, the
departments would be more likely to be interdependent with each other to accomplish their
work. In addition, due to the increased interdependence between departments, there is a
greater level of uncertainty in the operations. The authors further extrapolated f rom their findings
that when an organization’s department was more innovative in nature, the environment would
be organic, and thus less formal and requiring greater autonomy in their work. In summation to
Lawrence and Lorsch’s 1967 publications, the authors noted that organizational departments
with increasing interdependent tasks among each other required a corresponding level of
integration to mediate task uncertainty.
Complementary to Lawrence and Lorsch’s studies (1967a, 1967b), Chandler (1962)
recorded in his historical documents that a trend related to interdependence and integration was
noted in organizations with diverse business portfolios and multinational structures. When
businesses change their strategies to diversify their portfolios, their structures also become
highly differentiated and decentralized. Under their portfolio are independent products that can
operate autonomously with essential functions set up within their independent organization—like
a differentiated division within the larger organizational structure. As an organization becomes
more diversified, interdependence decreases among the differentiated divisions becau se of their
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autonomy. The contrary is also true in this case, that if an organization’s strategy is focused on
a single product, their structure is not differentiated or decentralized. Instead, they are expected
to be very functional and interdependent on each other since every department is contributing to
the development of the single product.
In the SCT literature, Thompson (1967) associated interdependence with technology as
an integration or coordination mechanism. He categorized interdependence into three types, in
increasing order of uncertainty and intensity of interaction between organizational departments:
pooled, sequential, and reciprocal.
Pooled interdependence. Pooled interdependence is described as a loosely formed
unit composed of disparate functions that may operate distinctly from each other (Johannes M
Pennings, 1975) such as a centralized or shared service that is heavily standardized by rules.
Pooled interdependence has the least uncertainty in its interactions among departments of an
organization due to its independent nature. In SCT literature, pooled interdependence is
associated with decentralized structures and organic systems (Donaldson, 2001). Such
organizations are more likely to have diversified strategies, and thus operate autonomously from
other departments.
Sequential interdependence. Sequential interdependence is defined as tasks or
activities between organizational departments highly reliant on a distinct direction to workflow
(Thompson, 1967). Each department is responsible for some sort of output that is necessary for
the next unit’s production. This type is highly interdependent and requires intensive coordination
but generally runs off a prescribed workflow. Sequential interdependence is higher in
uncertainty than pooled interdependence because task production is directly dependent on
another department’s output. Contrary to pooled interdependence, sequential interdependence
is expected to be in centralized structures and more mechanistic systems (Donaldson, 2001)
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Reciprocal interdependence. Reciprocal interdependence is described as a mutual
adjustment of workflow that occurs based on a feedback loop between departments to
accomplish tasks (Thompson, 1976; Aiken & Hage, 1968; Van de Ven, 1976). Reciprocal is
highest in uncertainty relative to the previous two interdependent types because tasks and
actions change according to a collaborative partnership between the two departments to
determine the next course of action. As uncertainty increases between organizational
departments, the level of coordination required increases to effectively perform and the level of
interdependence between departments is more intensive. Both reciprocal interdependence and
sequential interdependence require intensive coordination between departments. Thus, both
types of interdependence are more likely to operate in centralized structures that s upport the
organization. See Figure 2 below for a display of how uncertainty and coordination increases
with Thompson’s categories of interdependence.
Figure 2
Relationship Between Uncertainty and Interdependence
Type of Interdependence
Level of
uncertainty

Reciprocal
Sequential

Coordination
among
departments

Pooled
Task interdependence is a significant contingency when examining ACO structure, their
environments and performance. ACOs provide multidisciplinary and complex care coordination
for beneficiaries across the care continuum (A. J. Barnes et al., 2014). The US health system is
historically fragmented, which can be a compounded issue for effectively managing HNHC
patient populations (McCarthy et al., 2015). For ACOs to perform most effectively, ACOs would
need to connect across the fragmented pieces of the US health system to coordinate care.
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Thus, task interdependence would be expected to be high among providers in ACOs with high
performance.
Strategy as a Contingency
An important contingency that influences organizational structure is strategy. This
contingency is depicted in SCT literature as an organization’s future direction of its business,
which spans across product development, geographical distribution, targeted customer group,
or scope of services (Chandler Jr., 1962; Child & Francis, 1977). Common strategies cited in
organization theory literature include volume expansion, geographical dispersion, vertical
integration and diversification. Volume expansion is an increase in market share or customer
base. Geographical dispersion is the development of local presence in different geographies.
Vertical integration is the expansion of new functions that form multi-departmental structures
with aligned objectives for a service or product line. Diversification is defined as expansion of
new products or services offered, and essentially, separate targeted customer bases, objectives
and operations for each product leading to a multidivisional structure (Chandler Jr., 1962, p. 1516). Extant literature expounds that strategy is set by a governing body, most often a corporate
governance or board of directors that oversee long term planning, resource allocation and
overall strategy execution. Rezaee (2009, P. 7-9) describes corporate governance as an
overseeing body for regulations, policies, business practices, ethics management, legislation,
marketing and financial health of an organization. Depending on external and internal factors,
the role of corporate governance can shift to accommodate the needs of the organization; these
roles consist of auditing, supervising, coaching and steering. When conditions are less stable,
more uncertain and internally ineffective, boards take on more active execution roles . During
times of market transition, governance roles are required to shift towards a broad and diverse
composition to better represent expertise required for the conditions in which the organization is
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now operating (Ghofar & Islam, 2015). Likewise, governance roles can also be described as
financially driven or performance driven (Young, 2003). Previous studies apply contingency
theory to corporate governance by analyzing the moderating effect strategy has on governance
structures as they shift along with market conditions. According to Child & Francis (1977),
change in strategy leads to change in structure for decision making, environmental changes,
governance, resource allocation and integration across organizational departments.
Chandler describes multiple levels of vertical and horizontal alignment to execution of
strategies set by the governing body of a corporation (Chandler, 1962, p.10). As organizations
become more diversified, their structures shift from functional and centralized to divisional and
decentralized. Thompson (1967) posits that strategy is inherently linked to interdependency
because as organizations become more divisional, departments are reliant on a pool of shared
resources while operating independently from other departments. The less diverse an
organization, the more functional and interdependent their work are to each other (Child, 1997);
therefore, departments are operating intensively because their tasks are highly dependent on
another departments’ output (Smith et al., 1989). Figure 3 shows as organizational strategy
diversifies, interdependence decreases, and structure becomes more decentralized.
Figure 3
Relationship Between Strategy, Interdependence and Centralization
Type of Interdependence
Diversification

Pooled
Centralization
Sequential
Reciprocal
As indicated earlier, CMS focused on ACO performance rather than the local
implementation of ACO operations. Essentially, ACOs are composed of groups of providers and
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organizations voluntarily coming together to coordinate high quality care for populations
(McCarthy et al., 2015). By voluntarily coming together to form an ACO, disparate groups of
providers have aligned their business objectives and scope of services. According to the
strategy contingency, prior to joining the ACO, these disparate provider groups did not share a
common business direction nor were incentivized to coordinate care for even similar patient
populations. This could be construed as separate and diverse products across the care
continuum. But with the advent of the ACO, the ACO provides an umbrella for virtual, if not
organizational, alignment towards the same objectives with an officially established governing
body overseeing the members of the ACO and its performance (Chukmaitov et al., 2015).
Organizational Structures
Much of contemporary research on organizational structure is derived from seminal
studies conducted by Burns and Stalker (1961) on the management of organizational systems.
Burns and Stalker (1961) highlighted two opposing organizational structures: mechanistic and
organic systems. Both systems are contingent on the environments in which they operate.
Mechanistic systems are most appropriate in routine and stable environments structured for
control, whereas organic systems work best in unpredictable and non-routine environments
structured for innovation and autonomy (Burns & Stalker, 1961). These two management
systems frame the environment in which organizational structures are formed. The key
distinction between mechanistic and organic systems is the degree of control that management
enforces through its structures. The organizational environment that ACOs operate in can be
unpredictable and require flexible structures to adapt to highly localized needs, mitigate risks
within uncertain environments, and actively manage costs in the most effective manner possible
without jeopardizing quality of care.
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Formalization
Aiken and Hage (1968) define formalization as the parameters in which an
organization’s standard operating procedure is documented and the degree to which its
employees are free to deviate from such procedures (1968). Formalization has been
characterized as the documentation of roles, standard processes for information sharing, and
reported performance (Pugh et al., 1968). In SCT literature, formalization has been associated
with mechanistic systems where uncertainty is low and degree of control is built into an
organization’s bureaucracy (Burns & Stalker, 1961).
Interdependence and Formalization
According to SCT literature, as task interdependence increases, formalization decreases
because the organizational structure becomes more functional and centralized (Donaldson,
2001, p. 43). As mentioned earlier in this chapter, interdependence is categorized into three
types with corresponding levels of uncertainty. Since formalization has been associated with
decreasing levels of uncertainty in SCT literature (Burns & Stalker, 19 61; Lawrence & Lorsch,
1967; Donaldson, 2001), it can be assumed that pooled interdependence would be most
complementary to highly formalized structures, whereas sequential and reciprocal
interdependence would be most appropriate in organizations with low formalization. Figure 4
displays the inverse relationship between uncertainty and formalization.
Figure 4
Relationship Between Uncertainty, Interdependence and Formalization

Type of Interdependence
Level of
uncertainty

Reciprocal
Sequential
Pooled
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Formalization

Differentiation
In SCT literature, differentiation has been described as two different constructs. First,
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a) describe differentiation as the organizational division of work by
function and specialization. Divisions may operate independently, driven by division-specific
goals or incentives. Comparatively, Thompson (1972) describes differentiation as a vertical and
horizontal construct, identified by levels of hierarchy, number of divisions, and number of jobs.
Vertical Differentiation. Vertical differentiation is the hierarchical ranking of
organizational divisions, where span of control grows in layers of authority as the number of
employees grow (Blau, 1970). Organizational structures may be vertically differentiated along
managerial levels or subdivisions by branches and headquarters (George Ritzer, 1975). This is
true until the organization is at a point to leverage economies of scale and centralize
administrative duties across its organization. In healthcare, this construct has been translated
into levels of care, tiered access and pricing hierarchies across the care continuum (Bardey et
al., 2012; Gaynor et al., 2015; Mougeot & Naegelen, 2013) .
Horizontal Differentiation. Horizontal differentiation is the number of functional
divisions working across the organization that may operate as shared resources for the
organization, such as human resources, finance, and information technology (Blau, 1970). In
healthcare, horizontal differentiation can be seen in the increasing development of physician
group practices and independent practice associations across specialist groups. Strategically,
hospitals have contracted services, built health systems and virtual alliances across the care
continuum to expand scope of services (Young, Parker, & Charns, 2001). When organizations
grow to a certain size, tasks and responsibilities are grouped by function and specialization,
which leads to increased interdependence among the different functions (Van de Ven, 1976).
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Applied to ACO structures, differentiation could be described as how ACOs vary in their
contracting or services, according to local resources available or beneficiaries enrolled.
Decentralization. The concept of decentralization is linked to organizational size and
span of control. Decentralization is the concept that the organization has divided its workforce
into independent divisions managed by local forms of authority. The level of decentralization is
usually associated with size (Moch & Morse, 1977). As an organization grows, the more likely it
will be differentiated and authority or control from a hierarchy is also divided (Hollenbeck et al.,
2011). Authority is localized because the organization is practically too large for timely decision
making to flow up a large chain of command (Hinings, Greenwood, & Ranson, 1975;
Donaldson, 2001, p. 69).
Also linked to decentralization is interdependence and strategy. If an organization
changes its strategy to diversify its products, change direction or scope of services, the
organization’s structure is expected to be more autonomous, less interdependent with functional
departments, and more coordinated with centralized shared resources (Child & Francis, 1977).
In comparison, if an organization moves more towards an undiversified product, greater
centralization is expected through overarching governance, increased interdependence
between functional departments, and increased coordination between functional departments
(Donaldson, 2001). In healthcare, tiered services and levels of care within health systems are
likely to operate under a decentralized structure where decision-making authority is localized
and adaptable to local environments (Young et al, 2001; Hollenbeck et al, 2011). ACOs operate
under a similar concept where CMS allows organizations at the local environment to establish
the organizational structure that best meets their needs (A. J. Barnes et al., 2014). This can be
described in terms of the scope of services, level of integration among the services that are
within the ACO and the governance structure that directs ACO performance (Walker et al.,
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2017). For example, ACO governance structures range from hospital-led, physician-group-led,
co-leadership between hospital and physician group, or a separate gove rnance structure led by
local government representatives (Shortell et al, 2014). ACO governance demonstrates
potential alignment of provider incentives across the care continuum for effective population
health management (Abernethy & Stoelwinder, 1995; Alexander, Lee & Bazzoli, 2003; Van de
Ven, 2004; Charland, 2015; Burgers & Covin, 2016).
Integration. Integration is often paired with the study of differentiation. Integ ration is
described in SCT literature as the “effort among various subsystems” to coordinate work to
reach an organization’s goals (Zeithaml, Varadarajan, & Zeithaml, 1988; Donaldson, 2001,
p.41). In the ACO literature, integration is the most common of structural characteristics
explored (Frech et al., 2015; Gordon, 2016; Lewis et al., 2017; Mick & Shay, 2016) , especially
as care coordination is being evaluated in ACO performance, and this is highly dependent on
timely access to health services (Bazzoli et al., 2019; Shortell et al., 2017; Walker et al., 2017;
Winblad et al., 2017). Integration can occur both vertically and horizontally across an
organization.
Vertical Integration. In SCT, vertical integration is considered as integration across a
continuum of services or functions (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967a). This is usually seen in
organizations or functional departments with undiversified portfolios or strategies; workflow is
directional and intensively interdependent between functional departments. In SCT literature,
organizations with undiversified strategies that perform well show high interdependent activity
and high levels of coordination between functions (Donaldson, 2001, p. 43). Vertical integration
may be construed as organizational devices to align behavior and performance towards a
similar goal through contractual agreements, alliances, affiliations or levels of ownership
(Burgers et al., 2009; Jansen et al., 2009; L.J. Bourgeois, 1980; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967a;
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Turkulainen & Ketokivi, 2013). For example, if an ACO is highly integrated throughout the care
continuum, the ACO may have affiliations or contractual agreements with post-acute facilities or
home care agencies (Lewis et al., 2017). Affiliations have been noted as strategic alliances
among providers or multispecialty providers with hospitals for post-discharge follow up of high
risk populations (Fryer et al., 2016; Hickam et al., 2013), virtual agreements across health
services for timely access to preventive services like screenings and specialty care (Chukmaitov
et al, 2015), or safe transitions to post-acute facilities (Kennedy et al., 2018; Mileski et al., 2017;
Winblad et al., 2017).
Horizontal Integration. In comparison, horizontal integration in SCT is considered the
consolidation or mergers of similar services to expand access to the same type of service
(Young Parker & Charns, 2001; Jansen et al, 2009; Teixeira, Koufteros & Peng, 2012), such as
organizational mergers to alleviate interdependence among services (Pfeffer, 1972). For
example, in an ACO that is highly horizontally integrated, the ACO may acquire several primary
care practices or specialist groups to improve time to access care, reduce wait time, and
potentially divert unnecessary admissions or emergency room utilization.
Integration mechanisms. Thompson (1967) outlines integration mechanisms to
coordinate work. SCT literature describes integration as taking the form of 1) planned work or
rules, 2) centralized governance, and 3) the appointment of an independent body or individual to
act as a bridge among functions to coordinate activities (Thompson, 1967; Jansen, Tempelaar,
van den Bosch & Volberda, 2009). In SCT, intensive utilization and capability of information
technology tools is indicative of planned work through automation of standard operating
procedures and transforming logic into defined steps and rules (Child, 1973; Ouchi, 1977;
Starkweather, 1970). In evaluating the different integration mechanisms in the context of ACOs,
planned work or rules is described in the ACO literature as information systems used in the
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organization for information transfer, communication among providers, coordination across care
settings, and Tracking and monitoring of key performance indicators (Blumenthal, 2017;
Blumenthal & Abrams, 2016; Chukmaitov et al., 2015; Diana et al., 2015; Stremikis et al., 2017) .
As seen in the literature, ACOs oftentimes consider the needs and capabilities of their
organizations to manage specialized services in-house versus outsourcing. Integration has
been analyzed under the transaction cost economics (TCE) theoretical lens described as
organizations’ decision to internally produce or outsource expertise , but there is a difference
between a TCE perspective of integration versus a SCT perspective. Where TCE focuses on
cost and efficacy of producing specialized services versus outsourcing, SCT focuses on the
activities interdependent between subsystems to allow for greatest transmission of information
and transformation of services (Aiken & Hage, 1968). Furthermore, a critical program
component for ACOs is timely communication and access of services to effectively manage
patients across the care continuum, such as post-discharge transitions to a skilled nursing
facility.
Structure in Relation to Contingencies
Organizations adapt their structures to their environment to maintain positive
performance (Pugh, Hickson, Hinings & Turner, 1968; Donaldson, 2001). The environment in
which work is done serves as a contingency for an organization’s operations. Contingency
factors, such as organizational size, interdependency of tasks, and uncertainty in routine, are
organizational “contingencies”. When environmental contingencies change, organizations adapt
their structure to meet contingency demands so that they can ultimately progress and survive —
pursuing what is termed in SCT literature as “fit”. Fit is defined as the adaptation of an
organization’s structure according to the context of its environment in order to remain viable
(Donaldson, 2001). When an organization is in “fit”, the organization’s structural traits are in
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alignment to meet the demands of the environment, and performance improves as a result.
When an organization is in “misfit”, the organization’s structure may not be best suited to the
contingencies it faces, and performance declines as a result (Donaldson, 2001; Klaas, 2004;
Soylu, 2008; Van de Ven & Drazin, 1985). Figure 5 provides a visual representation of the “fit”
and “misfit” concept.
Figure 5
Structural Contingency Theory | “Fit” versus “Misfit”
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Analyzing Fit: Structural Adaptation to Regain Fit (SARFIT) and Hetero-Performance
Key to SCT research is the argument that organizations seek the most optimal fit
between structure and contingencies (Donaldson, 2001, 2006). In the literature, fit has been
analyzed in various ways to determine if there are alternative forms of understanding or
applying fit. Examples of different approaches to fit include: 1) natural selection, where
resources fall into place as best needed for the organization, 2) interactive pairs of contingency
and structure, and 3) a systems approach where the summation of several internal
contingencies and structural fits result in a holistic impact on performance (Van de Ven &
Drazin, 1985). A more functional approach to fit is Donaldson’s (2001) Structural Adaptation to
Regain Fit (SARFIT), described as the process in which a contingency in the organization
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changes, and the organization experiences reductions in efficiency and effectiveness (misfit)
until its structure changes to correspond with the contingency change. After the organization
adapts its structure to the most appropriate form for the changed contingency, performance is
positive again and the organization regains fit (Donaldson, 1987, 1999, 2001). Graphically, fit is
considered the point where contingency and structure intersect along a graph that indicates
optimal performance (see Figure 6. SARFIT). According to the concept of hetero-performance,
fit can be at different intersections where performance may be higher or lower, depending on
how well the organization adapts its structure (Donaldson, 2001, p. 263 -268). Performance is
not static nor pre-set for all organizations. Performance is dependent on the individual
organization’s contingencies and associated structure. The more optimal the fit between
contingency and structure, the higher the organization performs; in other words, the intersection
of contingency and structure is higher up on the fit line (Gresov, 1989; Klaas, 2004; Van de Ven
& Drazin, 1985; Xu, Cavusgil, & White, 2006).
Figure 6
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ACO Contingency Relationships
ACO Governance and Centralization
ACOs are examples of strategic alliances across healthcare providers to leverage
economies of scale for population impact (Colla, Lewis, Tierney & Muhlestein, 2016). The US
health system has historically functioned as a fragmented model. By participating in an ACO,
organizations are making a strategic decision to coordinate care as a system towards a similar
objective, but ACO literature has shown that shared accountability among providers is a
ubiquitous challenge (Lewis, Tierney, Colla & Shortell, 2017). Without shared incentives,
providers have had disparate goals that directed their activities, most especially among
hospitals, provider practices, and post-acute facilities, like skilled nursing facilities (SNF). In the
ACO literature, researchers have cited a potential solution to improve ACO performance when
providers do not share incentives: Centralize authority through shared governance between
providers and the hospital in the ACO (Kennedy et al., 2018). Centralized governance is
depicted in SCT literature as an independent group composed of representatives from
participating organizations that is positioned in an organization that oversees high level strategic
direction, resource allocation, long term planning and capital investments (Chandler Jr., 1962).
When looking at readmissions performance for HNHC patients, centralized governance through
shared accountability among providers in the hospital and post-acute settings are especially
important for chronic disease management and preventing unnecessary readmissions (H ayes et
al, 2016).
Historically, hospitals and providers operated under a diverse portfolio of objectives and
goals prior to joining an ACO. From the viewpoint of SCT, when hospitals and providers join an
ACO, they operate under a common goal with standardized objectives. In essence, ACOs
represent a strategic alignment among participating providers and health service organizations.
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The ACO can act as a vehicle to align structure, governance and performance across the care
continuum. As a consequence, the less diversified an organization’s portfolio is, its structure
becomes less decentralized and more functional. For example, prior to joining an ACO,
providers and health service organizations may be directed by individual goals, such as
hospitals under a case rate reimbursement model, post-acute skilled nursing facilities under a
fee-for-service reimbursement model and independent practice associations under a capitated
per-member-per-month model. After joining an ACO, each provider group, service organization
and health facility participating in the ACO are strategically aligned by performance and risk based agreements under the ACO. Thus, under the concept of SCT, ACOs will have greatest
impact on readmissions reductions for HNHC patients when governance is centralized at the
ACO level, structured as shared accountability between the hospital and providers. This may be
operationalized in ACOs by having the ACO’s governance co-led between hospital and provider
leadership. The contingency relationship is depicted in Figure 7.
Figure 7
Contingency-Structure Relationship #1
Strategy
Alignment

+

Governance

Further extrapolating from SCT literature on strategy and structure, this study infers that
the strategic oversight or alignment would indicate that an ACO controls long term planning,
resource allocation, objectives setting and funds flow at the highest level of the organization.
Therefore, based on this relationship between strategy alignment and governance, ACOs are
anticipated to exhibit better fit – as evidenced in earned total shared savings – when
governance is centralized at the ACO level and structured as a co-leadership between hospital
and physician leaders.

60

H1: ACOs with hospital and physician co-led governance structures are more likely to
produce total earned shared savings than ACOs without co -led governance structures.

Vertical integration within the ACO through physician alignment. According to
HNHC literature, HNHC patients have been identified as being complex because they possess
multiple chronic conditions, suffer from major chronic illnesses (such as congestive heart failure
and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease), and may be elderly, disabled, and require
behavioral health services and social support (Long et al., 2017). Because of their highly
complex needs, HNHC patients require intensive coordination among services and timely
access to care (Blumenthal & Abrams, 2016). ACOs with a high density of HNHC patient
populations would be expected to manage a greater amount of complex coordination for HNHC
patients than ACOs with lower HNHC patient populations. The higher the complexity in care
coordination, the greater the need for timely access to specialty care providers and preventive
care monitoring. HNHC patient populations are more susceptible to being readmitted due to
their multiple chronic conditions, diverse health needs, and challenging social and behavioral
situations (Hayes et al., 2016). This is especially important in terms of accessing provider
services across the care continuum. ACOs thus provide a strategic alignment among providers
and health service organizations to bridge the gap of complex care coordination for HNHC
patients. The greater the coordination needs, the more interdependent between health services.
Within the SCT literature, Donaldson (2001) synthesizes Thompson’s (1967) work on
interdependence and deconstructs the contingency into two basic elements: intensity of
interaction between groups and level of uncertainty. Intensity of interaction between groups is
defined as the frequency of administrative effort or interactions required between different
groups to accomplish work (Donaldson, 2001, p.172). For HNHC patient management,
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increased volumes or greater density of HNHC populations connotes an increased complexity in
care and thus increased uncertainty, which then requires more intensive interactions between
functions to decrease uncertainty. The corresponding structure thus suggests greater fit when
high interdependence is more centralized and an increasingly functional structure (Aiken &
Hage, 1968; Andrews & Boyne, 2014; Ford, Slocum, & Jr., 1977). Due to the high
interdependence needed for complex coordination of HNHC patients, this study expects high
interdependence among providers and health service organizations. Therefore, ACOs would be
less likely to have physician groups be decentralized from the service organization, like a
hospital. This can be applied to the current study in that as complex coordination increases, the
less likely physician group practices will be decentralized from the ACO. Thus, physician group
practices would be expected to be in tight alignment with service organizations, like a hospital in
the ACO (see Figure 8 for the second contingency relationship).
Figure 8
Contingency-Structure Relationship #2

Complex
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+
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The management of HNHC patient populations requires complex coordination. Based
on this relationship between complex coordination and physician alignment, it is hypothesized
that ACOs with higher volumes of HNHC patients among their beneficiaries are anticipated to
exhibit better fit – as evidenced in better performance through ACO program shared savings –
when physician group practices are more tightly aligned with the ACO rather than loosely
aligned. Tight alignment can be interpreted by the type of integration mechanisms ACOs
employ, such as contractual agreements, alliances, affiliations or levels of ownership (Lawrence
& Lorsch, 1967; Bourgeois, 1980; Burgers, Jansen, Van den Bosch & Volberda, 2009; Jansen,
Tempelaar, Van den Bosch & Volberda, 2009; Turkulainen & Ketokivi, 2013). The more legally
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binding an alignment, such as mergers, affiliations or types of ownership, the tighter the
alignment. The more virtual an agreement, the looser the alignment.
H2: Under conditions where the ACO is assigned to higher risk populations, ACOs with
tight physician and hospital alignment will outperform ACOs with loosely aligned
physician and hospital associations.

Interdependence between hospital and community behavioral health partners.
According to the Academy of Medicine’s HNHC patient taxonomy, behavioral health was one of
the fundamental factors of the HNHC patient profile that makes this population distinctly more
vulnerable to receiving sufficient quality care (Blumenthal et al., 2016; Long et al., 2017). Mental
illness or drug / alcohol problems have been cited as key predictors for high services utilization
among the Medicaid population (Blumenthal, 2017). Therefore, incorporating behavioral health
services into ACO networks should yield an impact on preventing readmissions following
hospital discharges.
In viewing this contingency relationship under the lens of SCT, there is high
interdependence between hospitals and behavioral health experts in the community. As
interdependence increases, the expectation is that the ACO becomes less decentralized and
more functional in structure. This would result in partner development between hospitals and
behavioral health expert groups, potentially in the form of post-discharge enrollment to
behavioral health services (Thompson, 1967; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Figure 9 depicts the
third contingency relationship for this study.
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Figure 9
Contingency-Structure Relationship #3
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n
Based on the contingency relationship between complex coordination and functional
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partnerships with behavioral health experts, it is anticipated that ACOs with high volumes of
HNHC beneficiaries will exhibit better fit – as evidenced in better performance in reduced
inpatient psychiatric admissions – when they involve some form of partnership between
hospitals and behavioral health expert groups. This may be in the form of preferred networks,
contractual agreements, memorandums of understanding, or physician privileges among post acute facilities. Examples of this may be where hospitals apply for a waiver to the two-midnight
rule when a patient is admitted through an emergency department, and the hospital h as an
agreement with a skilled nursing facility to transfer patients with lower acuity to be managed at a
lower level of care after a 23-hour observation stay. Another example is the assignment of a
social worker or behavioral health specialist to HNHC patients at risk due to mental illness.
H3: Under conditions where the ACO is assigned to higher risk populations, ACOs with
greater access to behavioral and mental health services will outperform ACOs without
such access.

ACO health IT integration among hospital, ambulatory and post-acute services.
Building on complex coordination of care for HNHC populations among ACO beneficiaries,
HNHC patient literature has described intensive communication among providers to coordinate
care. Coordinating care for HNHC patients requires intensive interaction that occurs for ongoing
care management, outcomes monitoring, and intervention activities (Blumenthal et al, 2016). To
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determine when interventions are necessary, many ACOs have developed transition care teams
to actively oversee beneficiaries posing the highest risk for readmission (Lewis et al, 2017).
Critical tools and information necessary for transition care teams to be successful are access to
patient medical records and care team notes. Immediate access to patient medical information
and updated communications between providers are one of the critical health IT factors
identified in Bazzoli and colleagues’ (2017) ACO taxonomy.
Under the lens of SCT, the intensive interaction described above may be labeled as
reciprocal interdependence among functions of health service experts. The more complex care
that is needed, higher levels of interdependence is expected. Thus, integration tools would be
needed for successful coordination among groups or services coordinating care for HNHC
patients in the ACO. Advanced levels of health IT integration is thus expected connecting
providers and service organizations in the ACO (Thompson, 1967). For reciprocally
interdependent tasks, “intensive” technologies are expected to be utilized where two-way
communication and feedback determines next steps in action and highlights the greatest level of
uncertainty in tasks. In order to mitigate the reciprocal nature of the interdependence between
functions for complex care coordination of HNHC patients in ACOs, a high level of health IT
integration is expected. Figure 10 displays the contingency relationship.
Figure 10
Contingency-Structure Relationship #4
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Thus, a high level of health IT integration is expected for a best fit between complex
coordination and health IT. Based on the contingency relationship between complex
coordination and health IT integration, it is anticipated that ACOs with high volumes of HNHC
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beneficiaries will exhibit better fit – as evidenced in better performance in unplanned admissions
for beneficiaries with Heart Failure, Diabetes or Multiple Chronic Conditions – when they exhibit
high levels of health IT integration.
H4: Under conditions where the ACO is assigned to higher risk populations, ACOs with
higher health IT integration will outperform ACOs with lower health IT integration.

Conceptual Model
The complex nature of readmissions among HNHC populations connotes that no one
contingency may definitively depict a best fit with ACO structure and performance. Considering
this complexity, this study will draw from Donaldson’s (2001) concept of multiple contingencies
that uses an additive model to determine best fit of contingencies and structure.
Figure 11 shows a conceptual model of this study. The first part depicts each
contingency relationship outlined previously in this chapter that will be analyzed for calculated
degree of fit to ACO performance. Secondly, scores for each contingency relationship will be
added in a composite model for overall calculated degree of fit for ACO performance. Overall,
the greater degree of fit between contingency and structure is expected to present a positively
correlating relationship with ACO performance. ACO performance dependent variables include
readmission rates and ACO shared savings. Control variables include ACO variables (such as,
ACO size, ACO Track, ACO program entry year, ACOs that changed Tracks or programs and
ACOs that have exited), market variables (such as, geographical areas, urban vs rural,
physician density) and beneficiary variables (such as those marked as HNHC or not). HNHC
patient populations will be identified as beneficiaries dually enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid,
diagnosed with chronic conditions, identified with behavioral health needs, or are disabled.
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Figure 11
Conceptual Model and Contingency-Structure Relationship #5
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As depicted in the conceptual model and referred to in Donaldson’s (2001) proposal that
multiple contingencies may be calculated by applying an additive approach, the final hypothesis
is an aggregate of the previous four hypotheses.
H5: ACOs with higher measures of fit between their structural characteristics and
contingencies will exhibit better performance than ACOs with lower measures of fit.

Chapter Summary
In accordance with SCT, this study hypothesizes that the relationships between an
ACO’s structure and its contingencies affect its performance. This study attempted to determine
what specific ACO characteristics are associated with strategy and task interdependence
contingencies, utilizing descriptions from Bazzoli and colleagues’ (2017) taxonomy of ACOs and
the Academy of Medicine’s (2017) HNHC patient taxonomy.
Four contingency relationships were outlined, and from the conceptual mode l, five
hypotheses were derived. Based on these hypotheses, the next chapter will detail the multiple
regression model to be used to statistically determine their significant relationships with ACO
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performance. The next chapter will also describe data sources, biases, research approach,
analytical mode, and variables (such as independent, control, moderating and dependent
variables).
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Chapter 4: Methods

The objectives of this chapter are to describe the research design, data sources, sample
and population, variables, and analytic methodology applied to this study. This will include study
assumptions and steps taken to mitigate threats to the internal and external validity of the study.
Research Design
This study is an exploratory, non-experimental, post-test-only non-equivalent group
design with multiple cross-sections to examine fit / congruence between contingencies and ACO
structural variables to explain ACO performance. Descriptive statistics will be conducted to
explore associations among independent variables. Regression analyses will be used to
analyze statistical significance, direction of relationships and impact with the dependent
variables. Finally, a two-step regression will be utilized to analyze for multiple contingency fit
(Volberda et al., 2012)
The study will consist of a three-year period, 2015 through 2017. Past organizational
theory research (Child, 1974; Donaldson, 1987; Ellis et al., 2002; Stan & Puranam, 2017) have
posited that a time lag occurs between an organizational change and its effect on performance.
Fit / congruence will be measured when organizational change occurred, for example, when
changes in contingency effectuate changes in structure (Donaldson, 2001). Previous studies
have applied one year or a moving average (time plus one) to account for any time lag when
examining fit (Sine et al., 2006; Sousa & Voss, 2008; Zajac et al., 2000). The sample population
will include ACOs participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) with a start
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date of 2015 and participated in the National Survey of Accountable Care Organizations.
Organizations that have elected to discontinue the ACO program or change their Track during
the study period will be excluded. For example, if an ACO changes from Pioneer to MSSP Track
1, that ACO would not be included in the analysis to maintain consistency and not threaten
internal validity of the study. Likewise, if an ACO discontinues its participation in the program
during the study period, that ACO will be excluded in the dataset to maintain consistency.
Therefore, this study will calculate fit / congruence (X) for ACO structural changes in initial
agreement period year 2015 and outcome measures (O 1 – O2) in PY 2016 through 2017 to
accommodate the anticipated time lag and the full agreement period of 3 years. MSSPs are
allowed 2 agreement periods of 3 years each. See figure 12 for the research design.
Figure 12
Research Design
X

O1 O2

Fit / Congruence
measurement PY 2015

Performance measurement
PY 2016 – PY 2017

Threats to internal and external validity. This study is a non-experimental and nonequivalent groups design because it will not manipulate independent variables for the study nor
randomly assign test subjects (Belli, 2009). Instead, this study leverages best practices in the
design of social sciences research to analyze existing ACO data for contingency relationships to
performance. Internal validity is related to the accuracy of a study and the extent the design was
able to control the impact extraneous variables may have on the outcomes. External validity is
the extent in which the study’s results may be generalizable in another context outside o f this
study. Threats to internal and external validity limit this study’s ability to establish a causal
relationship between contingencies, structure and performance. The threats include
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instrumentation, regression, testing, maturation, history, selection, setting and the existence of
multiple programs. Elimination or mitigation of each threat will be discussed in detail in the
following sections and highlighted in Table 4.
Instrumentation. Threats to internal validity related to instrumentation include any
changes to the mode of administration and data collection in a study (Trochim, 2007). This
study will utilize secondary data from two main sources: The Dartmouth Institute for Health
Policy and Clinical Practice and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS).
The Dartmouth Institute partnered with the University of California, Berkeley and The
Commonwealth Fund on a project to analyze ACOs across the United States. Part of the project
consists of the implementation and management of the National Survey of Accountab le Care
Organizations (NSACO), which is a longitudinal study implemented in 2012 that surveys ACO
executives and senior leadership regarding ACO structure, program characteristics, provider
partnerships, and health services across the ACO. The NSACO dataset has been utilized in
several studies since its inception, and the survey tool was validated by Dartmouth’s Data
Analytic Core department. The survey was designed specifically for longitudinal analyses at
national levels capable of linking to CMS datasets. Thus, threats regarding instrumentation for
the NSACO are eliminated by the instrument’s design.
Publicly available data and ACO performance data sources maintained by CMS are the
other data sources this study will use. ACO-level, beneficiary-level, and provider-level ACO data
are maintained by CMS and made public for researchers through the CMS.gov website as well
as a research data assistance center for purchase. The threat to internal validity related to this
dataset is that there have been changes in formatting and terminology for key metrics each
performance year that CMS has released ACO performance data. CMS had released ACO data
in a static .pdf file as a “fact sheet” compared to a public use file that CMS releases and updates
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nearly quarterly. In order to address this threat, this study will use only public use files released
at the end of the calendar year. Key terminology changes among performance year datasets
include “generated savings/generated losses,” “earned savings,” and the availability of
“Medicare trust fund” calculations. This was identified by the National Association of ACOs in
their September 2016 performance year review of Medicare Shared Savings Program
performance years 1 – 3 (Litton, 2016). The report suggested workaround calculations for
comparable analyses, which this study will apply to be able to analyze across performance
years.
Regression. The threat to regress towards the mean in a study exists when a pre-test is
conducted, scores show extreme performance, and participants are selected based on the pretest scores (Trochim, 2007). This study did not conduct a pre-test, so the study design
eliminates this threat.
Testing. The threat of having participants possess knowledge prior to the
program/survey conducted is significant when there is potential heterogeneity in performance
based on participants’ prior knowledge (Trochim, 2007). The CMS data are derived from
required data submissions from all participating ACOs. Therefore, the threat is neutralized
because all organizations participating in an ACO are required to complete a lengthy
submission process before being accepted as an ACO. No prior knowledge based on a pre -test
has thus been applied. Similarly, the NSACO did not conduct a pre-test, and the results of the
survey do not provide any direct benefit to ACOs that submit data to the NSACO.
Maturation and History. Potential threats to validity regarding maturation are defined as
changes that occur within participants that have an effect on the dependent variables.
Participant history can be construed as any external event from the study that may impact the
results. To address maturation and history, this study’s sampling population will include only
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ACOs participating in MSSP that entered the program in the same cohort year – 2015 – and
remained in the ACO without changes to its Track program until the final year. ACOs
participating in Track 1, which is the predominant group, are allowed to stay in Track 1 for a
maximum of three years.
CMS beneficiary assignment methodology was revised in 2016 and again in 2018. In
order to maintain as much consistency within the study population as possible, this study will
analyze performance years 2016 – 2017, which accounts for any changes in beneficiary
assignment. Medicare fee-for-service beneficiary assignment includes: 1) beneficiaries must
have had at least 1 primary care visit during an ACO assignment window with an ACO provider,
2) beneficiaries designate an ACO provider as their primary care provider (not to be substitute
by a specialty provider), and 3) beneficiaries designate an ACO professional to coordinate their
overall care. Exclusion criteria are highlighted as: 1) beneficiaries who have not had at least 1
primary care visit during an ACO assignment window with an ACO provider, 2) beneficiaries
elect to designate a non-ACO provider as their primary care provider, 3) beneficiaries elect to
designate a non-ACO provider or a specialist to oversee their overall care, 4) CMS will exclude
any services beneficiaries have received from ACO providers who participate in more than one
ACO (Medicare Shared Savings Program, 2017).
Selection Bias. Selection bias is defined as the selection of participants or data that
may have not been properly randomized to a degree that represents the study population
(Creswell, 2009, p. 218-220). This is a threat to internal validity because this study will not
randomly assign high need, high cost beneficiaries to ACOs or randomly assign providers to
ACOs. This study will mitigate some of these threats by its statistical model that will include
control variables for ACO market and program characteristics, such as geographical location,
rural/urban setting, ACO beneficiary size and provider density.
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Beneficiaries may self -select out of ACOs during the study period, which may affect the
outcomes if the groups are not equivalent from the beginning. This threat is eliminated by CMS
requirements that ACOs are benchmarked according to 3 years of data prior to the initial start
year. ACO benchmark years determine prior expenditure of key ACO metrics and beneficiary
composition. In addition, ACOs must have a minimum of 5,000 beneficiaries per performance
year. This stipulates a threshold of minimum beneficiaries. In addition, CMS calculates a risk adjusted beneficiary score to determine if adjustment is needed for the ACO’s benchmarking
scores. Therefore, ACO scores are readjusted and re-benchmarked accordingly if changes in
structure or beneficiary population occur.
Providers may potentially self -select into ACOs based on local knowledge of potential
beneficiaries in the community. Additionally, providers may participate in several ACOs ,
whereas ACOs are not allowed to participate in more than one shared savings program during
any single performance year. This poses as a threat for provider self-selection or cherry-picking
of populations that have greatest opportunity for better outcomes. In order to mitigate this threat,
the study population includes only ACOs that remain within the program for the study period.
Potential selection bias for HNHC beneficiary assignment to ACOs is mitigated by CMS’
assignment methodology, based on prospective assignment with retrospective reconciliation.
CMS’ beneficiary assignment methodology excludes services by providers participating in more
than one ACO, basing assignment on primary care services and the designation of an ACO
primary care provider (Medicare Shared Savings Program, 2017).
Multiple Programs. There is the potential threat that providers and organizations
participating in ACOs could be under conflicting healthcare programs that may influence results
of the survey (Creswell, 2009, pp. 217-223). CMS is the overarching national governing body
that maintains and oversees all CMS programs in which providers and organizations may
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participate. Rules exist for both providers and healthcare organizations that limit their
participation and align their improvement initiatives, such as the Hospital Readmissions
Reduction Program and Merit-based Incentive Payment System. Potential conflict exists in
some healthcare organizations or service providers that operate and are incentivized on a fee for-service basis versus value-based care. One of this study’s aims is to analyze the strategic
alignment of disparate services across the care continuum within ACOs. Thus, this specific
conflict will be an independent variable to be analyzed.
External Validity: Generalizability of the Study. Threats to external validity include
study generalizability—specifically, application to the broader ACO population. Due to the
study’s small sample size, the findings would not be comparable to the overall ACO population
(J. Barnes et al., 1994). However, the study’s findings may be transferable for targeted and
practical application to localized geographies and groups, utilizing data sources from the
National Survey of Accountable Care Associations and CMS (Zumbo & Rupp, 2004, p. 73;
Creswell, 2009, p. 217-223). In studies with limited generalizability, transferability is an
opportunity for practice managers to adapt or incorporate the study’s findings that best supports
their operations. In order to mitigate challenges with small sample sizes, this study will focus its
analysis on variables directly related to the contingency-structure pairs and HNHC indicators,
such as Medicare and Medicaid dual eligible and disabled ACO beneficiaries. In addition,
nonparametric statistical tests for non-normal distributions will be utilized to further enhance the
model’s statistical power. For researchers seeking to apply this study’s findings to a broader
ACO population, due to the small sample size and exploratory nature of the study, transferability
may be a more appropriate practical application that selectively uses key concepts of the
findings for ACOs in their local environments.
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Table 4
Threats to Internal and External Validity: Overview

Threats to Validity

Mitigation of Threats
•

Instrumentation

•
•

Utilize NSACO and CMS datasets, based on their data collection
methodologies
Include the most updated datasets published
Utilize recommended data transformation methodology per National Survey of
ACOs

Regression

N/A

Testing

N/A

Maturation/History

•

Include only ACOs that remained in Track 1 for study period

•

Beneficiary selection bias mitigated by CMS beneficiary assignment
methodology and CMS re-benchmarking when major adjustments occur in ACO
structure and beneficiary population changes
Provider selection bias mitigated by CMS exclusion criteria of any services with
providers participating in multiple ACOs

Selection Bias
•

•
Multiple Programs

Generalizability

•

•

Organizational threat mitigated by CMS exclusion criteria for ACOs to
participate in one shared savings program per performance year
Provider threat mitigated by CMS exclusion criteria for services provider by
providers participating in multiple ACOs
Selective application of the study’s findings to matching local environments
versus broad policy implications for the broad ACO population in general

Data Sources
This study will utilize the National Survey of Accountable Care Associations (NSACO) to
access data on ACO organizational characteristics, ACO partnerships, contract features, and
clinical and technical capabilities.
This study will merge NSACO data with publicly available CMS data sources, such as
the Shared Savings Program ACO Public Use File (PUF) for ACO financial and quality
performance data, beneficiary demographics, and CMS program eligibility.
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Study Population and Sampling Strategy
This study examines the population of accountable care organizations under Track 1 of
the Medicare Shared Savings Programs (MSSP) that started in 2015 and remained in Track 1
through 2017. For this study, an accountable care organization is defined as any organization
that has submitted an application and been accepted to CMS’s MSSP program.
Sampling Strategy
This study will be using data from the National Survey of ACOs (NSACO) and CMS’ Medicare
Shared Savings Program (MSSP) Public Use Files (PUF). The Dartmouth Institute for Health
Policy and Clinical Practice is the organizational body overseeing the NSACO instrument, data
management, research and analytics related to ACOs. This study’s student investigator
submitted a data request to The Dartmouth Institute for access to the NSACO survey data
pertaining to the hypotheses described in Chapter Three. Working with The Dartmouth Institute,
NSACO data were linked with CMS data from the PUFs posted on the public website for ACO
performance information. The dataset being utilized is composed of organization -level deidentified data on ACOs that responded to the NSACO. The following sections detail the specific
questions derived from the NSACO dataset.
The objective is to include as many organizations as possible that have submitted data
to both the NSACO and MSSP PUF during the period of 2015 – 2017. As described in the
review of SCT literature, researchers have stated a time lag is expected from time of
intervention to impact on performance (Sine et al., 2006; Sousa & Voss, 2008; Zajac et al.,
2000). According to the January 2018 Medicare Shared Savings Program Fast Facts release,
the majority of MSSPs are under ACO Track 1, a one-sided risk sharing model, representing
82% of all ACOs, as of 2018 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2018a). ACOs
participating in Track 1 are allowed two agreement periods of three years each until they are
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required to progress to a two-sided risk sharing model. Thus, in order to analyze ACO structures
on cost savings and quality outcomes, consistent participation in Track 1 is an inclusion criteria
for this study’s ACO dataset. This research will attempt to maximize the sampling size of the
study population utilizing a nonprobability sampling approach because each ACO in the dataset
does not have a definite probability of being selected for analysis.
Overview of Study Population. First, this study looks at the total number of ACOs
under Track 1 listed in the ACO Shared Savings Program Public Use Files (SSP PUF) from
2015 – 2017 posted on CMS.gov (N = 89) and those that participated in the NSACO (N = 45).
For those ACOs remaining in the dataset, this study included ACOs that remained in Track 1 for
their entire three-year agreement period and this research’s study period, 2015 – 2017.
Beneficiary size is evaluated and will include only those ACOs with a minimum of 5,000
beneficiaries. There is a slight possibility for ACOs to lose beneficiaries in their second or third
years, and CMS communicates to ACOs with less than 5,000 beneficiaries that they must meet
this minimum requirement. The sample size of ACOs that fit the above criteria is small (N = 45),
and thus this analysis is meant to be exploratory in nature. The results will set the foundation for
future analyses using NSACO data as more organizations participate.
Next, the number of ACOs from the ACO SSP PUFs will be matched to the National
Survey of Accountable Care Organizations. The dataset will include ACOs that completed the
NSACO survey for the study period, 2015 – 2017. Pertinent information from the NSACO
includes ACO governance structure, organizational structure, provider agreement types, and
health services agreements. If ACOs did not submit the above information to the NSACO during
the study period, those ACOs will be excluded from the dataset. See Figure 13 for exclusion
criteria and sampling sizes. This study will exclude Non-MSSP ACOs, ACOs in Tracks 1+, 2, 3,
Pioneer, and ACOs that did not complete the NSACO survey in 2015.
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Figure 13
Sampling Criteria
744 ACOs (all types: MSSP,
Managed Care, Medicaid, etc.)

392 MSSP ACOs
(all start years)

89 MSSP ACO Track 1
(start year 2015)

45 MSSP ACO Track 1 and
participated in NSACO
(start year 2015)

Measurement Variables
As presented in the conceptual model described in Chapter 3, this study will analyze fit /
congruence between ACO organizational characteristics and contingency variables related to
interdependence and strategy. A regression analysis will be conducted between fit / congruence
and ACO performance. This section describes how the study will operationalize the conceptual
model into analytical variables, such as the dependent, independent and control variables.
Study limitations will also be discussed at the end of the section.
Dependent Variables
ACO performance is based on multiple factors identified by CMS, such as relative
change in beneficiary readmissions, relative change in inpatient psychiatric admissions and total
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earned shared savings. This study uses three dependent variables in its analyses of fit /
congruence, which are discussed in the following sections.
All Cause 30 Day Readmission Rates. This dependent variable is derived from the
ACO SSP PUF as assigned beneficiaries readmitted to a hospital within 30 days from the index
admission per 1,000 discharges for all diagnoses. A lower rate indicates a greater quality score
for the ACO. Because this study includes only ACOs with a 2015 start year, a relative change in
readmission rate will be calculated from start year versus the end of the ACO’s first agreement
period, performance year 2017. This accounts for the anticipated time lag for operational
implementation of the ACO program. Relative change to readmissions will be analyzed using a
generalized linear regression model to determine if change over time is associated with program
structure or contingencies.
Earned Shared Savings Payments. This dependent variable is count data derived from
the ACO SSP PUF as total shared savings ACOs earn based on their quality performance score
exceeding a minimum savings rate. This study will include only ACOs participating in Track 1 as
part of their initial agreement period. This dependent variable is an indicator for the program’s
overall quality performance in comparison to their benchmarked performance that was
calculated by CMS using three years-worth of retrospective performance data. Earned shared
savings for performance years 2016 – 2017 will be added to represent total shared savings.
However, Track 1 MSSP ACOs operate under a one-sided risk model. The total shared savings
distribution will be highly positively skewed because Track 1 MSSP ACOs cannot earn negative
savings and there are no penalties under Track 1. Total shared savings will be analyzed using
an inflated zero negative binomial regression model to account for the potentially high number
of zeros in the distribution (Muoka, Ngesa & Waititu, 2016).
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Inpatient Psychiatric Admissions. In the ACO SSP PUF for performance years 2016 –
2017, ACOs reported on assigned beneficiaries discharged from an inpatient psychiatric facility
per 1,000 discharges. As identified in the literature, behavioral health factors heavily contribute
to functional challenges for HNHC patients, exacerbated by their multiple comorbidities and
diseases (Blumenthal, 2010 & 2017). Access to behavioral health services in the ambulatory
setting would theoretically prevent unplanned admissions. This study will analyze relative
change for inpatient psychiatric admissions from start year 2015 and the end of the ACO’s
agreement period in 2017 using a generalized linear regression model.
Independent variables
Per the conceptual model discussed in chapter 3, this study will calculate fit /
congruence for structural and contingency variables based on a factorial design, using 2015
data from the NSACO and SSP PUFs. The dataset will include ACOs that entered into a Track
1 agreement starting in 2015. Based on the contingency relationships described earlier, each
structural and contingency pair will be transformed into a dummy variable to analyze its
significance on ACO performance.
Structural Variables. The following subsections describe how this study will create
binary variables for the following ACO structures: Governance, physician alignment, functional
partnership, and health IT integration.
Governance. This structural variable will be derived from the NSACO survey instrument
from performance year 2015, based on the ACO’s self-identified leadership structure. This study
draws from Chandler’s (1962) research on structure and strategy. He lists the different
strategies as 1) growth by expansion of volume, 2) geographical dispersion, 3) expansion into
new functional services and 4) diversification into new products. As company strategies require
greater local presence, structures become more decentralized and greater coordination among
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divisions are required. Increased coordination equals to increased administrative activities.
Chandler highlights global companies that have created overarching decision-making offices
that oversee their catalogue of diverse products and coordination of activities across
widespread geographical presence. Long term planning and organizational decision-making
authority is centralized at a general office responsible for policy development and resource
allocation. In application to ACOs, this study will analyze the ACO leadership structure most
representative of inpatient and outpatient healthcare delivery. The question from the NSACO
survey instrument that will be used to analyze ACO leadership structure is presented below.
NSACO Question #9: Which of the following best describes the leadership structure of
your ACO? Please select one response.
•

Physician-led

•

Hospital-led

•

Jointly led by physicians and hospital

•

Coalition-led

•

State, region, or county-led

A binary variable will be calculated by transforming survey responses from ACOs that indicated
“Jointly led by physicians and hospital” as 1 (co-led) and all other responses as 0 (not co-led).
Physician Alignment. This structural variable will be derived from the NSACO, based
on contract characteristics of any provider agreements constructed with the ACO, such as joint
ventures, management service agreements or physician employment agreements for specialty
providers. This variable on physician alignment indicates services integrated along the care
continuum for an ACO’s assigned beneficiaries. Chandler (1962) describes organizational
expansion of services as vertical integration. Both Chukmaitov et al (2015) and Bazzoli et al
(2017) identify formal provider agreements as a critical ACO organizational characteristic for
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health service delivery. The question from the NSACO survey instrument that will be used to
calculate this structural variable is presented below. If an ACO marks that the “ACO provides
directly” or “ACO contracts w/ non-ACO providers” for the service specified, the variable will be
coded as 1, representing a tight physician alignment. If an ACO indicates that it is not
contracted with any providers through a formal relationship, the variable will be coded as 0,
representing a loose physician alignment. This variable is an indicator that ACO strategy is in
alignment of its physician resources, thus providing beneficiaries greater access to health
services in a timely manner.
NSACO Question #19: Please indicate how the following services are provided.
ACO provides
directly

ACO contracts
w/ non-ACO
providers

ACO has no formal
relationship with
providers

Don’t
know

A. Routine specialty care
(e.g., orthopedics)
B. Inpatient rehabilitation
services
C. Mental health services
D. Addiction treatment
E.

Skilled nursing facility

F.

Palliative/hospice care

G. Home health/visiting nurse
H. Hospital diversion services
(e.g., outpatient crisis
management, peer
support, etc.)

If an ACO has a formal agreement, it is more likely that the ACO is placing serious investment in
access to health services, which should hypothetically improve care coordination and quality
performance scores. Each service will be treated as a dummy variable and analyzed
individually.
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Functional Partnership. This structural variable will be derived from the NSACO, based
on indicators that partnerships exist for behavioral health services. This may be construed as
any ancillary services agreements, management service agreements, joint ventures, patient
transfer agreements, or professional services agreements with post-acute / ambulatory facilities,
such as skilled nursing facilities, long term acute care hospitals, acute rehab facilities,
behavioral health services or social services. The NSACO question below will calculate dummy
variables for each clinician type. This question is a multiple response question where ACOs may
indicate multiple types of clinicians participating in the ACO providing mental health services to
assigned beneficiaries.
NSACO Question #38: Do the following types of clinicians deliver any mental health or
addiction treatment as part of the organization(s) participating in the ACO contract?
A. Psychiatrists
B. Nurse practitioners or physician assistants
C. Psychologists
D. Social workers providing therapy
E. Peer support specialists
F. Addiction treatment counselors (e.g., licensed drug and alcohol counselor, licensed
clinical supervisor)
G. Addiction medicine specialists (i.e., psychiatrists or other physicians focused on
addiction medicine)
A dummy variable will be created for each clinician type where the ACO marked “yes” being 1
and indicating a functional partnership exists; if the ACO marked “no”, it will be 0 and in dicates
that a functional partnership does not exist. Because this is a multiple response survey
question, this study will analyze all combination of answers submitted to the NSACO for
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variability of the mean for total shared savings. The existence of these agreements are
indicators of intense sequential interdependence and care coordination that can decrease
readmissions to the hospital. High need, high cost patients are identified as having both
behavioral and social needs that further exacerbates the complexity of their care. This structural
characteristic is an indicator for an ACO to better engage high need, high cost patients and
expand the realm of control for ACOs to coordinate post-discharge care. ACOs can establish a
support system through community resources by forming official agreements with behavioral
health services or facilities to alleviate HNHC beneficiaries with little support once they return to
their communities.
Health IT Integration. The presence of health IT for enhanced communication,
coordination, and access to important beneficiary information through an electronic health
record or electronic medical record is a key structural variable. In the NSACO, multiple
questions are included in the survey regarding information exchange and access for efficient
beneficiary care coordination. For high cost, high need patients, timely access to beneficiary
health information is necessary for the complex care coordination required. Below highlights the
NSACO questions that will be converted into dummy variables for each multiple choice answer.
NSACO Question #21: To what extent are [data elements included in the electronic health
record] standardized (done in the same way) across the participating organizations in
your ACO?
•

Not standardized; varied across our ACO

•

Somewhat standardized across our ACO

•

Mostly standardized across our ACO

•

Fully standardized across our ACO
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NSACO Question #68: How many electronic health record (EHR) systems do you have in
place across your ACO? Please “X” one box.
•

A single EHR across all facilities

•

Multiple EHRs

•

A mixture of EHR and paper systems

•

No EHR capabilities at present

Both questions above are categorical variables and ordinal; from lowest IT integration
capabilities at “Not standardized; varies across our ACO” in question #21 and “No EHR
capabilities at present” in question #68 to highest IT integration capabilities at “Fully
standardized across our ACO” in questions #21 and “A single EHR across all facilities” in
question #68, respectively. A dummy variable will be created for each multiple choice response
to analyze ACO standardization.
Contingency Variables. Binary variables for ACO contingencies will be created for:
Strategy alignment and complex coordination.
Strategy Alignment. This contingency variable indicates alignment of organizational
objectives with ACO objectives; specifically, long-term planning pertaining to funds flow,
strategic partnerships, resource allocation and capital technology investments (Conway et al.,
2018; Day & Matousek, 2018; DeMuro, 2011). Chandler (1962) describes organizational
strategy as the long-term planning of enterprise level objectives for growth and sustainability.
Chandler’s definition of strategy can be applied to ACO research and structural contingency
theory. Strategy is a contingency that impacts organizational structure when changes occur, and
an organization seeks to adapt its structure to match its contingency for positive performance
(Donaldson, 2001, p. 284-283). ACO structures may consist of health systems, hospitals,
physician groups or health service providers. This survey question from the NSACO provides
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data as to what level in the ACO structure determines strategy and organizational long term
direction. Below highlights the NSACO questions that will be converted into binary variables.
NSACO Question 14: At what level are [strategic planning] activities conducted? Please
select one response per row.
•

Practice or hospital level

•

Region or division level

•

Contracting organization (ACO) level

A dummy variable will be created for an ACO that indicates whether they conduct their activities
at the “Contracting organization (ACO) level” for strategic planning (1 for ACO-level strategic
planning) or not (0 for strategic planning at lower levels, such as practice or hospital and region
or division levels).
NSACO Question #27: Please indicate how financial rewards (savings, bonuses, upfront
payments) from ACO participation are distributed [Yes, No or Don’t Know].
A. Retained by the ACO to offset overhead and infrastructure investments in information
technology, care redesign and related items
B. Allocated across participating ACO member organizations
C. Paid directly to physicians
A dummy variable will be created where 1 indicates that an ACO retains and allocates financial
rewards versus 0 indicates that the financial rewards are allocated across participating ACO
member organizations or paid directly to physicians. If an ACO retains the financial rewards, this
is considered as high alignment. This is a multiple response category, and this study will also
analyze the multiple response combinations.

87

NSACO Question #28: Are any of the following used to determine primary care physician
compensation in the ACO [Yes or No]?
A.

Productivity measures (e.g., RVUs)

B.

Base salary

C.

Clinical quality measures

D.

Patient satisfaction

E.

Cost reduction measures

A dummy variable will be created for each potential metric the ACO may use to determine
primary care physician compensation. This is a multiple response category, and this study will
conduct a multiple response analysis to better understand the potential combinations or patterns
that may exist among the responses.
Complex Coordination. This contingency variable will derive from CMS’ Hierarchical
Condition Categories (HCC) risk scores and is a continuous variable. HCCs are a prospective
risk adjustment methodology used by CMS for estimation of assigned beneficiary future
healthcare expenditure. The model is based on hierarchical grouping of disease state by patient
complexity, resource utilization, severity of illness, and demographic and disability status
information. Higher scores indicate higher risk and anticipated expenditure.
CMS calculates risk scores using demographic data of assigned beneficiaries under four
separate populations in the ACO: end stage renal disease, disabled, dual eligible, non-dual
eligible. The risks scores are applied to the ACO assigned beneficiaries of the relevant sub population to adjust for projected expenditure of the performance year. ACOs with a score of 0.5
are expected to have costs 50% lower than the average beneficiary, a score of 1.0 is expected
to be equal and a score of 2.0 is expected to be two times higher than the average (Better
Medicare Alliance, 2018). High need, high cost patients have been identified as needing
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intensive post-discharge care coordination due to their many behavioral needs and social risk
factors (Long et al., 2017). Some research studies have used HCC risk scores as a means to
analyze complexity and high risk patients (Bélanger et al., 2019; Fryer et al., 2016; Sen et al.,
2018). The HCC risk scores for assigned beneficiaries with disability or dual eligible status will
be used in this study as indicators for complexity and coordination. Dual eligible assigned
beneficiaries are individuals dually eligible for Medicaid and Medicare over the age of 65. Per
Better Medicare Alliance’s white paper on Medicare Advantage Risk Adjustment (2018), dual
eligible beneficiaries are considered as one of the highest risk and highest cost populations
requiring extensive “specialized care and management”. Thus, the higher the HCC risk scores,
the higher complexity and risk of the beneficiary population. See Table 5 for variables.
Contingency-Structure Pairs. Due to the small sample size, the contingency-structure
pairs will be analyzed in a stepwise approach for hypotheses 1 – 4, following Pennings’ (1987)
deviation analysis approach, exploring each pair and categorical response’s fit / congruence for
optimal performance. First, this study will calculate residual values for each contingencystructure pair, representing the distance from the fit line, as described by Van de Ven and
Drazin (1984, pp. 9, 22). The residual value for each ACO will then be added into a total
contingency score and used in a regression analysis to determine if multiple contingency fit /
congruence has statistically significant influence on ACO performance. This residual and
additive approach was utilized by Volberda and colleagues (2012), which built from Donaldson’s
multiple contingency approach (2001).
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Table 5
Study Variables
Variable

Measurement

Data Type

Dependent Variables
Readmissions per 1,000 dc

Final – Index / Index (2015 to 2017)

Ratio

Data Source
SSP PUF
Calculated

Earned shared savings

Sum of earned shared savings (2016 to 2017)

Count

Final – Index / Index (2015 to 2017)

Ratio

Calculated

Misfit (residual) scores of each contingency structure pair

Interval

Calculated

Sum of misfit scores (residuals) for each
individual fit / congruence

Interval

Calculated

Aggregate residual scores less than (-1) and
greater than (+1) SD from fit line considered as
“misfit”

Dichotomous

Calculated

Structural Variables
ACO governance

ACO leadership structure

Nominal

Provider contracts

ACO provider agreement types

Nominal

Mental health delivery

ACO mental health delivery by provider

Nominal

Data definitions

Data standardization

Ordinal

EHR

EHR centralization

Ordinal

Contingency Variables
Strategic planning

Level in ACO responsible for strategic planning

Dichotomous

NSACO

HCC risk scores for dually eligible and disabled
assigned beneficiaries

Interval

SSP PUF

Inpatient psych admissions
per 1,000 dc

Independent Variables
Individual measure of fit /
congruence
Aggregate measure of fit /
congruence
ACO Misfit

Hierarchical Condition
Category (HCC) dual and
disabled

NSACO

SSP PUF

Offset Variable
Log of assigned beneficiary panels by ACO
ACO size
Dual Eligible

Calculated

Dual eligible assigned beneficiaries / Total
assigned beneficiaries
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Interval

Calculated

Ratio

Calculated

Calculation of Fit / Congruence
This study will leverage a similar approach to calculating fit / congruence as published by
Pennings (1987), Van de Ven and Drazin (1985) and previously applied by Swofford (2011) and
Volberda et al (2012). Complementary to the fit / congruence concept, Burton & Obel (1998)
and Burton, Lauridsen & Obel (2002) published research on the calculation of misfit and
multicontingency models, analyzing the relationship between number of misfits and directional
implications to organizational performance. The authors found that the number of misfits did not
correlate with greater performance loss for individual metrics. However, overall performance
showed a slight inverse relationship with misfits in general. In contrast, Donaldson (2001, pp.
282-285) described misfit as a nonlinear relationship between performance and fit when
considering multiple contingencies.
According to the SARFIT concept, organizations seek to adjust their structure as
contingencies change, and as a result, performance decreases during this adjustment period.
As the organization adapts its former structure to fit with new contingencies, a new threshold for
fit develops between contingency and structure. Donaldson (2001) describes organizational
performance between the “old fit” line and “new fit” line as a moderate performance decrease
from previous performance levels as the organization adjusts its structure to attain fit. Thus, it
would be expected that many ACOs would be in misfit and experience performance decline as
they transition between their “old fit” and “new fit” when CMS releases new policies or
submission requirements. This study will leverage the concept of misfit, as described in SCT
literature regarding interdependence (Aiken & Hage, 1968; Thompson, 1967) and technology
(Donaldson, 2001). See Table 6 for the contingency-structure pairs, which include H1) strategy
alignment and shared governance, H2) complex coordination and physician alignment, H3)
post-discharge care coordination and functional partnerships, H4) complex coordination and
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health IT integration, and H5) the overall fit of all contingent-structure pairs. Each hypothesis
also indicates a reference group that will be used for the analysis.
Table 6
Contingency-Structure Pairs and Expected Performance Direction
Hypothesis

Contingency Variables a

Structure Variables b

Expected Performance

1

Strategy Alignment
(Aligned similar goals to ACO)

Governance
(Centralized Leadership)

(+) Total Earned
Shared Savings
(greater than $0)

• Strategic Planning: ACO level
• Financial Rewards retained by ACO
• Physician Compensation including
Clinical Quality indicators
2

Complex Coordination
(High interdependence)
Hierarchical Condition Category Risk
Scores for Dual Eligible/Disabled

3

Complex Coordination
(High interdependence)
Hierarchical Condition Category Risk
Scores for Dual Eligible/Disabled

4

ACO leadership structure
• Joint-Led Hospital/Physician

Service Alignment
(More formalized
partnerships)

(+) Total Earned
Shared Savings
(greater than $0)

Provider Agreement Types
(ACO formalized contract or
directly provided services)

( - ) Relative Change in
Readmissions
(reduction)

Functional Partnership
(More formalized
partnerships)

( - ) Relative Change in
Inpatient Psychiatric
Facility Admissions
(reduction)

Mental Health Delivery provided
by ACO

Complex Coordination
(High interdependence)

Health IT Integration
(More formalized processes)

Hierarchical Condition Category Risk
Scores for Dual Eligible/Disabled

Fully standardized data
A single EHR across all facilities

(+) Total Earned
Shared Savings
(greater than $0)
( - ) Relative Change in
Readmissions

a: Represents subcategories in NSACO multiple choice options that were identified as contingency variables for strategy (H1) and
interdependence (H2-H4) matched to structural variables that would be a “fit” and produce optimal ACO performance
b: Represents subcategories in NSACO multiple choice options that were identified as structural variables for centralized
organizational oversight through ACO governance (H1) and formalization (H2 -H4) matched to contingency variables that would be a
“fit” and produce optimal ACO performance

Based on Pennings’ deviation analysis approach from the SCT literature, this study will
calculate residual values to represent misfit in each contingency-structure pair. For hypotheses
92

with multiple independent variable subcategories, a composite residual score will be calculated
for each hypothesis. Next, this study will apply Donaldson’s (2001) additive multicontingency
model approach. This study will aggregate the average residual scores of all the hypotheses to
determine a total misfit score for each ACO. Finally, this study will adapt from Swofford’s (2011)
research on multicontingencies by categorizing ACO misfit based on a nominal threshold from
the aggregate residuals to be used in a regression analysis. Donaldson (2001, pp. 210-212)
further expounds on the relationship between misfit and performance, according to deviation
analysis, as one unit of misfit to a corresponding unit of performance. This study will categorize
ACOs with aggregate residuals one standard deviation from the fit line as being in “misfit” and
ACOs with residual values between (+1) and (-1) standard deviation in “fit”, effectively creating a
dichotomous variable for misfit from the residual scores.
Analytic Methodology
This study will first explore the relationship between ACO structure and contingency.
Each categorical variable from the NSACO will be transformed into dummy variables, or
“synthetic variables”, and analyzed in a stepwise approach for directional indicato rs of the
contingency-structure pairs to its dependent variable (Donaldson, 2001). This will be done to
increase robustness of the statistical model because of the small sample size. Residual values
will be calculated for each contingency-structure pair to evaluate misfit. The residuals are the
distance from the fit line, thus interpreted as “misfit” (Volberda et al, 2012). An additive approach
will then be applied to analyze multicontingency fit by calculating the sum of the residuals of
each contingency-structure pair as an independent variable to be included in a future regression
analysis (Donaldson, 2001; Swofford, 2011; Volberda et al, 2012).
Next, fit / congruence hypotheses will be tested between contingency-structure pairs
matrix, and the hypothesis for each pair will be analyzed for ACO performance using a
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regression analysis. The empirical formula of the multiple regression for readmissions and
inpatient psychiatric admissions dependent variables are:
Readmissions: Yi ∆2015,2017 = β0 + β1Xi 2015 + β2Ai 2015 + log(t) + εi.
IP Psych Admissions: Yi ∆2015,2017 = β0 + β1Xi 2015 + β2Ai 2015 + log(t) + εi.
Yi ∆2015,2017 is the relative change of the dependent variable for ACO readmissions and inpatient
psychiatric admissions i in performance years 2015 and 2017. β0 is the intercept in which the
contingency-structure pair intersect with Yi ∆2015,2017 on the regression plane. Xi 2015 is the
independent variable for contingencies in the contingency-structure pair being analyzed. Ai 2015
is the independent variable for structure in the contingency-structure pair being analyzed. The
log(t) is the offset variable for the log of ACO assigned number of beneficiaries during 2015. ε i is
the error term (or residuals) for the empirical formula.
The empirical formula of the zero-inflated negative binomial regression model (Oppong
et al., 2017) for total earned shared savings dependent variable is:
𝜋 + (1 − 𝜋𝑖 )𝑔(𝑌𝑖 = 0),
𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖 ) = { 𝑖
(1 − 𝜋𝑖 )𝑔(𝑌𝑖 ),

𝑌𝑖 = 0
𝑌𝑖 > 0

Pr is the probability of Yi success, interpreted as an ACO earning shared savings greater than
zero. 𝜋𝑖 is the logistic link function over time 2016 – 2017, where total earned shared savings
equal zero; versus (1 − 𝜋𝑖 ) is when Yi greater than zero. 𝑔(𝑌𝑖 ) is the negative binomial
distribution that takes into account the over-dispersed count data with excess zeros, including
the independent variables, offset and intercept, similar to the regression above.

Chapter Summary
This chapter described the methodology in which this study will analyze data from two
major national sources: The National Survey of ACOs and the Centers for Medicaid and
Medicare. This includes definitions of variables, transformation of variables for fit / congruence
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analysis, regression analysis of the hypotheses and the limitations of the study. The next
chapter will describe the preliminary results of the analysis.
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Chapter 5: Results

This chapter discusses data preparation, statistical analyses and results. The first
section describes how the dependent variables were calculated and their descriptive statistics.
The second section reports descriptive statistics for the independent variables and any
exploratory associations with the dependent variables. The third section reports the results of
the regression analyses conducted by hypothesis. The fourth section includes supplementary
analyses for the multiple response data used in the independent variables. The final section
concludes with a chapter summary.
Data Preparation and Calculation of Study Measures
This study created a dataset merging ACO level data from the National Survey of
Accountable Care Organizations and the Shared Savings Program Public Use Files available on
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid’s Research, Statistics, Data and Systems website. ACO
organizational data, such as the structure variables and some of the contingency variables
(specifically, the ACO strategic planning data), were derived from the NSACO, pulled by ACO
investigators from the Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and Clinical Practice. Data were then
matched to the SSP PUF on ACO demographics, such as ACO beneficiary size, HCC risk
scores for the dual eligible and disabled beneficiary populations, earned shared savings,
inpatient psychiatric admissions and 30-day all cause unplanned readmissions. ACO HCC risk
scores and earned shared savings were calculated by CMS based on three years of
retrospective ACO performance data. Inclusion criteria for the ACOs in this
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study’s dataset are: Medicare Shared Savings Program ACOs under Track 1 that participated in
the NSACO, ACOs that started in 2015, and ACOs that remained in Track 1 until 2017, which is
the end of the first agreement period.
The dependent variables for the study were calculated for relative change in
readmissions and inpatient psychiatric admissions by ACO from start year 2015 and end of
agreement period 2017. The formula used for readmissions was: 2017 readmissions per 1,000
discharges minus 2015 readmissions per 1,000 discharges, divided by 2015 readmissions per
1,000 discharges. The formula used for inpatient psychiatric admissions was: 2017 inpatient
psychiatric admissions per 1,000 discharges minus 2015 inpatient psychiatric admissions per
1,000 discharges, divided by 2015 inpatient psychiatric admissions per 1,000 discharges. Total
earned shared savings per ACO was calculated as the sum of 2016 and 2017 ACO earned
shared savings. 2015 was not included because it was a start year and, as noted in Chapter 4,
this study incorporated a one-year lag time from the first year of the ACO’s inception to account
for program improvements.
For the independent variables, NSACO survey answers obtained via the paper
submission version of the survey were excluded from the analyses due to insufficient sample
size. There were several NSACO survey questions that had multiple response options; thus,
dummy variables were created to better analyze impact of individual responses and to improve
robustness of the model by minimizing the degrees of freedom used. The multiple response
questions from the NSACO that were re-coded into dichotomous variables for each response
option include: Financial rewards, physician compensation, provider agreement types and
mental health delivery by provider. Several NSACO survey questions were 1) aggregated
multiple choice options and re-coded into dichotomous variables or 2) re-coded into
dichotomous variables by response, in order to simplify the model and minimize degrees of
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freedom used. These variables include strategic planning (at the ACO level: yes or no), ACO
leadership structure (joint-led by hospital and physician or not), data standardization and EHR
centralization.
Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variables
The data for ACO earned shared savings, readmissions and inpatient psychiatric
admissions were derived from CMS’ Shared Savings Program Public Use File. The dependent
variable for total earned shared savings was calculated as a sum of 2016 – 2017 ACO savings
at the organizational (ACO) level. Readmissions and inpatient psychiatric admissions were
calculated as the relative change (∆) from 2015 to 2017. Table 8 presents descriptive statistics
for the dependent variables and Appendix 1 provides histograms and Q-Q plots for further
perusal.
Total Earned Shared Savings. The sample size was relatively small (N = 45). This
study’s dependent variable was composed of count data with a distribution that was non-normal
(Shapiro-Wilk statistic = .671, sig. p = .000), heavily right skewed (skew = 1.387) and overdispersed (kurtosis = .633). ACOs earned on average $1.97M ± $3.18M in shared savings. A
wide range existed (range = $10.3M), and the majority of ACOs in the sample (66%) earned
zero savings. The Q-Q plot for total earned shared savings (see Appendix 1) highlighted
outliers, and the non-zero values displayed unequal variances across the distribution. According
to statistical count model literature, poisson distributions are identified by the population’s
variance being equal to the mean, whereas the negative binomial distribution is more positive
and severely right-skewed than the poisson (Rodriguez, 2013; UCLA: Statistical Consulting
Group, 2019; Zamri & Zamzuri, 2017; Zhang, 2019). Based on the distribution characteristics
described, total earned shared savings was identified as a negative binomial distribution. Thus,
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this study will compare generalized negative binomial regression and a zero inflated negative
binomial regression to determine which model would be most appropriate (Muoka et al., 2016)
Relative Change in Readmissions. The mean readmission rates per 1,000 discharges
in the ACO’s assigned beneficiary population showed a mean relative change in readmission
rates of 5.23% ± 9.07%. A decline was observed in overall readmissions performance from
2015 to 2017. The majority of ACOs (69%) saw increases in readmission rates, or decreased
performance, as evidenced by the mean readmission rate increasing from 162.02 readmissions
per 1,000 discharges in 2015 to 169.42 readmissions per 1,000 discharges in 2017 (see
Appendix I for three-year trends for readmission rates). The distribution was normal (ShapiroWilk statistic = .981, sig. p = .641) with slightly positive skew to the right (Skew = .210) and
moderately thinner tails than expected in a normal distribution (Kurtosis = -.476). For the
regression analysis, this study will use a generalized linear regression model for readmissions.
Relative Change in Inpatient Psychiatric Admissions. ACO trends displayed slight
improvement in overall inpatient psychiatric admissions with a mean value of -12.00% ± 33.80%
relative change in psych admissions from 2015 – 2017. The distribution was slightly non-normal
(Shapiro-Wilk statistic = .916, sig. p = .004) with moderately positive skew to the right (Skew =
1.060) and highly kurtosed with long tails and high peak in its distribution (Kurtosis = 2.308),
indicating potential outliers in the distribution. Similarly to readmissions, this study will use a
generalized linear regression model for inpatient psychiatric admissions. See Table 7 for
dependent variables’ descriptive statistics.
Correlations Between Dependent Variables. Correlations analysis on total earned
shared savings, relative change in readmissions and relative change in inpatient psychiatric
admissions showed no statistically significant values and a relatively moderate negative
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relationship (range Pearson correlation = -.025 to -.144) between the dependent variables (see
Appendix 2 for Correlation Matrix: Dependent Variables).
Table 7
Descriptive Statistics – Dependent Variables
∆ Readmissions b

N (ACO level)

Total Earned Shared
Savings a
45

45

∆ Inpatient Psychiatric
Admissions c
44 (missing 1)

Mean

$1.97M

5.20%

-1.22%

Median

$0.00M

5.00%

-1.67%

Standard Deviation

$3.18M

9.07%

3.38%

Variance

$1.011E+13

8.22%

1.14%

Skewness

1.387

.210

1.060

Kurtosis

.633

-.476

2.308

Shapiro-Wilk Test for

Statistic = .671,

Statistic = .981,

Statistic = .916,

Normality

sig. p = .000

sig. p = .641

sig. p = .004

Name

a. Calculated as the sum of ACO earned shared savings 2016 – 2017
b. Calculated as the relative change in readmission rates per 1,000 discharges for all causes from 2015 start year and 2017
c. Calculated as the relative change in rate of discharges from an inpatient psychiatric facility per 1,0 00 discharges from 2015 start
year and 2017

Independent Variables
For this study’s independent variables, the frequency distribution showed that 28.9% (n
= 13) of ACOs operated under a joint-led physician and hospital leadership structure, with a
mean total shared savings of $1.27M ± $2.67M. Whereas, 53.3% (n = 24) of ACOs were
physician-led, with a mean total shared savings of $3.01M ± $3.59M. An Independent T-Test for
ACO Leadership Structure showed a mean difference of $0.90M between joint-led ACOs and
other ACO leadership structures. Per Levene’s statistic (.sig value = .133), equal variances
were assumed but joint-led structures were not statistically significantly different versus other
ACO leadership structures (t(43) = .942, p = .351).
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In terms of strategic planning, 60% of ACOs (n = 21) indicated strategic planning was
done at the ACO level. Of those ACOs with strategic planning at the ACO level, the majority
were physician-led. A comparison between the groups showed a mean difference of total
earned shared savings at -$2.50M, where ACOs that conducted strategic planning at the ACO
level have a mean $2.96M ± $3.70M versus ACOs conducting strategic planning at the hospital
or regional level with a mean $0.50M ± $1.20M. Per Levene’s statistic, equal variances were not
assumed (sig. value = .000) and there was a statistically significant difference between the
groups (t(33) = .942, p = .003).
ACOs appeared to operate under varying financial and service models. The majority of
ACOs retained and reallocated across ACO members any financial rewards earned from shar ed
savings. (76% and 78% of ACOs in the sample, respectively) The metrics ACOs primarily used
to determine ACO physician compensation were clinical quality (80% of ACOs), patient
satisfaction (64% of ACOs) and productivity (53% of ACOs), which reflected a shift towards
value as more ACOs concentrated on quality and patient satisfaction.
Numerous ACOs in the sample population (n = 45) directly provided routine specialty
care (60%), inpatient rehabilitation (47%), mental health (33%) and home health service s (31%).
There was no clear standard model of contractual services that demonstrate significant savings
or reduction in readmissions. For example, financial rewards distribution and physician
compensation showed diverse combinations that were utilized by ACOs, but the ACOs still
earned zero shared savings. See Table 8 for descriptive statistics of independent variables.
ACOs appeared to operate under varying financial and service models. The majority of
ACOs retained and reallocated across ACO members any f inancial rewards earned from shared
savings. (76% and 78% of ACOs in the sample, respectively) The metrics ACOs primarily used
to determine ACO physician compensation were clinical quality (80% of ACOs), patient
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Table 8
Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables
Variable

ACO
Governance

Strategic
Planning

Financial
Rewards
Distribution b

Physician
Compensationb

Data
Definitions d

Categories

n a (% total)

Mean Savings (SD)

Mean ∆Readm (SD)

Physician-led

24 (53.3%)

$3.01M (± $3.59M)

6.1% (± 8.9%)

Hospital-led

4 (8.9%)

$0

6.7% (± 4.5%)

Jointly led by physicians and
hospital

13 (28.9%)

$1.27M (± $2.67M)

5.3% (± 2.7%)

Coalition-led

2 (4.4%)

$0

-1.0% (± 2.8%)

Other (State, region, or countyled, other)

2 (4.4%)

$0

-1.5% (± 13.4%)

ACO level

27 (60%)

$2.96M (± $3.70M)

4.1% (± 8.1%)

Hospital / Practice level

14 (31%)

$0.63M (± $1.30M)

5.6% (± 10.3%)

Regional level

4 (8%)

$0

12.0% (± 10.7%)

Retained by ACO

34 (76%)

$2.39Mc (± $3.45M)

6.0% (± 9.0%)

Reallocated across members

35 (78%)

$2.07Mc (± $3.25M)

1.2% (± 9.3%)

Paid to physicians

24 (53%)

$2.69Mc (± $3.55M)

3.7% (± 9.4%)

Productivity

24 (53%)

$1.28M (± $2.21M)

6.0% (± 9.4%)

Base Salary

19 (42%)

$0.89M (± $2.17M)

5.8% (± 8.7%)

Clinical Quality

36 (80%)

$1.74M (± $2.84M)

4.6% (± 9.0%)

Patient Satisfaction

29 (64%)

$1.60M (± $2.92M)

5.4% (± 9.6%)

Cost Reduction

18 (40%)

$1.67M (± $2.73M)

6.1% (± 9.6%)

Fully standardized

5 (11%)

$1.67M (± $3.73M)

8.8% (± 7.5%)

Mostly standardized

15 (34%)

$3.00M (± $3.32M)

6.7% (± 9.8%)

Somewhat standardized

14 (32%)

$1.97M (± $3.21M)

1.8% (± 9.1%)

Not standardized

9 (20%)

$0

5.3% (± 6.9%)

Single system

8 (18%)

$0.35M (± $0.86M)

7.6% (± 8.4%)

Multiple EHRs

29 (66%)

$2.05M (± $2.96M)

4.2% (± 9.5%)

Mix EHR / paper

6 (14%)

$2.29M (± $4.27M)

5.6% (± 6.7%)

No EHR

0

$0

0

EHRd

a: total sample n = 45
b: multiple response survey question; ACOs may select more than one category representative of a variety of financial approaches
c: savings are overall ACO’s total earned shared savings; not specific amount of savings by distribution methodology
d: sample missing 1 case; n = 44

101

satisfaction (64% of ACOs) and productivity (53% of ACOs), which reflected a shift towards
value as more ACOs concentrated on quality and patient satisfaction. In terms of information
technology, the majority of ACOs reported that they “mostly” (n = 15, 34%) or “somewhat” (n =
14, 32%) standardized data elements for reporting and operations. Mean total earned shared
savings were concentrated with ACOs reporting “mostly” standardized data elements ($3.00M ±
$ 3.32M). Regarding electronic health records (EHR), the majority of ACOs reported to have a
mix of EHR and paper (n = 6, 14%) or operating with multiple EHRs (n = 29, 66%), ranging
between $2.05M - $2.29M in mean total earned shared savings. Readmission rates increased
overall, showing a performance decline. The highest increase in readmission rates were ACOs
with mostly standardized (6.7% ± 9.8%) and fully standardized data elements (8.8% ± 7.5%).
Table 9 Descriptive Statistics of Categorical Variable by Provider Type shows ACOs that
delivered mental health services by type of provider. There is some discernible performance
improvement that range between -1.2% and -13.7% from 2015 to 2017. ACOs did not display
any preferences for mental health service delivery; distribution was almost equal across
psychiatrists, NP / PAs, psychologists and social workers. The greatest improvement in
psychiatric admissions were seen with the use of NP / PAs and social workers. However, there
were very high standard deviations (ranging from ±32.0% – 38.6%), due to the small number of
ACOs and the relatively small number of inpatient psychiatric admissions.
Table 9
Descriptive Statistics of Categorical Variable by Provider Type a
Variable

Categories b

n c (%)

Mean ∆IP Psych Adm (SD)

Mental Health Delivery

Psychiatrist

26 (59.0%)

-11.3% (± 32.0%)

NP / PA

29 (66.0%)

-13.5% (± 32.8%)

Psychologist

23 (52.3%)

-1.2% (± 38.6%)

Social Worker

27 (61.4%)

-13.7% (± 35.0%)

a: multiple response survey question; ACOs may select more than one category
b: excluded categories with less than 40 ACO responses
c: sample missing 1 case; n = 44
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Table 10 shows descriptive statistics for categorical variable by service type. No
discernible outcome trends were found among ACOs that directly provided routine specialty
care (60%), inpatient rehabilitation (47%), mental health (33%) and home health services (31%).
For example, financial rewards distribution and physician compensation showed diverse
combinations that were utilized by ACOs, but the ACOs still earned zero shared savings.
Table 10
Descriptive Statistics of Categorical Variable by Service Typea
Provides
Directly

Contracts

No Contract

Don’t Know

Variable

Categories

n (%)

n (%)

n (%)

n (%)

ACO Provider
Contracts

Routine specialty
care

27 (60%)

2 (4%)

15 (33%)

1 (2%)

IP rehab

21 (47%)

3 (7%)

18 (40%)

3 (7%)

Mental health

15 (33%)

3 (7%)

21 (47%)

5 (11%)

Addiction
treatment

9 (20%)

2 (4%)

26 (58%)

7 (16%)

Skilled nursing

8 (18%)

8 (18%)

26 (58%)

3 (7%)

Palliative/hospice

11 (24%)

5 (11%)

26 (58%)

3 (7%)

Home health

14 (31%)

9 (20%)

19 (42%)

3 (7%)

Hospital diversion

12 (27%)

2 (4%)

23 (51%)

8 (18%)

a: multiple response survey question; ACOs may select more than one service category across a variety of contracting approaches

The continuous independent variables included hierarchical condition category risk
scores for dual eligible and disabled assigned beneficiaries. ACO population risk scores were
an average 1.04 (± .09) for dual eligible and 1.09 (± .09) for disabled assigned beneficiaries,
which were very close to each other, indicating a similar or an overlapping population. Figure 14
presents Hierarchical Condition Category risk scores by relative change in readmission rates
and Figure 15 presents Hierarchical Condition Category risk scores by dual eligible
beneficiaries. HCC scores above 1.00 indicated a patient population with higher risk and
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anticipated cost expenditure, while below 1.00 were lower than average risk and expected costs
for the specific condition evaluated.
Figure 14
Change in Readmissions by HCC Risk Scores

Figure 15
Distribution of Dual Eligible by HCC Risk Scores
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Table 11 shows HCC risk scores of dual eligible assigned beneficiaries were moderately right
skewed (.422); whereas, HCC risk scores for disabled were highly skewed (.911) and kurtosed
(2.65).
Table 11
Hierarchical Condition Category Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Mean (SD)

Variance

Skew

Kurtosis

HCC Dual

1.04 (± .09)

.009

.422

-.071

HCC Disabled

1.09 (± .09)

.009

.911

2.65

ACO Sizea

18.6K (± 20.7K)

4.32E+008

3.43

13.82

Percent Dual Eligibleb

5.2% (± 3.4%)

.001

1.39

1.63

a: ACO assigned beneficiary panel start year 2015
b: percent calculated by dividing the ACO’s number of dual eligible assigned beneficiaries by total assigned beneficiaries of 2015

Based on the literature, high need, high cost patient profiles consisted of complex
psychosocial healthcare needs, most likely over 65 years in age (i.e, Medicare), living at a lower
socioeconomic status (i.e., Medicaid) and operating with functional disabilities ( Blumenthal,
2017). The average percentage of dual eligible patients to the total ACO assigned beneficiari es
was 5.20% ± 3.40% with a .001 variance. below presented the distribution of dual eligible to
non-dual eligible beneficiaries by ACO. The percentage of dual eligible assigned beneficiaries
were not correlated with the overall size of an ACO’s beneficiary population. Offset variables in
this study will be included as a log transformation of ACO assigned beneficiaries and dual
eligible assigned beneficiaries. The average size of ACO assigned beneficiaries were 18.6K ±
20.7K with a high variance (4.32E+008) across the spectrum. The highly variable small sample
size will be difficult for this study to accurately analyze impact on performance in a predictive
fashion. Thus, a log transformation will be computed to transform assigned beneficiaries into an
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offset variable for the regression models evaluating earned shared savings. Similarly, when
evaluating mental health services and impact to inpatient psychiatric admissions performance,
this study will employ dual eligible assigned beneficiaries as an offset.
Figure 16
Distribution Ratio of Dual Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries

Multicollinearity
Under regression model assumptions, independent variables are not highly correlated
with each other. Due to this study’s small sample size, multicollinearity, or highly correlated and
exact linear relationships among independent variables, is a substantial challenge. In addition,
the independent variables that are from multiple response questions have high associative
relationships. This study conducted a Pearson’s correlation analysis and ran a linear regression
to calculate variance inflation factors (VIF) to understand the extent variance may be inflated.
See Appendix 2 for multicollinearity values. Finally, an ANOVA of the potential multiple
response combinations was performed to determine if there were statistically significant
variances among the multiple response groups in order to determine the final statistical model.
The independent variables were analyzed for multicollinearity to identify any highly correlated
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independent variables in preparation for the regression analyses ahead. Based on the VIF
values and correlations, slight or moderate multicollinearity existed, which may lead to
inaccurate regression coefficients and incorrect standard errors (Daoud, 2018). As discussed in
earlier chapters, this study will mitigate multicollinearity by transforming indepe ndent variables
into dichotomous variables for regression analyses.
Multiple Response Analysis
The contingency variables for strategy alignment and financial rewards, contracted
services and mental health delivery were multiple response survey questions from the NSACO.
The following tables show the multiple response distribution of applicable contingency and
structural variables from NSACO: Table 12 for financial rewards distribution, Table 13 for mental
health services, Table 14 for physician compensation and Table 15 for ACO provider contracts.
Contrary to expectations, the distribution tables showed great variability across services and
access. This study conducted ANOVAs for the combinations in the distribution to understand
variance among the groups, but due to the small number of ACOs in the sample and the
exploratory nature of this research, the ANOVAs did not show significant trends in the multiple
responses.
A correlation matrix was conducted (see Appendix 2) to determine if high correlations
existed between independent variables for each of the statistical models. Statistically significant
results were present for physician compensation categories “base salary” and “productivity” in
the statistical model evaluating hypothesis 1, nearly all provider agreement type categories in
hypothesis 2, nearly all mental health delivery clinician type categories in hypothesis 3, and
most data standardization and EHR categories in hypothesis 4. To gain more insight as to the
degree of correlation, correlation statistics were run to evaluate VIF values. Scores equal to 1
are not correlated, scores between 1 and 5 are mildly correlated, and scores greater than 5 are
107

highly correlated. All independent variables exhibited mildly correlated VIF scores (see
Appendix 2). In addition, ANOVAs were run for multiple response combinations to determine if
any statistically significant variances existed between groups.
Table 12
Multiple Response Distribution for Financial Rewards Distribution
Variable
Financial Rewards
Distribution
A.
B.
C.

Retained by ACO
Reallocated across
members
Paid to physicians

Multiple
Response
Combinations

n a (%)b

Total
Savings c

ACOs w/Zero
Savings d

Total Assigned
Beneficiaries e

A

3 (7%)

$0

3

50,983

B

4 (9%)

$0

4

60,219

C

0

$0

0

-

AB

11 (24%)

$16,701,068

8

282,565

AC

4 (9%)

$8,827,468

3

61,224

BC

4 (9%)

$0

4

63,857

ABC

16 (36%)

$55,701,220

7

235,273

a: Possible combinations ACO mark “yes” for how they distribute financial rewards
b: Count of ACOs indicating “yes” for how they distribute financial rewards
c: Total Shared Savings gained by the ACOs that selected “yes”
d: Count of ACOs that had zero ($0.00) total shared savings (potential contributor to excess zeros)
e: Total of assigned beneficiaries for ACOs that marked “yes”

Table 13
Multiple Response Distribution for Mental Health Delivery by Clinician Type
Variable
Mental Health Delivery by
Clinician Type
A.
B.
C.
D.

Psychiatrist
NP / PA
Psychologist
Social Worker

Multiple Response
Combinations

Number of ACOs

Total Assigned
Beneficiaries

None Selected

7

174,012

A

2

30,812

AB

1

12,349

ABC

1

35,437

ABCD

17

371,587

ABD

2

18,888

AC

1

12,131

ACD

2

17,106

B

4

75,470

BD

4

45,849

C

2

18,681

D

2

23,708
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Table 14
Multiple Response Distribution for Physician Compensation
Variable

Multiple
Response
Combinations

n a (%) b

Total
Savings c

ACOs w/Zero
Savings d

Total Assigned
Beneficiaries e

Physician Compensation

A

0

$0

0

-

B

0

$0

0

-

C

3 (7%)

$8,881,385

1

31,496

D

0

$0

0

-

E

0

$0

0

-

AB

2 (4%)

$7,130,415

1

42,477

AC

0

$0

0

-

AD

0

$0

0

-

AE

0

$0

0

-

BC

0

$0

0

-

BD

0

$0

0

-

BE

0

$0

0

-

CD

2 (4%)

$10,303,700

1

78,040

CE

1 (2%)

$0

1

7,090

DE

1 (2%)

$0

1

5,942

ABC

4 (9%)

$5,375,365

3

80,009

ABD

1 (2%)

$0

1

15,020

ABE

0

$0

0

-

ACD

3 (7%)

$3,916,671

2

50,592

ACE

1 (2%)

$2,104,728

0

15,344

ADE

0

$0

0

-

BCD

0

$0

0

-

BCE

0

$0

0

-

BDE

0

$0

0

-

CDE

7 (16%)

$20,059,690

4

77,616

ABCD

7 (16%)

$4,453,320

6

153,324

ABCE

0

$0

0

-

ABDE

0

$0

0

-

BCDE

2 (4%)

$0

2

13,900

CDEA

7 (16%)

$20,059,690

4

77,616

ABCDE

3 (7%)

$0

3

146,253

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Productivity
Base Salary
Clinical Quality
Patient Satisfaction
Cost Reduction

a: Possible combinations ACO mark “yes” for how they distribute financial rewards
b: Count of ACOs indicating “yes” for how they distribute financial rewards
c: Total Shared Savings gained by the ACOs that selected “yes”
d: Count of ACOs that had zero ($0.00) total shared savings (potential contributor to excess zeros)
e: Total of assigned beneficiaries for ACOs that marked “ye s”
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Table 15
Multiple Response Distribution for ACO Provider Contracts
Multiple Response
Combinations
ACO Provider
A
Contracts
AB
ABC
A. Routine specialty ABCDEFGH
care
ABCDFG
B. IP rehab
ABCDFGH
C. Mental health
ABCDFH
D. Addiction
ABCDGH
treatment
ABCEFGH
E. Skilled nursing
ABCFG
F. Palliative/hospice ABCG
G. Home health
ABCH
H. Hospital diversion ABDEFGH
ABE
ABEFG
ABG
ABH
ACD
ACDEF
ACDEFH
ACDFG
ACDFGH
ADF
AF
AFGH
AGH
AH
B
BCD
BCDEF
BCDEFG
BCDEFGH
BCDEGH
BE
BEFGH
BGH
C
CDEFGH
CDEFH
CG
DEF
DEFG
DEH
DH
E
EF
EFG
EG
EH
F
G
Variable

ACO Provides Directly
Contracts w/ Non-ACO Providers
n
Beneficiaries
n
Beneficiaries
2
28,522
1
8,310
4
153,820
1
30,346
1

6,057

1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

5,795
15,020
19,839
45,768
33,705
16,728
8,327
10,190
35,437
13,308
42,603
23,614
12,131

2

1
1
1
1

1

No Contract
Beneficiaries
33,371

8

63,828

1
1

11,569
7,666

1
1

12,349
4,555

1
1

7,090
11,311

1
1
1
2

11,551
28,491
15,344
28,522

1
1
1

17,073
23,614
12,131

2
2

17,757
133,451

1
1
1
1
1

30,346
16,728
25,098
45,768
80,178

1
2
1

5,795
14,664
42,603

12,005

97,251

11,551
28,491
15,344
12,349

1

8,310

1

7,090

1

12,005

1

1

1

1

1

n
1

11,569
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80,178

11,311

8,327

7,090

2
1
1
2

57,319
15,020
15,920
50,269

2
3

33,705
162,838

Evaluating Theoretical Hypotheses
The five hypotheses for this study were evaluated using zero inflated negative binomial
regression analysis for the financial dependent variable total earned shared savings. A
generalized linear regression was used to evaluate dependent variable s for clinical outcomes:
readmission rates and inpatient psychiatric admissions. This study calculated relative change in
rates for readmissions and inpatient psychiatric admissions to determine ACO performance
from 2015 to 2017. The sample size is small and varied slightly for some of the models, notably
for hypotheses 2 and 3, where some ACOs did not fully participate or answer all questions. In
addition, multicollinearity exists among many of the independent variables, in particular the
multiple response variables. In efforts to improve model robustness, offset variables were
included to address variable ACO beneficiary size and dual eligible population size. To alleviate
the multicollinearity of the independent variables, the final regression models evaluated the
contingency structure pairs by each category as a dummy variable for multiple response
variables in hypotheses 2 and 3.
This study explores the direction and impact of relationships between contingency structure pairs using generalized linear regression and zero inflated regression because they
are generally more flexible with fewer assumptions required than multiple linear regression
(Zhang, 2019). Additionally, the independent and dependent variables were used for multiple
analyses; there is an increasing likelihood of conducting a Type I error and interpreting the
results as a false positive. To mitigate this, a Bonferroni type adjustment was applied to
calculate altered p-values and lower the critical value to greater than .05. The formula used for
the correction is: α/n, where n = number of hypotheses being tested and α is p-value .05
(McDonald, 2014). The adjusted p-value is .01 (α/n = .05/5). This study will utilize the adjusted
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p-value for its analyses and discussion of the findings. The result of each hypothesis is
described, and the reference variable is indicated in each section.
Hypothesis 1 Results
This study ran two different statistical models for count data: a generalized linear model
and a zero inflated model. According to the literature on statistical approaches to count data
analysis, previous studies have used the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values as a means
to compare goodness of fit (Rodriguez, 2013). The lower the AIC values, the better the fit. In
comparison between the two models, the generalized linear model shows higher AIC values
(AIC values ranging from 1200 - 1600) than the zero inflated counts model (AIC values ranging
500 - 550), indicating better model fit with the zero inflated counts model. Zero inflation models
adjust for a high proportion of zeroes and carry forward the results in the model for the final
count (Sharma & Landge, 2013).
Based on descriptive statistics, the dependent variable’s mean ($1.97M) and variance
($1.011E+13) are not equal and does not meet general assumptions for a Poisson distribution.
Instead, the distribution shows extreme over-dispersion and strongly indicates a negative
binomial distribution. Thus, the study ran a zero inflated negative binomial regression (ZINB)
with a logit link function and the log of assigned beneficiaries as an offset variable. A stepwise
approach was applied, starting with a baseline model that includes the structural variable (ACO
Leadership Structure) and outcomes variable (ACO Total Earned Shared Savings). Contingency
variables (Strategic Planning at the ACO level, Financial Rewards and Physician
Compensation) were added sequentially. In addition, question 25 (ACO financial rewards
distribution) and question 28 (ACO physician compensation) of the NSACO were analyzed
separately to review impact to the overall model. According to Structural Contingency Theory
literature, this study anticipated that ACO-level decision-making and governance, paired with
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regional alignment of strategic objectives, would be associated with greater ACO performance,
such as ACOs reporting greater total shared savings.
The ZINB’s final count model results in Table 16 show that leadership is not statistically
significant at the .01 level; however, the variables for strategy, financial rewards distribution in
model 3a (ACO retains rewards), and physician compensation in model 3b (base salary and
clinical quality) were statistically significant at or greater than the .01 level. As discussed earlier
in the chapter, this study aims to explore the direction and impact of the contingency -structure
relationship on total earned shared savings. Strategy displays a positive relationship between
strategic planning at the ACO level and total shared savings in model 2 ( p = .001, IRR = 2.340).
The magnitude of the impact decreases slightly but remains positive as financial rewards
distribution and physician compensation contingency variables are added to the model.
In models 3a and 3b, strategic planning at the ACO level remains statistically significant ( p =
.004, p = .000, respectively) with an incident rate ratio (IRR) of 1.848 and 2.132, respectively. In
model 3a, ACOs that retain financial rewards earned 3.827 times greater total earned shared
savings than ACOs that distributed financial rewards to providers ( p = .001). Although not
statistically significant according to the adjusted p-value, ACOs that reallocate financial rewards
across member organizations in the ACO showed a p-value of .05 and earned .635 times less
total earned shared savings than ACOs that distributed financial rewards to providers. In model
3b, results show statistically significant values for ACOs that include base salary (p = .001) and
clinical quality (p = .001) as compensation metrics for their providers. ACOs using base salary
and clinical quality as metrics earn .528 and .471 times less total shared savings than ACOs
using productivity as a metric. Applying the adjusted p-values, patient satisfaction is not
statistically significant at the .01 level (p = .021). However, the values are close to being
statistically significant, and show ACOs with patient satisfaction as a compensation metric
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earning 1.527 times greater total shared savings than ACOs using productivity as a metric.
Interestingly, cost reductions do not display a statistically significant value.
Table 16
Regression Results for Hypothesis 1

Zero Inflated Count Model
Dependent Variable: Total Earned Shared Savings
Model

1

2

3a

Estimate

Std . E rro r

z Value

Sig.

IRRb

Joint Hospital / Physician Leadership

.693

.753

.921

.357

1.999

(Ref) Physician, Hospital or Coalition
Leadership

0a

-

-

-

-

Joint Hospital / Physician Leadership

.000

.885

.000

1.000

1.000

Strategic Planning ACO-Level1.386

1.386

.840

-1.651

.099

3.999

(Ref) Strategic Planning Hospital /
Region-Level

0a

-

-

-

-

Joint Hospital / Physician Leadership

.042

.914

.046

.963

1.043

Strategic Planning ACO-Level

-1.281

.869

-1.473

.141

.278

Variable

Financial Rewards Retained by ACO

-.853

.888

-.961

.337

.426

Financial Rewards Allocated across ACO
organizations

.001

.835

.001

.999

1.001

(Ref) Finance rewards Paid to Physicians

0a

-

-

-

-

Joint-Led ACO Leadership Structure

-.107

1.006

-.107

.915

.899

-1.418

.909

-1.559

.119

.242

Base Salary

1.702

.867

1.963

.050

5.485

Clinical quality measures

-.715

1.074

-.665

.506

.489

Patient satisfaction measures

.756

.885

.853

.393

2.130

Cost reduction measures

.421

.917

.460

.646

1.523

(Ref) Productivity

0

-

-

-

-

Strategic Planning ACO-Level

3b

a: reference variable
b: Incident rate ratio (IRR): exponentiated value of estimate
* statistically significant at the .01 level
** statistically significant at the .001 level
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Final Count Model
Dependent Variable: Total Earned Shared Savings
Offset variable: log of assigned beneficiaries
Model

Variable
Joint Hospital / Physician Leadership

1

2

3a

-.048

Std . E rro r

z Value

Sig.

.325

-.147

.883

IRRb
.953

(Ref) Physician, Hospital or Coalition
Leadership

0a

-

-

-

-

Joint Hospital / Physician Leadership

.080

.268

.298

.766

1.083

Strategic Planning ACO-Level

.850

.268

3.176

.0 01 * *

2.340

(Ref) Strategic Planning Hospital /
Region-Level

0a

-

-

-

-

Joint Hospital / Physician Leadership

.211

.205

1.032

.302

1.235

Strategic Planning ACO-Level

.614

.216

2.842

.004*

1.848

Financial Rewards Retained by ACO

1.342

.407

3.296

.0 01 * *

3.827

Financial Rewards Allocated across ACO
organizations

-.635

.324

-1.958

.050

.530

(Ref) Finance rewards Paid to Physicians

0a

-

-

-

-

Joint-Led ACO Leadership Structure

.380

.177

2.149

.032

1.462

.194

3.908

.0 00 * *

2.132

Strategic Planning ACO-Level

3b

Estimate

.757

Base Salary

-.639

.189

-3.380

.0 01 * *

.528

Clinical quality measures

-.753

.233

-3.225

.0 01 * *

.471

Patient satisfaction measures

.423

.184

2.299

.021

1.527

Cost reduction measures

-.289

.170

-1.699

.089

.749

(Ref) Productivity

0

-

-

-

-

a: reference variable
b: Incident rate ratio (IRR): exponentiated value of estimate
* statistically significant at the .01 level
** statistically significant at the .001 level

115

Hypothesis 2 Results
For hypothesis 2, this study evaluated data from the NSACO that specifies different
types of service agreements used by ACOs. As presented in the descriptive statistics, ACOs
had the option to select multiple responses on the survey, and the combination of responses
were widely distributed with no obvious bias towards any particular combination of provider
types or services. The responses indicate the extent to which ACOs formalize health services
delivery and integrate via contractual provider agreements. Extrapolating from Structural
Contingency Theory literature, this study hypothesized that ACOs would see positive
performance when engaged in vertical integration of health services along the patient care
continuum. Positive performance is defined here as earning total shared savings and reducing
rate of readmissions. In addition, the adjusted p-value of .01 will be used to report and interpret
statistical significance in the results for Hypothesis 2.
A zero inflated negative binomial regression (ZINB) was utilized to analyze the
dependent variable of total earned shared savings, and a generalized linear regression (GLM)
was utilized to analyze the dependent variable of change in readmission rates from 2015 –
2017. Each model in the zero inflated negative binomial regression analyzed the structural
variable for agreement type individually. In the generalized linear regression, all response
variables were included with hospital diversion services as the reference variable. This was the
linear regression model that produced the best fit, per the omnibus test. Hierarchical Condition
Category for disabled and dual eligible assigned beneficiaries were used as contingency
variables indicating complexity for the ACO’s population. As HCC scores increase d, complexity
of care and medical services coordination were expected to also increase.
The ZINB final count model in Table 17 showed that most contingency and structural
variables had non-significant results. However, the Hierarchical Condition Categorical risk
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scores for dual eligible assigned beneficiaries showed a positive trend approximating towards
statistical significance (considering adjusted p-value at .01 level) in relation to ACO
performance. This trend could be seen in model 1 analyzing only HCC risk scores (p = .042,
IRR = 2.799), model 5 with addiction treatment (p = .038, IRR = 2.889), model 6 with Skilled
Nursing Facilities (SNF) (p = .042, IRR = 2.816), model 7 with palliative care services (p = .057,
IRR = 2.616) and model 8 with home health services (p = .053, IRR = 2.732). Results displayed
a trend where ACOs may earn 1.5 – 2.9 times more total shared savings when serving dual
eligible populations with a higher HCC risk score.
Under service provision and contracting, ACOs that directly provided and contracted
non-ACO providers for routine specialty care and inpatient rehabilitation exhibited statistically
significant results at .01 and .001 alpha levels. In model 2, ACOs with some formal arrangement
to deliver routine specialty care showed a statistically significant (p = .004, IRR = .558)
likelihood to earn .558 times less total shared savings than ACOs without any formal
agreements. ACOs with some formal arrangement for inpatient rehabilitation earned .655 times
less total shared savings than ACOs without any formal agreements.
In the generalized linear regression, results showed a negative relationship between
ACOs that had some formal agreement for routine specialty care and home health services.
This study hypothesized that the more formalized the relationship between ACO providers, the
better the performance. Better performance here was considered lower readmission rates from
2015 – 2017. Findings showed that ACOs with a formal agreement to provide routine specialty
care had .731 times less improvement in readmission rates from 2015 – 2017 than ACOs
without any formal agreements. Similarly, ACOs with a formal agreement to deliver home health
services showed .728 times less improvement in readmission rates from 2015 – 2017 than
ACOs without any formal agreements.
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Table 17
Regression Results for Hypothesis 2
Zero Inflated Count Model
Dependent Variable: Total Earned Shared Savings
Offset variable: log of assigned beneficiaries
Model

Estimate

Std. E rro r

z Value

Sig.

IRRb

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

-15.105

6.941

-2.176

.030

2.7 54 E-07

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible
Assigned Beneficiaries

1.238

4.841

.256

.798

3.449

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

-36.252

14.706

-2.465

.014*

0.000

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible
Assigned Beneficiaries

-7.260

7.532

-.964

.335

0.001

ACO formal contract with or directly providing
routine specialty care

3.876

1.664

2.330

.020

48.231

(Ref) ACO no formal contracts with routine
specialty care providers

0a

-

-

-

-

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

-18.864

7.997

-2.359

.018

6.4 19 E-09

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible
Assigned Beneficiaries

-.098

4.988

-.020

.984

0.907

ACO formal contract with or directly providing
inpatient rehab

1.633

.858

1.903

.057

5.119

(Ref) ACO no formal contracts with inpatient
rehab

0a

-

-

-

-

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

-15.327

6.939

-2.209

.027

2.2 06 E-07

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible
Assigned Beneficiaries

1.063

4.866

.218

.827

2.895

ACO formal contract with or directly providing
mental health services

.357

.740

.482

.630

1.429

(Ref) ACO no formal contract with mental
health services

0a

-

-

-

-

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

-16.747

7.618

-2.199

.028

5.3 32 E-08

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible
Assigned Beneficiaries

.384

5.103

.075

.940

1.468

ACO formal contract with or directly providing
addiction treatment

1.042

.902

1.156

.248

2.835

(Ref) ACO no formal contracts addiction
treatment

0a

-

-

-

-

Variable

1

2

3

4

5
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Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

-15.109

6.952

-2.173

.030

2.7 43 E-07

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible
Assigned Beneficiaries

1.238

4.841

.256

.798

3.449

ACO formal contract with or directly providing
SNF

-.007

.732

-.010

.992

0.993

(Ref) ACO no formal contracts SNF

0a

-

-

-

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

-15.786

7.243

-2.180

.029

1.3 94 E-07

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible
Assigned Beneficiaries

.924

4.931

.187

.851

2.519

ACO formal contract with or directly providing
palliative services

.698

.788

.886

.376

2.010

(Ref) ACO no formal contracts palliative
services

0a

-

-

-

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

-15.770

7.087

-2.225

.026

1.4 16 E-07

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible
Assigned Beneficiaries

1.605

4.871

.330

.742

4.978

ACO formal contract with or directly providing
home health services

.488

.727

.672

.502

1.629

(Ref) ACO no formal contracts home health
services

0a

-

-

-

-

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

-15.576

7.022

-2.218

.027

1.7 20 E-07

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible
Assigned Beneficiaries

.982

4924

.199

.842

2.670

ACO formal contract with or directly providing
hospital diversion services

-.887

.754

-1.176

.240

0.412

(Ref) ACO no formal contracts for hospital
diversion services

0a

-

-

-

-

7

8

9

a: reference variable
b: Incident rate ratio (IRR): exponentiated value of estimate
* statistically significant at the .01 level
** statistically significant at the .001 level
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Final Count Model
Dependent Variable: Total Earned Shared Savings
Offset variable: log of assigned beneficiaries
Model

Variable

Estimate

Std. E rro r

z Value

Sig.

IRRb

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

-.064

1.308

-.049

.961

9.380E-01

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible
Assigned Beneficiaries

2.799

1.377

2.033

.042

16.428

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

.227

1.043

.217

.828

1.25

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible
Assigned Beneficiaries

1.548

1.189

1.302

.193

4.702

ACO formal contract with or directly providing
routine specialty care

-.584

.201

-2.903

.004*

.558

(Ref) ACO no formal contracts with routine
specialty care providers

0a

-

-

-

-

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

.492

1.200

.410

.682

1.64

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible
Assigned Beneficiaries

2.413

1.281

1.884

.060

11.167

ACO formal contract with or directly providing
inpatient rehab

-.423

.217

-1.948

.051

.655

(Ref) ACO no formal contracts with inpatient
rehab

0a

-

-

-

-

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

.185

1.242

.149

.882

1.203

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible
Assigned Beneficiaries

2.437

1.381

1.765

.077

11.439

ACO formal contract with or directly providing
mental health services

-.289

.229

-1.259

.208

.749

(Ref) ACO no formal contract with mental health
services

0a

-

-

-

-

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

-.183

1.326

-.138

.890

.833

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible
Assigned Beneficiaries

2.889

1.389

2.080

.038

17.975

ACO formal contract with or directly providing
addiction treatment

-.149

.289

-.513

.608

.862

(Ref) ACO no formal contracts addiction
treatment

0a

-

-

-

-

1

2

3

4

5
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6

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

-.036

1.322

-.027

.978

.965

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible
Assigned Beneficiaries

2.816

1.382

2.037

.042

16.710

ACO formal contract with or directly providing
SNF

.031

.249

.125

.900

1.031

(Ref) ACO no formal contracts SNF

0a

-

-

-

-

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

-.270

1.330

-.203

.839

.763

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible
Assigned Beneficiaries

2.616

1.373

1.906

.057

13.681

ACO formal contract with or directly providing
palliative services

-.198

.271

-.731

.465

.820

(Ref) ACO no formal contracts palliative
services

0a

-

-

-

-

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

-.029

1.315

-.022

.982

.971

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible
Assigned Beneficiaries

2.732

1.415

1.931

.053

15.364

ACO formal contract with or directly providing
home health services

-.049

.235

-.210

.834

.952

(Ref) ACO no formal contracts home health
services

0a

-

-

-

-

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

-.502

1.330

-.378

.706

.605

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual Eligible
Assigned Beneficiaries

2.411

1.363

1.769

.077

11.145

ACO formal contract with or directly providing
hospital diversion services

-.300

.249

-1.206

.228

.741

(Ref) ACO no formal contracts for hospital
diversion services

0a

-

-

-

-

7

8

9

a: reference variable
b: Incident rate ratio (IRR): exponentiated value of estimate
* statistically significant at the .01 level
** statistically significant at the .001 level
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Generalized Linear Regression Model
Dependent variable: Relative Change in Readmission Rates 2015 – 2017
Offset variable: log of assigned beneficiaries
CI for Exp(B)
Variables

B

Std
Error

Hierarchical Condition Category
Disabled Assigned Beneficiaries

.238

.6336

.707

1.269

.367

4.394

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual
Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries

-.176

.5067

.728

.838

.311

2.263

ACO formal contract with or directly
providing routine specialty care

-.313

.0908

.001**

.731

.612

.874

ACO formal contract with or directly
providing inpatient rehab

.078

.0758

.306

1.081

.931

1.254

ACO formal contract with or directly
providing mental health services

-.023

.1348

.864

.977

.750

1.273

ACO formal contract with or directly
providing addiction treatment

.071

.1406

.615

1.073

.815

1.414

ACO formal contract with or directly
providing SNF

.090

.1060

.396

1.094

.889

1.347

ACO formal contract with or directly
providing palliative services

.132

.1285

.303

1.141

.887

1.468

ACO formal contract with or directly
providing home health services

-.318

.0964

.001**

.728

.603

.879

(Ref) ACO formal contract with or
directly providing hospital diversion
services

0a

-

-

-

-

-

a: reference variable
b: Incident rate ratio (IRR): exponentiated value of estimate
* statistically significant at the .01 level
** statistically significant at the .001 level
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Sig.

Exp(B)

Lower

Upper

Hypothesis 3 Results
For hypothesis 3, behavioral and mental health services are evaluated by analyzing
contingency-structure pairs related to inpatient psychiatric admissions. According to Structural
Contingency literature, this study anticipated that as ACOs provide timely access to relevant
behavioral and mental health services, ACO performance should improve by reducing the
number of inpatient psychiatric admissions that occur. The dependent variable is the relative
change in discharges from an inpatient psychiatric facility from 2015 to 2017. This study
calculated a ratio for dual eligible assigned beneficiaries to total population as an offset and
explanatory variable. The offset accounts for the added complexity when the population has a
higher ratio of dual eligible assigned beneficiaries (AB). The calculated ratio for dual eligible ABs
acts as an explanatory variable to analyze if higher populations of dual eligible ABs correlate
with higher inpatient psychiatric admissions. Due to multicollinearity among the multiple
response answers and the many combinations of responses ACOs submitted, each response is
evaluated in an individual model with the HCC risk scores and dual eligible ratio. The adjusted
p-value of .01 will be used to report and interpret statistical significance.
Per the regression results in Table 18, the dual eligible explanatory variable is
statistically significant in each of the models, displaying an inverse trend with inpatient
psychiatric admissions improvement. This may indicate that every unit of increase in the dual
eligible population, the rate of improvement decreases for inpatient psychiatric admissions. In
model 1, ACOs see a statistically significant (p = .001) performance decline for the use of
psychiatrists to deliver behavioral and mental health services; these ACOs are more likely to
see .731 times less improvement in inpatient psychiatric admissions than ACOs using other
clinician types. Model 3 presents psychologists as approximately significant effect in
performance improvement. ACOs that provide behavioral and mental health services using a
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psychologist see an improvement near statistical significance (p = .042). ACOs using
psychologists see 1.235 times improvement in inpatient psychiatric admissions from 2015 –
2017 in comparison to ACOs using other clinician types.
Table 18
Regression Results for Hypothesis 3
Generalized Linear Regression Model
Dependent variable: Relative Change in Inpatient Psychiatric Admissions Rates 2015 – 2017
Offset variable: log of dual eligible assigned beneficiaries
CI for Exp(B)
Model

1

2

3

Variables

B

Std
Error

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

.171

.514

.707

1.269

.367

4.394

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual
Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries

-.324

.705

.728

.838

.311

2.263

Dual Eligible

-5.709

1.821

.002*

.003

9.345E- 5 .118

ACO behavioral health delivered by
psychiatrist

-.006

.111

.001**

.731

.612

.874

(Ref) ACO behavioral health delivered by
clinicians other than psychiatrist

0a

-

-

-

-

-

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

.125

.488

.799

1.133

.435

2.950

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual
Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries

-.443

.727

.542

.642

.155

2.668

Dual Eligible

-5.431

1.815

.003*

.004

.000

.153

ACO behavioral health delivered by NP/PA

-.111

.126

.379

.895

.698

1.146

(Ref) ACO behavioral health delivered by
clinicians other than NP/PA

0a

-

-

-

-

-

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

-.089

.531

.867

.915

.323

2.590

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual
Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries

-.111

.677

.869

.895

.238

3.369

Dual Eligible

-6.020

1.759

.001**

.002

7.739E-5

.076
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Sig.

Exp(B)

Lower

Upper

4

ACO behavioral health delivered by
psychologist

.211

.104

.042

1.235

1.008

1.513

(Ref) ACO behavioral health delivered by
clinicians other than psychologist

0a

-

-

-

-

-

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

.202

.501

.687

1.224

.459

3.265

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual
Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries

-.400

.713

.575

.671

.166

2.714

Dual Eligible

-5.673

1.902

.003*

.003

8.261E-5

.143

ACO behavioral health delivered by social
worker

-.066

.112

.554

.936

.751

1.166

(Ref) ACO behavioral health delivered by
clinicians other than social worker

0a

-

-

-

-

-

a: reference variable
b: Incident rate ratio (IRR): exponentiated value of estimate
* statistically significant at the .01 level
** statistically significant at the .001 level
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Hypothesis 4 Results
In hypothesis 4, this study analyzed the contingency-structure relationship between ACO
information technology (IT) and interoperability as complexity increases. Specifically, this
hypothesis evaluates ACO performance as IT definitions are standardized acr oss care settings
and electronic health records are centralized. According to Structural Contingency Theory, this
study hypothesized that as ACOs increase integration of information technology and related
interoperability capabilities, performance would improve. This hypothesis utilized the zero
inflated negative binomial regression because it explores count data from the dependent
variable total earned shared savings. As applied to the previous hypotheses, the findings for
hypothesis 4 will continue to utilize the adjusted p-value of .01 as an indicator for statistical
significance when reporting findings.
Table 19 shows model 1 in the final count model, the structural variable evaluated is
centralization of electronic health record (EHR) systems operating within an ACO. The
reference variable is ACOs operating with a single unified EHR. ACOs operating with a mix of
electronic health record and paper systems earn a statistically significant ( p = .000) 4.773 times
greater total shared savings than ACOs operating under a single EHR. ACOs operating with
multiple EHRs earn a statistically significant (p = .018) 2.177 times greater total shared savings
than ACOs operating under a single EHR. In model 2, ACOs that have standardized most of
their data elements across their member organizations show that they earn a statistically
significant (p = .008) .384 times less total shared savings than ACOs with fully standardized
data elements across their organizations.
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Table 19
Regression Results for Hypothesis 4
Zero Inflated Count Model
Dependent Variable: Total Earned Shared Savings
Offset variable: log of assigned beneficiaries
Model

1

2

Estimate

Std. E rro r

z Value

Sig.

IRRb

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

-15.338

7.285

-2.105

.035

3.161

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual
Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries

-.032

5.091

-.006

.995

5.078

ACOs operating with a mix of EHRs and
paper systems

-1.056

1.465

-.721

.471

4.773

ACOs operating with multiple EHRs

-1.536

1.270

-1.209

.227

2.177

(Ref) ACOs operating with a single EHR

0a

-

-

-

-

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

-12.732

6.788

-1.876

.061

.000

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual
Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries

-3.404

5.503

-.619

.536

.033

ACOs that standardized some data
elements

-1.730

1.168

-1.481

.139

.177

ACOs that standardized most data
elements

-2.434

1.179

-2.064

.039

.088

(Ref) ACOs that fully standardized data
elements

0a

-

-

-

-

Variable

a: reference variable
b: Incident rate ratio (IRR): exponentiated value of estimate
* statistically significant at the .01 level
** statistically significant at the .001 level
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Final Count Model
Dependent Variable: Total Earned Shared Savings
Offset variable: log of assigned beneficiaries
Model

1

2

Estimate

Std. E rro r

z Value

Sig.

IRRb

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

1.151

1.077

1.069

.285

3.161

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual
Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries

1.625

.976

1.666

.096

5.078

ACOs operating with a mix of EHRs and
paper systems

1.563

.374

4.185

.0 00 * *

4.773

ACOs operating with multiple EHRs

.778

.329

2.361

.018*

2.177

(Ref) ACOs operating with a single EHR

0a

-

-

-

-

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

.863

1.180

.731

.465

2.370

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual
Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries

-.023

1.509

-.016

.988

.977

ACOs that standardized some data
elements

-.489

.331

-1.480

.139

.613

ACOs that standardized most data
elements

-.956

.362

-2.644

.008*

.384

(Ref) ACOs that fully standardized data
elements

0a

-

-

-

-

Variable

a: reference variable
b: Incident rate ratio (IRR): exponentiated value of estimate
* statistically significant at the .01 level
** statistically significant at the .001 level
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Hypothesis 5 Results
Per Donaldson’s (2001) concept of multiple contingency fits, this model analyzed the
level of multiple fits across the previous hypotheses 1 – 4. Empirically, according to the
literature, this study anticipated overall greater misfit would result in slight performance decline.
Furthermore, Donaldson (2001) provides contextual consideration in the form of his SARFIT
model, hypothesizing that as contingencies change, organizations adapt their structures,
leading to a transition from “fit” to “misfit” in the endeavor to find their new “fit”. Thus, a level of
“misfit” would be expected if organizations are in a stage of adaptation. This study’s resu lts
show that when misfit is analyzed by itself, greater ACO misfit is associated with greater total
shared savings. Possible interpretation of these results is that a certain degree of misfit is
expected as ACOs are continuously adapting their organizational structures in an effort to
execute new CMS rules in a timely fashion. This is discussed further in Chapter 6.
This study approached misfit calculation based on Pennings’ (1987) and Volberda and
colleagues’ (2012) publications, which utilized residuals of each contingency-structure pair as
the calculated deviation from fit. In hypothesis 5, the following steps provide details of the
process in which misfit was calculated: 1) Pearson residuals were saved from each hypothesis’s
final model above, 2) a composite score of the residuals was calculated for each ACO for each
hypothesis, 3) an aggregate of the misfit scores were conducted for total misfit, 4) ACOs with an
aggregate score less than a standard deviation (-1) / greater than a standard deviation (+1) from
the fit line (Pearson residual value of zero) would be labeled as “misfit”, and 5) the misfit scores
were used to analyze for multicollinearity and the directional relationship with total earned
shared savings, using a zero inflated negative binomial regression.
Descriptive statistics for “misfit” show 73.3% of ACOs in the study are not in “misfit” (n =
33, ͞x = $1.036M total shared savings) and 26.7% of ACOs are in “misfit” (n = 12, ͞x = $4.544M
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total shared savings). Within the subcategory of ACOs not in “misfit”, 78.8% (n = 26 of 33) show
zero total shared savings. When looking at 2017 ACO savings rates for th is study’s sample (n =
45 total ACOs), 21 ACOs produced negative savings, 15 ACOs met the minimum savings rates
required by CMS to earn shared savings, and 9 ACOs produced positive savings but did not
reach the minimum savings rates threshold to earn shared savings. Additionally, in the
regression analysis, Cook’s distance and leverage values show two outliers with large residuals
as potentially influencing the analysis. After filtering those two ACOs from the sample, little
changes in statistical significance were observed. Therefore, in the effort to preserve as many
degrees of freedom as possible for the regression, the two ACOs were not filtered out.
Table 20 show two models analyzed: 1) misfit as a predictor variable by itself with the
log of assigned beneficiaries as an offset variable to account for different ACO sizes, and 2)
misfit, HCC for dual and disabled assigned beneficiaries as predictor variables with the log of
assigned beneficiaries as an offset. In model one, the results display a statistically significant (p
= .015) positive relationship: per the incident rate ratio (IRR), an ACO in “misfit” sees 1.725
times greater total earned shared savings, or 72.5%, more than an ACO in “fit”. Positive
correlation in model one may reflect the innovation being encouraged by CMS for ACOs to seek
local solutions to improve the value of healthcare delivery in their communities (Pierce-Wrobel &
Micklos, 2018). As mentioned above, another possibility is that ACOs are in constant misfit in
order to react quickly to abrupt changes in CMS rules. Several changes are published to the
ACO rules annually, and performance improvement calculations are based on each year’s
results. This could mean future ACO analyses would need to capture pre / post -changes to
CMS ACO final rules and organizational program changes in greater detail. In model two, when
hierarchical conditions for disabled and dual eligible assigned beneficiaries are included as
predictor variables, “misfit” retains a positive estimated value but is not statistically significant.
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This result may indicate that the impact of high need, high cost assigned beneficiaries do not
have statistically significant influence on ACO performance or that the distribution of high need,
high cost assigned beneficiaries are evenly distributed to a point that their influence on ACO
performance is comparable across organizations.
Table 20
Regression Results for Hypothesis 5
Zero Inflated Count Model
Dependent Variable: Total Earned Shared Savings
Offset variable: log of assigned beneficiaries
Model
1

2

Estimate

Std. E rro r

z Value

Sig.

IRRb

ACO in Misfit

-1.846

.751

-2.457

.014*

0.158

(Ref) ACO in Fit

0a

-

-

-

-

ACO Total Contingency Misfit

-.1.555

.813

-1.912

.056

0.211

(Ref) ACO in Fit

0a

-

-

-

-

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

-14.796

7.036

-2.103

.035

1.036

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual
Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries

2.086

4.908

.425

.671

8.053

Variable

a: reference variable
b: Incident rate ratio (IRR): exponentiated value of estimate
* statistically significant at the .05 level
** statistically significant at the .01 level
*** statistically significant at the .001 level
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Final Count Model
Dependent Variable: Total Earned Shared Savings
Offset variable: log of assigned beneficiaries
Model

Estimate

Std. E rro r

z Value

Sig.

IRRb

ACO in Misfit

.545

.224

2.437

.015*

1.725

ACO in Fit

0a

-

-

-

-

ACO in Misfit

.474

.273

1.736

.083

1.606

ACO in Fit

0a

-

-

-

-

Hierarchical Condition Category Disabled
Assigned Beneficiaries

.968

1.344

.720

.471

2.633

Hierarchical Condition Category Dual
Eligible Assigned Beneficiaries

1.021

1.570

.650

.516

2.776

Variable

1

2

a: reference variable
b: Incident rate ratio (IRR): exponentiated value of estimate
* statistically significant at the .05 level
** statistically significant at the .01 level
*** statistically significant at the .001 level

Chapter Summary
This study undergoes an exploratory analysis utilizing organizational variables from the
NSACO to analyze contingency-structure relationships on ACO total earned shared savings,
changes in readmission and changes in inpatient psychiatric admissions. A key concept in
Structural Contingency Theory is that better fit between contingency and structure results in
improved performance. This is interpreted in this study as the residual from the best fit line in
each contingency-structure relationship evaluated in the hypothesis through regression
analyses.
This chapter describes the study variables, preparation of the data, calculation of
individual misfit scores through residual generation of each hypothesis’s model and composite
score computation for a total misfit score. The results of the regression analyses were reported
on ACO performance and contingency-structure fit.
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Because this is an exploratory analysis, intensive descriptive statistics were conducted,
and correlational analyses were reported in the appendices. The regression analyses that were
used were primarily focused on directional impact of the explanatory variables. The results of
the analyses were not as expected for every hypothesis. This can potentially be attributed to
some correlational relationships among some of the independent variables and the small
sample size, which indicates great future research opportunity. Expected and actual directional
associations are depicted in Table 21 as a summary table of the findings for all hypotheses.
Table 21
Results Summary
Directional Associations of Contingency-Structure Analyses
Total Earned
Shared Savings

Change in
Readmissions

Exp

Act

Exp

Act

H1: ACOs with hospital and physician co-led governance
structures are more likely to produce total earned shared
savings than ACOs without co-led governance
structures.

+

none

H2: Under conditions where the ACO is assigned to
higher risk populations, ACOs with tight physician and
hospital alignment will outperform ACOs with loosely
aligned physician and hospital associations.

+

-*

+

-*

Variable

H3: Under conditions where the ACO is assigned to
higher risk populations, ACOs with greater access to
behavioral and mental health services will outperform
ACOs without such access.
H4: Under conditions where the ACO is assigned to
higher risk populations, ACOs with higher health IT
integration will outperform ACOs with lower health IT
integration.

+

+* / -*

H5: ACOs with higher measures of fit between their
structural characteristics and contingencies will exhibit
better performance than ACOs with lower measures of fit.

-

+* /

Change in IP
Psych
Admissions
Exp

Act

+

-*

nonea

* statistically significant relationships for some of the independent variables analyzed
a: H5 model including HCC disabled and dual eligible assigned beneficiaries showed no statistically significant relationships with
ACO total shared savings
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Chapter 6: Conclusion

This chapter discusses the study’s findings and its application to the exploratory nature
of the research. Discussion of managerial and policy implications are broadly discussed, future
research opportunities are identified, and study limitations are presented.
Discussion of the Study Findings
This study used a two-step approach to analyze multiple contingency fit (Van de Ven &
Drazin, 1976). The first step consists of analyzing four contingency-structure pairs. Regressions
were used to better understand directional effect contingency-structure pairs had on ACO
performance. From each regression, a Pearson correlation residual value was calculated.
According to the deviation analysis approach in the SCT literature, residuals are one way to
quantify organizational misfit by representing deviation from a fit line between contingency and
structure. In this study, if a contingency-structure pair included subsegments, an average was
calculated from the residuals of the subsegments. Second step in this study applied
Donaldson’s additive fit approach to multiple contingencies. Each residual value was added to
determine overall multiple contingency fit. Donaldson describes contingency fit as historically
built on interaction terms (Donaldson, 2001, p. 210), but he cites previous contingency studies
that have applied additive fit models as more practical and representative of complex multicontingent organizations. An additive approach allows for analytical models to empirically
quantity misfit in a holistic manner, such as negative values for misfit can balance positive
values for fit (Pennings, 1987; Volberda et al., 2012). The study results showed support for
hypotheses related to strategy and some clinical service delivery, but further research with
greater robustness in data collection is needed to improve analytical accuracy. Some of the
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issues stem from the NSACO multiple response questions and the resultant combination of
health services selected by ACOs.
Multiple Response Survey Questions
Approaches to multiple response analyses are diverse and nonconclusive, mainly
focused on the descriptive and correlational aspects of the analytics (Stephen, 2016). The
contingency and structural variables in hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 ar e from multiple response survey
questions from the NSACO. The tool is purposefully flexible to allow for detailed capture of ACO
services. Conceptually, the combinations represent scope and diversity of services ACOs
provide for their beneficiary populations. Theoretically, the greater number of services included
in an ACO’s portfolio should represent greater community access to healthcare (Kansagara et
al., 2011; Misky et al., 2010). There is an opportunity to correlate the combination of services
with individual beneficiary needs, identified via diagnoses by medical record number.
Beneficiary-level data would provide more granularity on ACO performance and the effect from
formalized agreements. Since this study utilized ACO-level data, little trends are identifiable
among the ACOs due to the small sample size.
Putting the Study Results in Context
This study analyzed individual contingency-structure pairs by hypothesis and then took
an additive approach to calculating a composite contingency score for misfit. Misfit was then
analyzed in a regression model, assuming an inverse relationship between ACO performance
and misfit. This next section will discuss each hypothesis’s results and the overall misfit analysis
in hypothesis five.
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 examined the relationship between strategy and governance on ACO
performance. Allocation of resources, financial rewards distribution and ACO physician
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compensation were interpreted as the extent to which ACOs aligned their strategies—thus,
indicating a single or centralized objective aligned across all provider care settings . In SCT
literature, strategy is a contingency that affects structure. When an organization’s strategy is
diverse, the organization is providing multiple services towards diverse objectives. This would
be considered a diversified portfolio of services and expected to best fit with a decentralized
structure operating in autonomous divisions of labor. In contrast, if an organization’s strategy is
to primarily serve a single service or have a single objective across its functions, the structure
that would best fit would be centralized and functional. Extrapolating from SCT literature,
governance structures with representations for both ambulatory and inpatient settings would be
optimal during times of transition in a market.
Hypothesis 1 anticipated that ACOs with physician and hospital joint-led structures
would perform better than other structures. In the ACO literature, conflicting results were found
among different studies. In one study, correlations between leadership structure, organizational
characteristics and performance reported that physician-led ACOs earned less shared savings
and lower quality scores in comparison to hospital and joint-led ACOs (McWilliams, 2016;
Ouayogodé, Colla & Lewis, 2017). However, in an Health Affairs article by Muhlestein and Hall
(2014), the authors discuss how better quality results do not always equate to better finan cial
results. In a subsequent study, researchers reported that physician-led ACOs saw higher
savings than hospital-led ACOs in 2018 (LaPointe, 2019). Another publication in Health
Services Research (Comfort et al., 2018), examined ACO governance structures and
performance. The authors categorized governance in three ways: physician -led, integrated and
hybrid. They found that quality and cost outcomes were comparable across different ACO
governance structures. This study’s results indicated heterogeneous financial performance
across ACOs; in addition, there were a disproportionately high number of ACOs earning zero
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shared savings. The results show performance is not statistically significantly different for joint led ACOs in comparison to other structures. Previous studies have primarily focused on
governance and performance. Specifically, physician-led and hospital-led structures. This study
provides another perspective for ACO programs that examine governance structure, strategy
and performance.
Strategic planning at the ACO level shows statistically significant better performance
than ACOs conducting strategic planning at the regional or hospital levels. This is in line with
strategy and contingency literature; strategic planning is defined as long term planning and the
reallocation of resources as determined by a governing board or centralized entity (Young,
2003; Strebel, 2004; Bradshaw, 2009). This is further reiterated by the results for financial
rewards distribution, which displays a statistically significant relationship where performance is
higher for ACOs that retain financial rewards. For physician compensation, patient s atisfaction
was the only metric that showed an approximate statistically significant relationship to
performance in comparison to productivity. Base salary and quality displayed lower earned
shared savings than productivity. This is contrary to the concept of value-based care models;
ACO programs are means to transition from volume-based care, such as productivity-driven
incentives, to value-based care, such as quality and satisfaction (Muhlestein, Saunders,
Richards & McClellan, 2018). The results show partial consistency with the literature. This could
reflect the study’s limitations, such as the small sample size and scope. Nevertheless, the
results indicate variability and that a clear relationship does not exist among patient satisfaction,
quality and performance. Considerations to be taken into account when analyzing physician
incentive models, capital investments and resource allocation.
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Hypothesis 2
According to SCT literature, formalization is associated with decreased uncertainty and
increased interdependence (Donaldson, 2001, p. 56). In the ACO environment,
interdependence is high as the aim of the program is to increase care coordination and improve
access to preventive care services, especially in consideration of high need, high cost patients
(O’Malley, Rich, Sarwar, Schultz, Warren, Shah & Abrams, 2019). In the context of Structural
Contingency Theory, this hypothesis explored the relationship between formalization of services
through contractual agreements and interdependence. High HCC risk scor es indicated greater
acuity in the patient population served, and thus, more complex coordination necessary to
manage care across settings for patients with high needs. The more coordination needed, the
greater the interdependence between tasks and provider groups would be expected. In order to
reduce uncertainty among interdependent activities, providers would need to formalize their
relationships on agreed upon terms so that their objectives would be aligned. However, in
environments that are more organic or operate under constant change, SCT literature
postulates that less formal structures allow for flexibility and innovation. Thus, organizations
operating in increasingly uncertain environments may best fit with less formal structures. In
practical terms, this study explores to what extent ACOs with formal structures thrive when
operating in highly interdependent operations and uncertain environments.
The study’s results indicate that there may be a relationship regarding access to
healthcare services, albeit not statistically significant to the .01 level. that formalization of the
services do not play a more significant role as long as ACO beneficiaries gain access to
services in a timely fashion. Formal contractual agreements may even limit beneficiary access
to services, if resources are not easily accessible to beneficiaries. Consistent with past
research, there is wide inconsistency and variation in ACO performance related to structure and
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performance, indicating comparable outcomes for diverse ACO str uctures (Ouayogodé, Colla &
Lewis, 2017; Comfort, Shortell, Rodriguez & Colla, 2018). In addition, policy changes occur on
an annual basis for ACO payment and performance, contributing to consistent uncertainty in the
healthcare landscape.
Findings from hypothesis 2 analyses show near statistically significant results (.01 ≤ p ≤
.05) when ACOs with higher HCC risk scores for dual eligible populations directly provide
services or contract services for addiction, skilled nursing facilities, palliative care and home
health. Interestingly, the direction on performance is an inverse relationship with HCC risk
scores for dual eligible beneficiaries. These findings indicate high variability and wide
confidence intervals in the data, which suggest future research would be beneficial to better
understand the topic. Under the lens of SCT, these findings may imply that as HCC risk scores
increase, uncertainty in the environment increases and less formal structures would be a better
fit for ACOs. The variability further suggests that operations are so uncertain when ACOs
service populations with high risk scores, that trends or patterns in the interaction among
providers are too dynamic to document or standardize. This is supported by the many
combinations of agreement types ACOs reported out, which further implies that ACOs are
matching the services they are contracting or providing to their local environments, and high
variability exists among ACOs because of their local needs. Therefore, formalizing agreements
with post-acute services may not be the most effective tactic and a variety of tactics should be
considered when managing high need, high cost patients. Additionally, a takeaway from these
findings is that ACOs require greater flexibility to better perform, and an y overregulation may
have deleterious effects.
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Hypothesis 3
In ACO literature, some studies have presented statistically significant associations
between quality care performance and ACO provider composition, specifically, primary care
providers and specialists (Albright, Lewis, Ross & Colla, 2016; Ouayogodé, Colla & Lewis,
2017). Extant literature posits that ACOs have two main options for mental and behavioral
health services integration for their beneficiary populations: 1) to contract services with provider
groups outside of the ACO’s network or 2) to build a network of mental and behavioral health
specialists integrated into the ACO network (Kathol, Patel, Sacks, Sargent & Melek, 2015).
Studies have suggested that building an integrated behavioral health network allows for
greater access and alignment for coordination of care (Lewis, Colla, Tierney, Citters, Fisher &
Meara, 2014). Other studies have reported ACOs seeing a reduction in spending for post-acute
care services before and after joining a Medicare Shared Savings Program, including
discharges from facilities (McWilliams, Gilstrap, Stevenson, Chernew, Huskamp & Grabowski,
2017). Most ACOs provide behavioral health services through fragmented means and disparate
financial models. This study’s results show a rich diversity in the types of specialists employed
by ACOs to deliver behavioral health services. In addition, there is inconsistent performance
seen across the types of specialists employed and ACO performance; psychiatrists and
psychologists show statistically significant results. However, ACOs using psychologists to
deliver behavioral and mental health services saw slight improvement for a decrease in inpatient
psychiatric admissions, whereas ACOs using psychiatrists saw little to no improve ment. Social
workers and NPs/PAs did not show statistically significant relationships or performance
improvement. A key variable is the ratio of dual eligible beneficiaries in a population; the results
show that increases in dual eligible beneficiaries are associated with higher admissions.
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When evaluating multiple response combinations, 17 of 44 ACOs reported that they use
psychiatrists, NP/PAs, psychologists and social workers to deliver behavioral and mental health
services to their beneficiary populations. Furthermore, drawing from hypothesis two’s
descriptive statistics results, about 50% of ACOs reported that they directly provided mental
health services (see Table10). This study’s hypothesis three results may reiterate the notion that
type and variety of behavioral health services do not play significant factors in driving ACO
outcomes improvement. There is no statistically significant difference across ACOs directly
providing mental health services, contracting with non-ACOs or no formal contracts. This
exploratory analysis into ACO contract types for behavioral and mental health services further
iterates that there isn’t a standard model of behavioral health service delivery, and localized
approaches may be most appropriate to produce optimal performance. ACOs also may not be
adequately prepared for larger populations of dual eligible beneficiaries.
Hypothesis 4
In the ACO literature, electronic health record technology is cited as being a key tool for
managing care transitions for patient populations (Wu, Rundall, Shortell & Bloom, 2016). In a
study assessing health IT and care coordination in ACOs, researchers categorized care
coordination and health IT exchange in three ascending levels of complexity: 1) information
capture for standardization, 2) information provision for unidirectional activities, and 3)
information exchange for bidirectional activities. The authors found that there was a statistically
significant association between information exchange for bidirectional activities and care
management processes, but results did not show statistically significant associations for
standardization and unidirectional activities (Shortell, Rundall & Bloom, 2017).
CMS had made recent attempts to simplify EHR rules for ACO physicians in an effort to
decrease bureaucratic burden and physician burnout from heavy administrative requirements
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(Arndt, 2018). In the ACO literature, some studies found that as ACOs grew in size, having an
integrated EHR helped moderate decline in performance (Bao & Bardan, 2017). According to
the Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) report “Using Health IT for Care Coordination: Insights
from Six Medicare Accountable Care Organizations,” findings stated that ACOs with single
EHRs across their network were able to “share data in real time, enhancing providers’ ability to
coordinate care” (Levinson, 2019, p. 3). However, the OIG report continues to note anecdotal
feedback from providers that ACOs under a single EHR also placed heavy administrative
burden on ACO providers. The workflows built into EHRs did not always capture operational
workflows, and thus workarounds are put in place to accommodate (Levinson, 2019, pp. 3-5).
In the SCT literature, as discussed in Chapter 3, technology as a contingency is discussed in
relation to uncertainty and interdependence. Technology serves as a contingency that
influences the environment in which organizations and personnel operate. Technology
influences the form in which information sharing occurs, the speed in which information is
available for decision making and the vehicle for intra/inter -organizational communication
through a shared language (Ford et al., 1977; Keller, 1994).
A crucial component cited in ACO and SCT literature regarding to technology as a
contingency is its effect on organizational interoperability (Chukmaitov et al., 2015; Samal et al.,
2016). According to the literature and the context in which this study applies SCT, technology
integration encompasses technical capabilities, operations and information sharing (Alexander
& Randolph, 1985; Luo & Donaldsen, 2013; Premkumar et al., 2005) . Based on the literature,
this research study hypothesized that as ACOs grew their capabilities and became more
integrated, performance would improve. In the context of EHRs, ACOs with a single EHR across
their network would be considered as the most integrated. Conceptually, providers would not
have to learn or keep up-to-date with multiple systems to manage their daily activities. On the
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contrary, the study’s results showed that ACOs with multiple EHRs and a mixture of electronic
and paper systems performed better than ACOs with single EHRs.
Such results may imply that ACOs provide a high level structure for disparate healthcare
providers, but that full operational and system integration continue to be opportunities for
improvement. Prior to joining an ACO, healthcare providers may have practiced under different
information systems and workflows. Significant operational changes may still be necessary to
centralize EHRs, and providers may continue to operate with the same workflows prior to joining
an ACO, regardless of the information system being used.
This hypothesis looked at the level in which ACOs standardized data definitions; the
level of standardization was interpreted as the extent to which providers communicated with a
common understanding of the information shared, so they may make effective decisions for
care coordination. Ideally, if information being shared was easily accessible and understood
among providers, care coordination would be easier when managing high need, high cost
patients and ACO performance would thus be positive. For example, providers managing
patients with multiple diagnoses and comorbid conditions may be able to reduce unplanned
readmissions related to timely access to specialty care or better contain costs of unnecessary
testing when patients enter into an emergency department for care. In Shortell, Rundall and
Bloom’s study (2017) on health IT and care coordination, standardization and unidirectional
activities were statistically significant with care management processes. Their report does not
directly support this study’s results. Conceptually, health IT standardization among ACO
organizations would provide foundational aspects for improved care coordination, which should
result in improved performance. In Lloyd’s (2018) report on Medicaid ACO’s data support
needs, the author outlines benefits to supporting data capabilities and access to Medicaid ACOs
to promote standardization of definitions, results, interpretation of results and better identify
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improvement areas in targeted populations. This is in line with the results of this study and
reiterates the importance of operationalizing standardized definitions for integrated care
coordination. This essentially reduces uncertainty among providers and establishes a common
language for action and interpretation.
Hypothesis 5
In previous contingency studies, Swofford (2015) analyzed health system access,
geography and efficiency with hospital performance. He applied Donaldson’s (2001) multiple
contingency theory and used an additive 2x2 approach for his research. In comparison,
Volberda and colleagues (2012) published a slightly different approach that extrapolated similar
concepts from Donaldson (2001) on multiple contingency analysis. The researchers analyzed
deviation across contingency-structure regression analyses and calculated the sum of the
deviations to equate to a total contingency score. In the same spirit of both Swofford (2011) and
Volberda and colleagues (2012), this study calculated Pearson residuals across the
contingency-structure pairs from the four hypotheses and calculated a composite score to
produce an average misfit score. Therefore, the further the score from zero, the greater the
misfit.
According to Donaldson (2001), the concept of multiple fit is that organizational
performance should decline as overall misfit across multiple contingencies increases. The
study’s results did not empirically support this concept and showed an inverse relationship
between the misfit score and ACO performance for total earned shared savings. However,
Donaldson (2001) expounds on organizations’ structural adaptation to fit. He further describes
there is an anticipated performance decline during the interim between an organization’s
endeavors to find their new “fit” with new contingencies (Donaldson, 20 01, pp. 210).
Extrapolating from Donaldson (2001), this study may consider ACOs in a constant state of
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“misfit” as ACO rules change annually, representing an organic environment in which ACOs
must operate and adapt (Burns & Stalker, 1961). Furthermore, annual changes by CMS evinces
a constant state of uncertainty for ACOs at a macroeconomic level. ACO literature has noted
that successful ACOs have demonstrated a penchant for care delivery innovation and
continuously seeking greater performance improvement opportunities (Curtis, 2015; McHugh et
al., 2018; Pierce-Wrobel & Micklos, 2018).
As CMS continues to gather feedback on drivers to ACO success, there is evidence of
CMS simplifying rules and allowing for greater flexibility in ACO local operations so as to
decrease bureaucracy. Potentially, a longer time period is needed to be evaluated; instead of a
single three-year agreement period for Track 1 ACOs, it would be beneficial to include all tracks
across two agreement periods and compare among different types of ACOs, such as
commercial ACOs, evaluating the effect of misfit on ACO performance. This study’s results
further reiterate the fact that this study is exploratory, with limited data and opportunities for
refinement of the NSACO survey instrument for better data capture and ACO participation.
Managerial Implications
This study’s results include wide variation across ACOs. The implications for managers
from hypotheses one and two are that a standardized best practice for formalizing partnerships
or contractual agreements across healthcare services along the care continuum does not
initially exhibit performance improvement. Formal or non-formal relationships were not
statistically significant in driving ACO performance improvement to the extent of earning sh ared
savings. This may imply that networks across the care continuum rely more on independence
and flexibility than formalized networks.
In relation to behavioral health services, managerial implications from hypothesis three
are that the size of ACO beneficiary panels are important, and a deeper analysis of behavioral
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health specialist to dual eligible beneficiary size ratio is needed. Instead of focusing on contracts
and agreements, managers may focus more on official and unofficial access to services by the
size and density of behavioral health needs patients. Furthermore, the results show that
performance is not better with greater access and increased variety of clinician types delivering
behavioral health. Instead, adequate access to the dual eligible population could potentially be
beneficial.
In hypothesis four, results suggest that ACOs that fully standardize data elements
across member organizations are associated with higher shared savings in comparison to
ACOs that standardize some but not all data elements. However, the number of EHRs utilized
within an ACO showed an inverse relationship with performance. The more centralized ACOs
are with their EHRs, such as operating under a single EHR, the less shared savings the ACO
earned. Managerial implications for EHR centralization are to further evaluate and carefully
assess organizational readiness for changes across the ACO. Findings suggest that fully
integrating EHR workflows with post-acute care providers is not clearly indicative with positive
ACO performance. Managers may consider integration in the context of interoperability between
information systems and organizational workflows. Heavy capital investment and intensive
change management would be necessary for successful implementation of a single EHR within
an ACO across all member organizations.
Theoretically, the more uncertain the environment, the greater the interdependence
between groups, the less formal a structure should be to be in fit. Too much formalization
makes an organization too rigid to react and adapt in a mercurial environment. However, the
ACO should provide some virtual construct that helps reduce the uncertainty between
interdependent provider groups along the care continuum.
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One of the major benefits of an ACO has been that the ACO can access capital funding
for infrastructure development that smaller independent practices or provider groups would not
have been able to invest and maintain, such as an EHR. The results indicate it may be more
important to be operating under a standard set of definitions than operating in a single EHR.
Practically speaking, an organization’s priorities may need to first document standard operating
procedures to reduce uncertainty or variability among different provider groups.
Lastly, hypothesis five results indicate that ACOs may operate in a constant state of
misfit, and this could be optimal for the dynamic healthcare environment instituted by CMS and
the continued uncertainty surrounding the Affordable Care Act. This may indicate that
organizations situated and structured to respond to the constant uncertainty and regulatory
changes in the healthcare landscape are positioned to perform better. Therefore, managers
may consider how to structure their ACO programs in a way that allows for innovation in health
technologies and care coordination across multiple transition points along the patient journey.
Another point to consider when developing or building out ACO provider networks is
concentration or provider access dependent on high risk populations, such as dual eligible
assigned beneficiaries. The use of advanced technologies or innovative means to access care
is especially important for the dual eligible population and may require different strategies. Thus,
contingency-structure pairs within an ACO may need to be categorized according to different
levels of patient complexity and risk. Managers could target locations where high need, high
cost beneficiaries with higher HCC risk scores reside and align health services access by
greatest density of need (Colla, Lewis, Kao, et al., 2016; D’Aunno et al., 2018; Fryer et al., 2016;
Jean-Baptiste et al., 2017).
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Policy Implications
This study represents preliminary findings and analyses for ACOs under the framework
of contingency theory. Tentative policy implications can be initiated based on this exploratory
research. Although the analyses presented diverse and varied outcomes due to the small
sample size, the results are supported by other ACO research stating similar inconclusive or
diverse results for most of the hypotheses analyzed. Based on the findings from this exploratory
research, operational and regulatory flexibility may allow ACOs to service according to their
assigned beneficiary populations and local communities. In addition, ACOs should continue to
be incentivized to take risks and innovate population health solutions. This may require
additional grants or payment schemes to be considered like previously executed advanced
payment plans or grants for health IT investment incentives.
ACOs are well-positioned to address access to preventive care services, complex
patient needs, chronic illness management and transitional care services in their community
(Peck et al., 2018; Schoen et al., 2009). Although ACOs possess a wide spectrum of
infrastructure, their baseline infrastructure includes an electronic health record or medical
information sharing mechanism across its care continuum for beneficiaries. There are
opportunities for future private-public partnerships to enhance public safety during global
pandemics, such as COVID-19, and apply population-based screening, establish extensive
contact tracing programs and leverage innovative digital solutions, like telemedicine or remote
patient monitoring (Bleser et al., 2020). Important policy implications for such partnerships is
reimbursement and payment schemas by the government. This is a rapidly growing area of
interest in the domain of telemedicine and its versatility when social distancing policies and
executive stay-at-home orders are in place during pandemics. Recent changes to the ACO
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program by CMS include greater regulatory flexibility and expanded benefit for the use of
telehealth (Verma, 2018).
As mentioned earlier, ACOs have a complementary care model that may ideally address
high need, high cost patients because of their complex care needs. Future regulatory
reimbursement schemas may incentivize ACOs that service high risk sub-segments within their
beneficiary populations. Other reimbursement models for consideration may be through grants
or flexible reimbursement of telehealth services, especially for ACOs operating in rural areas or
densely populated high-risk geographical regions.
Comments on Contingency Theory
This study’s methods utilized Donaldson’s (2001) and Volberda and colleagues’ (2012)
approach to multiple contingency fit. Specifically, Donaldson (2001) and Volberda and
colleagues (2012) describe organizational misfit as the measured distance from the fit line.
Donaldson (2001) further expounds misfit as the residual from the regression line. In evaluating
contingency and structure, Donaldson (2001) evaluates Drazin and Van de Ven’s (1985)
argument regarding overall effect of multiple fits. He posits that Drazin and Van de Ven (1985)
utilize the Euclidian distance formula to analyze systems fit for multiple contingency pairs. The
Euclidian distance formula is, in essence, an additive model. This study applies the same
concept of misfit as being the residuals calculated between contingency and structure pairs from
the fit line in a regression analysis. Furthermore, for hypothesis five, each contingency-structure
pair’s residual scores were aggregated, and a composite score was made to represent overall
misfit for each ACO.
This study utilized a multiple contingency approach to hypothesis five to analyze
organizational misfit. However, in reviewing ACO structure and contingency, it becomes
apparent that multiple structures exist within the ACO, along with multiple contingencies. This
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especially true in the inherent construct of the ACO. ACOs are composed of disparate
healthcare providers along the care continuum, with many possibilities that each provider are
entering the ACO with existing operations or technologies. Thus, the extent in which providers
operate or are structured deviate from the ACO’s structure or operations, may be another more
appropriate way of analyzing ACO misfit. This approach may consist of multiple fits among
contingency-structures within an organization. This approach would be applicable to any type of
matrixed or large organization. Additionally, a multiple fits approach may be appropriate for
intra-organizational analysis. At a macro-level, Structural Contingency Theory, alone, may not
be appropriate to incorporate environmental variables into its analyses. Potentially, a synthesis
of SCT and another macro-level theory may be more appropriate.
Donaldson (2001) also discusses confounding factors and constituents of fit, mostly in
an organization’s prior years’ performance. Drawing from past SCT literature, Donaldson (2001 )
points out that correlations exist between performance and contingencies that may result in
erroneous associations when calculating misfit. A way to counter this confounding factor is to
include a lagging dependent variable. This study adapted this appro ach to ACOs by summing
the last two years of total earned shared savings and excluding the first year’s performance to
account for changes that organizations may have made to accommodate to first year
participation. One difference related to ACO performance and prior year performance is that
CMS bases benchmark and minimal savings rates on three years of an ACO’s retrospective
performance data, so relative improvement would be considered for each ACO’s local
environment.
Contingency-structure pairs were identified by extrapolating upon Chandler’s (1962)
descriptions on strategy and structure, Burton and Obel’s (1998) descriptions on differentiation,
centralization and vertical integration, and Donaldson’s (2001) analysis of technology,
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interdependencies, and coordination. Due to the small sample size, slight correlation among
independent variables, and in an effort to minimize the degrees of freedom used in the statistical
models to improve goodness of fit, multiple response variables were converted into
dichotomous variables and analyzed individually instead of as multiple response groups. This
approach highlights the exploratory nature of the research as well as the opportunity for more
refined analysis with a larger sample size.
Study Limitations
There are limitations to design and methods in this study, especially as it is a preliminary
and exploratory study on ACO contingency-structure pairs. Potential limitations previously listed
in the methods chapter are: 1) non-experimental design, 2) changing survey instrument and
thus data capture by CMS and the NSACO, 3) small sample size, and 4) regional or market
changes not captured by the survey instruments.
This study is a non-experimental design and thus susceptible to selection bias, and it is
not meant for cause-and-effect research. The study utilizes a secondary dataset, and the
researcher is unable to manipulate any of the predictor variables. Study part icipants include
those who have successfully submitted data to CMS and participated in the NSACO
consistently. NSACO participants may be susceptible to self -selection bias and represent only
those ACOs with greater data capture or health information capabilities. NSACO submission
options allow for ACOs to choose either a paper or electronic version of the survey, which
contain slightly different questions or response options for some multiple -choice questions. Due
to the variation, this reduced the viable sample size even further. Benchmark data or baseline
data is incorporated into the ACO reporting methodology by CMS, but there is no benchmark or
baseline data from the NSACO. Ideally, this would be a mixed-methods research design where
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interviews were conducted with ACO leadership to have greater contextual data on ACO
organizational structure.
The second study limitation for this research is data collection methodology. Survey
participants included ACO leadership who may have changed throughout the study period,
which may have affected ACO strategies or perspectives during the agreement period the
NSACO was conducted. Several different people or teams may have been responsible for filling
out the survey, and this may have resulted in different approaches or interpretations of the
survey questions. However, the Dartmouth Institute mitigated this limitation by have robust
review of all data submitted and comparing submissions with prior year submissions to assure
for continuity.
The third study limitation is the small sample size for this research due to the number of
ACOs participating in both the NSACO and submitting complete data to CMS SSP. The sample
size is small (N = 45), and thus the study is expected to contain wide confidence intervals and
large standard errors, indicating less precision in the model estimates. However, the sample
nevertheless provides an opportunity to better explore directional implications of the
relationships between structure and contingency for ACO performance. For future data capture,
consistent survey submission options across ACOs would be beneficial. For future research,
evaluating among Medicaid, Medicare and Commercial ACOs would be an opportunity for
greater program performance analysis.
Last, the fourth study limitation for this research is market or regional changes that may
impact ACO fit that is not adequately captured through the ACO SSP PUF or the NSACO.
Although the ACO beneficiary state of residence is controlled, there is still the potential that
regional changes to an ACO’s environment may influence the ACO’s approach or participation.

153

CMS requirements and rules for quality and financial performance have changed on an annual
basis. In an effort to account for natural disasters, promote “regulatory flexibility and free market
principles,” CMS publishes final rules late into the year for the upcoming performance year
(2017). Although changes to policies allow for ACOs to advocate for more appropriate
submission requirements, changes simultaneously increase marketplace volatility that may not
be accurately captured in the dataset.
Suggestions for Future Research
As indicated previously throughout this paper, there are suggestions for future research
associated with the study’s limitations and gaps in the literature. First, opportunities exist to
expand the scope of the study from Track 1 MSSP ACOs to all program types and
subcategorize by Medicare, Medicaid and Commercial ACOs. This would require merging
across several datasets and addressing different risk models being employed. However, this
would be a beneficial analysis to see if significant performance differences related to
contingency-structure pairs that may exist among different payers.
Second, research opportunities exist to further explore vertical integr ation of behavioral
and mental health services in the context of dual eligible populations with high density. This is
an area of high need, high cost patient research that requires greater evaluation in the ACO
literature. This study provides preliminary analysis evaluating the different combination of
behavioral health providers available through ACOs and the statistical significance of dual
eligible populations on an ACO’s ability to adequately provide services in a way that prevents
admissions to an inpatient psychiatric facility.
Third, building on this study’s preliminary analysis on ACO agreement types, healthcare
administrators would especially benefit from further research about health services access,
regardless of contractual agreements within the ACO network. A potential avenue for further
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investigation is health services access by population density based on risk scores of
Hierarchical Condition Category of ACO beneficiaries. Because ACO beneficiaries are not
required to access services within a network, contractual agreements and referrals may not be
as significant to timely services and preventative care.
Fourth, there is opportunity to further explore ACO organizational readiness and health
IT integration. Greater analyses would be beneficial to administrators to understand levels of
standardization and integration needed for different types of providers, especially in the post acute setting. In addition to standardization, it would be valuable to understand if there is any
association with formalized relationships and standardization required for health IT integration
across different ACO members or providers.
, as indicated by the findings throughout this study, ACO variability in performance,
structure and even contingency exist. Further exploration of ACO programs and patient
populations according to the local communities in which they subsist may provide greater insight
into ACO performance. As ACO data capture progress in sophistication and volume of data
available, geographical and regional trends may assist in better understanding ACO
development and patient population trends.
Finally, there is opportunity for more application of multiple contingen cy approaches to
be used for ACO research. ACOs are prime for evaluating multiple contingencies because their
scope expands across several care settings and environments. The platform in which ACOs
operate also indicate internally, ACOs operate within several structures and that could be paired
to multiple contingencies analyses. ACOs also operate in a uniquely multi-level environment
that could be further explored under the lens of Structural Contingency Theory, specifically,
vertical and horizontal integration.
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Conclusion
Accountable care organization research has been diverse with opportunities for more
granularity on organizational structures, contingency and performance. This exploratory study
serves to reiterate ACO diversity and performance variation. Conceptually, multiple contingency
fits have not been applied on ACO structure research, and this study attempts to apply
Donaldson’s (2001) approach to multiple fit on ACO contingency-structure pairs. Although this
study contains several limitations, most especially with its small sample size, results are
indicative of how ACO performance is reliant on flexibility and innovation at the local level.
In the regression analysis results, this study exhibited statistically significant
relationships between contingency-structure pairs and performance for strategic planning at the
ACO level, retaining financial rewards with the ACO, rewards distribution across members and
full data elements standardization. However, a co-led leadership structure, formal agreements
or direct provision of health services, diverse access to behavioral health provider types and
single EHR systems across the ACO did not indicate statistically significant relationships or
showed inverse relationships to performance. Overall, administrators may find it useful to
consider different means for health services access that does not need to be based on formal
agreements or contracts. Additionally, health IT integration may require intensive change
management or organizational readiness assessments before implementing a single EHR
throughout the ACO’s member organizations.
Methodologically, this study applied Donaldson’s (2001) multiple contingency fit
approach and extrapolated from Burton and Obel’s (1998) organizational design descripti ons
related to structural contingency. Considering the quantitative results from this study’s analyses,
SCT is an exceptionally adequate theoretical framework applicable to ACO research. The high
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variability of ACO performance indicates more localized solutions, increased flexibility and
simpler rules would potentially support further ACO innovation and improvement.
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Appendix 1

Table 22
Three Year Trend – Readmission Rates
Readmission Ratea
2015

Readmission Ratea
2016

Readmission Ratea
2017

N

45

45

45

Mean

162.02

161.20

169.42

Median

162.00

161.00

172.00

Std. Deviation

21.504

23.858

19.355

Std. Error of Mean

3.206

3.557

2.885

a. Readmission Rates per 1,000 discharges for ACO assigned beneficiaries within a performance year

Table 23
Three Year Trend – Inpatient Psychiatric Admission Rates
IP Psych Admission
Ratea 2015

IP Psych Admission
Ratea 2016

IP Psych Admission
Ratea 2017

N

44

44

44

Mean

9.91

9.11

8.18

Median

9.50

9.00

7.50

Std. Deviation

5.750

4.886

4.775

Std. Error of Mean

.867

.737

.720

a: Inpatient psych facility discharges per 1,000 person years in ACO performance year
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Figure 17
Histogram –Total Earned Shared Savings

Figure 18
Q-Q Plot – Total Earned Shared Savings

Figure 19
Histogram – Relative Change in Readmissions
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Figure 20
Q-Q Plot – Relative Change in Readmissions

Figure 21
Histogram – Relative Change in Inpatient Psychiatric Admissions

Figure 22
Q-Q Plot – Relative Change in Inpatient Psychiatric Admissions
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Appendix 2

Table 24
Collinearity Statistics
Independent Variable

VIF

Leadership

1.208

Strategic Planning

1.134

Retained

1.287

Allocated

1.202

Paid to Physicians

1.264

Productivity

1.901

Base Salary

1.890

Clinical Quality

1.483

Patient Satisfaction

1.664

Cost Reduction

1.717

Routine

1.904

IP Rehab

2.230

Mental Health

3.016

Addiction

2.800

SNF

1.554

Palliative

3.370

Home Health

2.734

Hospital Diversion

1.859

Psychiatrist

2.110

NP_PA

1.508

Psychologist

2.002

Social Worker

1.639

Mix EHRs

1.112

Multiple EHRs

0.000a

Single EHR

2.228

Not Std Data

1.340

Some Std Data

0.000a

Most Std Data

1.455

Fully Std Data

2.454

a: excluded variables in regression
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Table 25
Correlation Matrix: Independent Variables
Leadership
Leadership
Strategic Planning
Retained
Allocated
Paid to
Physicians
Productivity
Base Salary
Clinical Quality
Patient
Satisfaction
Cost Reduction
Routine
IP Rehab
Mental Health
Addiction
SNF
Palliative
Home Health
Hospital Diversion
Psychiatrist
NP_PA
Psychologist
Social Worker
EHRs
Data
Mix EHRs
Multiple EHRs
Single EHR
Not Std Data
Some Std Data
Most Std Data
Fully Std Data
ACO Size

Strategic
Planning

Retained

Allocated

Paid to
Physicians

Productivity

Base
Salary

1
-0.227
-0.089
0.180

1
-0.049
-0.091

1
0.069

1

-0.008

0.086

0.193

0.143

1

-0.049
-0.119
-0.143

0.086
0.187
0.119

-0.014
-0.142
-0.026

0.036
0.024
0.267

-0.071
0.078
0.200

1
.619**
0.200

1
0.090

0.105

0.129

0.010

0.273

.329*

0.143

0.071

0.192
0.159
0.165
0.034
0.041
0.067
0.180
0.124
0.008
-0.086
0.111
-0.106
0.022
0.150
-0.140
-0.200
0.217
0.012
0.041
0.173
-0.217
-0.022
0.135

-0.055
-0.073
-0.015
0.000
-0.197
-0.069
-0.046
0.127
-0.166
0.070
0.036
0.035
0.178
0.246
0.074
-0.170
0.024
0.207
0.051
-0.168
0.120
0.060
-0.008

-0.274
0.082
0.036
-0.098
-0.285
0.112
0.007
-0.070
-0.068
0.160
-0.194
0.079
-0.135
-0.140
0.282
0.129
-0.073
-0.081
-0.233
-0.037
0.073
0.201
-0.136

0.218
0.096
0.084
-0.018
0.059
-0.104
0.038
0.024
0.000
-0.010
0.068
-0.084
0.127
-0.237
-0.044
0.109
0.076
-0.262
-0.134
0.265
0.038
-0.151
-0.262

0.127
0.015
0.059
0.027
-0.198
-0.249
-0.153
-0.132
-0.101
-0.017
-0.175
-0.141
-0.162
0.007
0.178
-0.148
0.283
-0.157
-.312*
0.094
0.189
-0.094
-0.172

-0.236
-.391**
-0.277
-.373*
-0.184
0.010
-.296*
-0.269
-0.226
0.223
-0.111
0.271
0.083
0.166
0.062
-0.148
0.000
0.105
0.134
-0.283
0.189
0.047
0.197

-0.239
-.355*
-.519**
-.426**
-0.256
-0.269
-.427**
-.355*
-0.102
.316*
0.111
.332*
0.280
.396**
0.004
-.397**
0.127
0.194
0.247
-.318*
0.064
0.127
0.130

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 25
Correlation Matrix: Independent Variables Continued
Clinical
Quality

Patient
Satisfaction

Cost
Reduction

Routine

Clinical Quality

1

Patient
Satisfaction

.441**

1

Cost Reduction

.295*

.417**

1

Routine

-0.169

0.021

0.230

1

IP Rehab

-0.282

0.003

0.248

.565**

Mental Health

0.120

0.213

Addiction

0.136

-0.084

*

IP Rehab

Mental
Health

Addiction

1

.366

**

.414

.392**

1

0.159

0.245

0.093

.654**

1

**

SNF

-0.142

-0.079

-0.084

0.219

.424

0.179

0.138

Palliative

-0.167

-0.027

0.175

.499**

.372*

.605**

.522**

.523**

.500**

0.294

Home Health
Hospital
Diversion

-0.275

-0.244

0.122

.475**

-0.188

-0.149

0.137

.382**

0.161

.505**

.545**

Psychiatrist

-0.078

-0.111

-.342*

-0.078

-.320*

-.573**

-.387*

NP_PA

-0.127

0.191

0.013

-0.003

-0.119

-0.095

0.108

-0.243

-.432**

-.558**

-.332*

Psychologist

-0.146

-0.111

-.408**

Social Worker

0.060

-0.078

-0.004

-0.211

-0.284

-.372*

-0.176

EHRs

-0.241

-0.143

-0.015

-0.262

-0.183

-.510**

-.540**

Data

-0.132

0.075

-0.176

-0.050

0.144

-.328*

-.393**

Mix EHRs

0.087

0.103

-0.024

0.164

.299*

.391**

0.266

Multiple EHRs

0.118

0.066

0.096

0.080

-0.222

0.020

0.127

Single EHR

-.294*

-0.118

-0.053

-0.243

0.037

-.383*

-.563**

Not Std Data

-0.028

-0.209

-0.068

-0.113

-0.293

0.144

0.213

0.159

0.266

0.159

0.071

-0.032

-0.133

-0.096

0.057

Some Std Data

0.118

0.230

.385**

Most Std Data

0.236

0.033

-0.192

Fully Std Data

*

-.354

-0.033

-0.144

-0.135

0.111

-.323

-.483**

ACO Size

-0.143

-0.108

-.350*

-.525**

-0.239

-0.196

0.013

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 25
Correlation Matrix: Independent Variables Continued
SNF

Palliative

Home
Health

SNF

1

Palliative

.438**

1

Home Health

.350*

.709**

1

Hospital
Diversion

0.185

.480**

.440**

*

**

*

Hospital
Diversion

Psychiatrist

NP_PA

Psychologist

Social
Worker

1

Psychiatrist

-.299

-.462

-.341

-0.145

1

NP_PA

-0.230

-0.094

-0.245

0.039

.377*

1

Psychologist

-0.264

-.434**

-.391**

-0.110

.686**

0.273

1

-0.115

-0.216

.479**

.512**

.457**

1

Social Worker

-0.222

-0.193

EHRs

-0.278

-.303*

-0.187

-.370*

0.179

-0.058

0.166

0.102

Data

-0.123

-0.163

-0.116

-0.192

.301*

-0.006

0.248

0.081

Mix EHRs

0.253

0.203

0.182

0.230

-0.087

0.090

-0.021

0.011

Multiple EHRs

-0.110

0.051

-0.016

0.044

-0.072

-0.080

-0.164

-0.141

0.196

0.006

0.247

0.179

Single EHR

-0.167

-0.266

-0.099

-.345*

Not Std Data

-0.052

0.048

0.160

0.084

-0.036

0.008

-0.079

0.055

Some Std Data

0.274

0.101

-0.081

0.133

-0.279

0.113

-0.177

-0.119

Most Std Data

-0.220

-0.051

-0.081

-0.133

0.171

-0.126

0.164

0.041

Fully Std Data

-0.055

-0.177

-0.016

-0.133

.298*

0.106

0.199

0.137

-0.127

-.319*

-0.146

0.236

0.182

0.208

0.005

Data

Mix
EHRs

Multiple
EHRs

ACO Size

-0.029

EHRs
EHRs

1

Data

.336*

1

Mix EHRs

-.800**

0.006

Multiple EHRs

**

Single
EHR

Not Std
Data

Some
Std Data

Most Std
Data

Fully Std
Data

1

0.118

-.440

-.658**

1

**

**

.739

.556

-0.182

-.555**

1

Not Std Data

-0.059

-.742**

-0.087

0.236

-0.196

1

Some Std Data

-0.283

-0.281

0.164

0.100

-0.277

-.354*

1

Most Std Data

0.055

.491**

-0.082

0.000

0.000

-.354*

-.500**

1

Fully Std Data

.411**

.629**

0.021

-.500**

.693**

-0.177

-0.250

-0.250

1

0.143

-.303*

0.130

0.173

Single EHR

ACO Size

0.219

0.113

-0.093

-0.087

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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0.253

Table 26
Correlation Matrix: Dependent Variables
∆ Readmissionsb

∆ Inpatient Psychiatric
Admissionsc

Pearson
Correlation

-.025

-.144

Sig. (2-tailed)

.869

.345

Total Earned
Shared Savingsa

Total Earned Shared
Savings a

∆ Readmissions b

∆ Inpatient
Psychiatric
Admissions c

Pearson
Correlation

-.025

-.138

Sig. (2-tailed)

.869

.368

Pearson
Correlation

-.144

-.138

Sig. (2-tailed)

.345

.368

a. Calculated as the sum of ACO earned shared savings 2016 – 2017
b. Calculated as the relative change in readmission rates per 1,000 discharges for all causes from 2015 start year and 2017
c. Calculated as the relative change in rate of discharges from an inpatient psychiatric facility per 1,000 discharges from 2015 start
year and 2017
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